Optimization with demand oracles

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 110-127

  Badanidiyuru, Ashwinkumar ^a   Dobzinski, Shahar ^a   Oren, Sigal ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

procurement auctions

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; CARDINALITY CONSTRAINTS; ECONOMIC SETTING; GENERAL CLASS; GREEDY ALGORITHMS; PROCUREMENT AUCTION; SUBMODULAR; VALUATION FUNCTION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; OPTIMIZATION;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 84863527813     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2229012.2229025     Document Type: Conference Paper

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