Quasi-property: Like, but not quite property

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

Volumn 160, Issue 7, 2012, Pages 1889-1925

  Balganesh, Shyamkrishna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864036234     PISSN: 00419907     EISSN: 19428537     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (163)

1. See generally PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 20-32 (2d ed. 2005).
2. See Peter Birks, Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13, in THE CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 6 (Peter Birks ed., 1997).
3. For work on the category of quasi-contract, see generally WILLIAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1893) (five volumes);
4. Arthur Linton Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L. J. 533 (1912);
5. William A. Keener, Quasi-Contract, Its Nature and Scope, 7 HARV. L. REV. 57 (1893);
6. Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Contract Distinguished from Quasi Contract, 2 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1914);
7. and Max Radin, The Roman Law of Quasi-Contract, 23 VA. L. REV. 241 (1937).
8. Scholarship on the idea of quasi-delict, which is much rarer, includes Nathan Isaacs, Quasi-Delict in Anglo-American Law, 31 YALE L. J. 571 (1922)
9. and Olivia Robinson, Justinian's Institutional Classification and the Class of Quasi-Delict, 19 J. LEGAL HIST. 245 (1998).
10. 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
11. See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2002) (attributing the term "quasi-property" to International News Service);
12. 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAWOF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 15.02 (4th ed. 1986) ("The landmark case in this field, the INS case⋯ is one of the most important cases, if not the most important, in the law of unfair competition. ").
13. See Int'l News Serv., 248 U. S. at 238.
14. See, e.g., Newman, 287 F.3d at 797 & n. 13 (describing quasi-property as "a term with little meaningful legal significance").
15. See, e.g., J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) (contending that "use serves a justificatory role for the [property] right, while exclusion is⋯ the formal essence of the right");
16. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 596-600 (2008) (noting the centrality of the right to exclude but explaining that the "right and remedy" have been unlinked, with consequences for "intellectual property and property more generally");
17. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (arguing that the right to exclude is not simply an essential aspect of property; rather, "it is the sine qua non").
18. See Int'l News Serv., 248 U. S. at 236 ("[W]e may and do assume that neither party has any remaining property interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first publication⋯. ").
19. For a fuller treatment of this idea, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 88-93 (1998).
20. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 789-90 (2001). Indeed, the exclusionary principle can be traced as far back as Kant's concept of property. (Pubitemid 33652111)
21. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 90 (2009).
22. For an early identification of this phenomenon, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69, 69-73 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., Nomos XXII, 1980);
23. see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L. J. 357, 359-60, 366-75 (2001).
24. 248 U. S. 215.
25. See, e.g., Hunter v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 318, 324 (1857) (construing a statutory lien as giving the furnishers of building materials "a quasi property in those materials, and others with which it has been commingled in the building");
26. Gove v. Cather, 23 Ill. 634 (1860).
27. See, e.g., Horner v. Pleasants, 7 A. 691, 692 (Md. 1887);
28. Balt. & Ohio R. R. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23, 35-36 (1875);
29. Casey's Lessee v. Inloes, 1 Gill 430, 501 (Md. 1844).
30. See, e.g., Woodruff v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 605, 626 (1871) ("They had⋯ an interest in the cotton itself, the jus in re, which is quasi property; and the United States held the cotton charged with that obligation of specific performance to which it was subject when seized."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
31. The Elgee Cotton Cases, 89 U. S. 180 (1874).
32. For earlier works on the property law related to burial remains, see generally Tanya K. Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 971-72 (1999)
33. and P. D. G. Skegg, Human Corpses, Medical Specimens, and the Law of Property, 4 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 412, 412 (1975).
34. See also Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R. I. 227, 235-44 (1872).
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 407-08 (9th ed. 2009).
36. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 203 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817).
37. See, e.g., Renihan v. Wright, 25 N. E. 822, 823-25 (Ind. 1890) (arguing that because of the "ecclesiastical element" inherent in England's jurisprudence but "not found in our[s]", England's law should not "exert any controlling influence");
38. Pierce, 10 R. I. at 237 (noting that while "[t]he question is new in this state⋯ there is no right of property in a dead body").
39. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) ("[T]he courts have talked of a somewhat dubious 'property right' to the body, usually in the next of kin, which⋯ cannot be conveyed, can be used only for the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but is a source of liability for funeral expenses." (footnotes omitted));
40. For example, under Arkansas law, "the next of kin [has] a quasi-property right in a dead body." Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984). For examples of state court cases identifying a quasi-property interest
41. see Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964);
42. O'Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899);
43. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S. E. 24, 27 (Ga. 1905);
44. Burney v. Children's Hosp. in Bos., 47 N. E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897);
45. Brown v. Maplewood Cemetery Ass'n, 89 N. W. 872, 879 (Minn. 1902);
46. In re Donn, 14 N. Y. S. 189, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1891);
47. Long v. Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 86 P. 289, 290-91 (Okla. 1905);
48. Hackett v. Hackett, 26 A. 42, 43-44 (R. I. 1893);
49. Pierce, 10. R. I. at 238;
50. and Griffith v. Charlotte, Columbia & August R. R., 23 S. C. 25, 41 (1885).
51. Pierce, 10 R. I. at 237-38;
52. accord Donn, 14 N. Y. S. at 191 ("It is the almost universal practice among civilized people to scrupulously conform to the wishes and requests of friends and relatives as to the disposition to be made of their bodies.").
53. Hackett, 26 A. at 43.
54. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 30, § 12, at 63.
55. See, e.g., Donn, 14 N. Y. S. at 191;
56. Long, 86 P. at 292 ("[E]quity will always aid one in the enjoyment of a legal right, even though no property interests are involved.").
57. See, e.g., Galvin v. McGilley Mem'l Chapels, 746 S. W.2d 588, 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("The gist of the cause of action, as presently evolved, is the emotional distress and anguish to the nearest kin from mistreatment of the body.").
58. See, e.g., Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 801 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Dilution law, unlike traditional trademark infringement law⋯ is not based on a likelihood of confusion standard, but only exists to protect the quasi-property rights a [trademark] holder has in maintaining the integrity and distinctiveness of his mark."
59. (quoting Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 628 (6th Cir. 2003)));
60. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 613 n. 7 (E. D. Va. 1997) ("A federal dilution claim⋯ shifts the focus away from consumer protection and towards the protection of an owner's quasi-property right in a famous mark, itself.").
61. 15 U. S. C. § 1127 (2000) (defining "dilution"), amended by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2
62. 120 Stat. 1730, 1730-33
63. (striking definition of "dilution" from 15 U. S. C. § 1127 and fleshing out dilution law in § 1125).
64. See Kellogg, 337 F.3d at 628 (laying out the five-part test for trademark dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act);
65. see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:70 (4th ed. 2009) ("Dilution⋯ might occur where the effect of the defendant's unauthorized use is to dilute by tarnishing or degrading positive associations of the mark and thus, to harm the reputation of the mark.").
66. See Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1835 (2000) ("[T]rademark law is instead viewed as⋯ developing from the notion of unfair competition⋯ [which] in turn evolved from the commercial tort of fraud and deceit. Hence,⋯ courts⋯ use elements of both the tort of deceit and trespass,⋯ which results in quasi-property protections." (footnotes omitted)).
67. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 673 (1999) ("The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.");
68. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing "the right to exclude others" as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property");
69. For the leading account unbundling the idea of the right in rem, see Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 322 (1920).
70. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 162 N. E. 99, 99 (N. Y. 1928)
71. (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 455 (11th ed. 1920)).
72. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 235-36 (1918).
73. For the series of articles, see Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460 (1934) [hereinafter Green, Relational Interests (pt. 1)];
74. Leon Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935) [hereinafter Green, Relational Interests (pt. 2)];
75. Leon Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936).
76. See, e.g., Green, Relational Interests (pt. 1), supra note 51, at 461 ("This inadequacy of classification has proved extremely costly to legal science⋯.").
77. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 239-40 (1918) (explaining that the test for misappropriation examines "the rights of complainant and defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves", rather than "the rights of the complainant as against the public", since the purchaser of a newspaper has different rights in relation to the seller and the news than does the competitor who would "transmit that news for commercial use⋯ in order to divert a material portion of the profit from those who have earned it");
78. see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "Hot News": The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 438-40 (2011) (elaborating on the relational requirement in the misappropriation doctrine).
79. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U. S. 642, 653-54 (1997) (adopting the misappropriation theory for insider trading). Misappropriation theory and insider trading are closely related.
80. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative" Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1266-68 (2001); (Pubitemid 33656661)
81. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Privatizing "Outsider Trading", 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 696 (2001).
82. See O'Hagan, 521 U. S. at 656 ("[T]he fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to the principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities.");
83. see also Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1504-06 (1999) ("[T]he misappropriating trader deceives those who entrusted her with confidential information. " (footnote omitted)).
84. Cf. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-72 (1983) (discussing possible reasons for allocating property rights in corporate information to "insiders" rather than shareholders).
