The link between organizational errors and adverse consequences: The role of error-correcting and error-amplifying feedback processes

Errors in Organizations

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 245-272

  Ramanujam, Rangaraj ^a   Goodman, Paul S ^b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864377706     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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