Why computers can't feel pain

Minds and Machines

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 507-516

  Bishop, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Computationalism; Machine consciousness; Panpsychism

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; TURING MACHINES;

BRADFORD; CAMBRIDGE; COMPUTATIONALISM; CURSORY EXAMINATION; INPUT SET; MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS; MENTAL STATE; PANPSYCHISM;

OPEN SYSTEMS;

EID: 84863959215     PISSN: 09246495     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11023-009-9173-3     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Bishop, J. M. (2002a). Dancing with pixies. In J. Preston & J. M. Bishop (Eds.), Views into the Chinese room. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Bishop, J. M. (2002b). Counterfactuals cannot count: A rejoinder to David Chalmers. Consciousness and Cognition, 11(4), 642-652.
3. Chalmers, D. J. (1996). Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton? Synthese, 108, 309-333. (Pubitemid 126788296)
4. Chrisley, R. (2006). Counterfactual computational vehicles of consciousness, toward a science of consciousness 2006, April 4-8, Tucson Convention Center, Tucson Arizona, USA.
5. Klein, C., (2004), Maudlin on computation, (working paper).
6. Maudlin, T. (1989). Computation and consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, 86, 407-432.
7. Putnam, H. (1988). Representation & reality. Cambridge: Bradford Books.
8. Searle, J. (1990). Is the brain a digital computer? Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 64, 21-37.