85. See O'Hagan, 521 U. S. at 656.
86. Boorman v. Nev. Mem'l Cremation Soc'y, Inc., 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010).
87. Riley v. St. Louis County, 153 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1998);
88. accord Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 880 (Colo. 1994) ("Clearly, there can be no property right in a dead body in a commercial sense, since a dead body cannot be bartered or sold. Some courts have recognized a quasi-property right in dead bodies for the limited purpose of seeing that the body is decently interred or disposed of.").
89. See, e.g., Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 882 & n. 6;
90. Boorman, 236 P.3d at 9;
91. see also Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S. E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that because Mrs. Bauer "has no pecuniary interest in her husband's corpse,⋯ accordingly, Mr. Bauer's corneal tissue is not subject to valuation" with respect to her conversion claim).
92. See, e.g., Riley, 153 F.3d at 631 (denying a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment invasion of privacy claim because the protection is for highly personal matters only).
93. See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100, 102 (1917) (noting how the focus was on behavior and not the asset itself);
94. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Role of Unfair Competition in the Common Law (describing the nature of the focus in greater detail), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012);
95. Ramon A. Klitzke, Trade Secrets: Important Quasi-Property Rights, 41 BUS. LAW. 555, 557 (1986) ("It is clear that [trade secret protection's] home port is fairness and honesty between business competitors.").
96. See, e.g., Hunter v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 318, 323-24 (1857) (finding a supplier of building materials to have a lien over his contribution to the building);
97. V. S. Cook Lumber Co. v. Harris, 71 P.2d 446, 450-51 (Okla. 1937) (treating the interest of a shareholder who has borrowed on his stock as quasi-property, subject to the superior claim of the corporation);
98. Att'y Gen. v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 578-80 (1874) (upholding, against a Contracts Clause challenge, the right of the state to set the maximum tolls that the defendant railroad companies could charge passengers or freight shippers, since "[a]s far as the franchise [to toll] is considered property, it was subject to this limitation", reserved by the state, that the franchise could be altered);
99. MARIE C. MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 188-89 (1985) (describing a museum's interest as a gratuitous bailee or trustee in terms akin to quasiproperty).
100. See Harmon D. Maxson, Comment, Property-Damages for Timber Trespass, 1 WM. & MARY L. REV. 434, 436 n. 7 (1958)
101. (noting that, with regard to the property principles presented in Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U. S. 432(1882), "it is recognized even in courts of law that an equitable and quasi-property right is acquired by one who in good faith adds value to the property by his labor, although the property⋯ may be that of another").
102. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 945-46 (2010) (describing torts as "relational, injury-inclusive wrongs");
103. see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972);
104. Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L. J. 1335, 1347-52 (1986);
105. and Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 973 (2004).
106. This idea owes its origins to Jim Harris. See J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 64-66 (1996) ("Ownership acts as an irreducible organizing idea in the daily, noncontested functioning of a property institution. No inferential move from the content of all these rules can give us a list of the privileges and powers which ownership entails.").
107. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S467-78 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance] (casting exclusion and governance as rules of access and of use, applied according to their respective costs and benefits);
108. see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L. J. 1742, 1749 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Intellectual Property as Property] (applying this distinction to explain the difference between patent and copyright law).
109. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 74, at S467-71.
110. Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2, 2011, at 1, 14.
111. see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543 (2010).
112. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967) ("A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.");
113. see also Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J. L. & ECON. 163, 165 (1975) ("Establishing and protecting property rights is very much a productive activity toward which resources can be devoted. But, like any other activity, the amount of this investment will depend upon the marginal benefits and costs to investors of allocating resources to these endeavors.");
114. Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S332 (2002) ("Desmetz hypothesized that property rights emerge when some change in the relative value of resources occurs that makes it cost-effective to internalize costs that previously were experienced as externalities⋯.").
115. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2005) (arguing that, in the intellectual property context, courts and commentators treat such property as real property-which "leads them to an almost obsessive preoccupation with identifying and rooting out that great evil of the modern economic world-free riding").
116. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2000);
117. see also Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 865, 866 (2008) ("[W]hen the parties involved have some common incentive to 'coordinate' their behavior, the law's articulation of a behavior will tend to create self-fulfilling expectations that it will occur."). Indeed, recent experimental evidence seems to suggest that the focal point theory, at least in a modified form, holds true for property law.
118. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 452 (2010) ("How a property entitlement is framed⋯ will affect the attitudes and behaviors of societal actors subject to legal rules and influence policymakers as they choose among possible legal rules.").
119. Boorman v. Nev. Mem'l Cremation Soc'y, Inc., 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010).
120. See, e.g., Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ct. Ch.) 674 (noting that relief in equity for libel could only be sustained on protection of rights of property). For early accounts documenting and criticizing this rule
121. see Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 642-46, 668-77 (1916)
122. and Joseph R. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 YALE L. J. 115, 122-26 (1923).
123. See generally Green, Relational Interests (pt. 2)
124. see also Green, Relational Interests (pt. 1), supra note 51, at 461 ("Courts, having assumed that equity would only protect a property interest, have constantly expanded the property concept to include every sort of valuable interest which they deemed worthy of protection. ");
125. William Bliss Giles, Note, A Re-Interpretation of Gee v. Pritchard, 25 MICH. L. REV. 889, 889 (1927) (explaining that the Gee rule "has been so severely criticized and so strained in its application that one is inclined to doubt that it has appreciable vigor at the present time").
126. See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1289 (2000) (noting a "recent upsurge" in "[t]reating privacy as a property right");
127. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2000) (explaining that "some American commentators have proposed that the law should grant individuals a property right in their personal data");
128. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 744-45 (2004) (discussing the issue of "whether genetic information should be treated as property").
129. (1937) 58 CLR 479, 509 (Austl.).
130. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1-2 (1996).
131. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2036-38 (1996) (discussing how and why social norms ban "commodification"); (Pubitemid 126408773)
132. See, e.g., Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S. E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) ("The quasi-property right in a corpse is not pecuniary in nature, nor should it be⋯. [O]ur laws⋯ will not impose a pecuniary value on the flesh itself. To do so would make the strangest thing on earth that much stranger.");
133. see also PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 30, § 12, at 63 ("It seems reasonably obvious that such 'property' is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are being protected⋯.").
134. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 234-35 (1918).
135. For a description of the unscientific or lay conception of property, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-27 (1977).
136. See Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, supra note 74, at 1787, 1793 (envisioning a model to explain the cost of clarifying boundaries of the protected "res" in intellectual property law).
137. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 730-52 (2009) (describing the claiming systems in both patent and copyright law).
138. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law (1870), reprinted in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 212, 212 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) ("It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards.").
139. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 74, at S455-56.
140. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 248 (1998) ("[A]lmost anything can qualify as a trade secret, provided it has the potential to generate commercial value⋯ [including] customer lists, pricing information, business methods and plans, and marketing research data." (footnotes omitted)).
141. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 481 (1974).
142. see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1) (amended 1985)
143. 14 U. L. A. 537 (2005) ("'Improper means' includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage⋯.").
144. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 24-32 (2004) (explaining "transparency" as a criterion for assessing interpretive theories of contract);
145. see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 27 (2001) (noting that objections based on self-understanding of tort law "cannot serve as a functional explanation of the core of tort law").
146. But see Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 349-56 (2007) (embracing the efficient evolution model of the common law as "postulating a causal mechanism" undermining Smith and Coleman's views of transparency).
147. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 85-102 (2009) (distinguishing analogy made on the basis of factual similarity from precedent);
148. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746 (1993) ("[A]nalogical reasoning focuses on particulars, and it develops from concrete controversies.").
149. For an introduction to the mapping of legal concepts, see STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING 1-22 (2003).
150. See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 25-36 (2004) (identifying these concerns as valid but recognizing the area to present a "loose framework" category).
151. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet: The Real Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265, 327-31 (2006) (adopting an incoherence objection to the application of property metaphors to the Internet).
152. *5-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002) (holding that a baseball spectator who had caught a Barry Bonds baseball had a legally cognizable prepossessory interest).
153. See, e.g., S. R. A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U. S. 558, 567, 570 (1946) (describing the federal government's security interest in a piece of private property as a form of "equitable ownership").
154. See, e.g., Producers Lumber & Supply Co. v. Olney Bldg. Co., 333 S. W.2d 619, 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) ("[W]hen a person, acting in good faith without negligence, in the mistaken belief that he is the owner of the land, erects improvements on the land of another, he then has an equitable interest⋯ in the land⋯ to the extent his improvements enhance[] the value of the land⋯.").
155. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N. E.2d 712, 715-17 (N. Y. 1985) (declaring that a professional license earned during a marriage should be considered marital property).
156. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37-55 (2011);
157. Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1853-60 (2012) (distinguishing exclusion property from governance property where there exists a multiplicity of owners and interests within the "black box");
158. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L. J. 275, 285-89 (2008) (arguing that the exclusion approach to ownership does not tell us enough about the owner's position).
159. For an interesting recent account on the realist-formalist divide, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010).
160. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605-07 (1908) (describing the formalist approach as entailing a form of mechanical jurisprudence);
161. Alf Ross, Comment, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 815, 818-19 (1957).
162. see Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1558 (2003)
163. and Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L. J. 607, 647 (2007).