Striving for social status

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 672-

  Immorlica, Nicole ^a   Kranton, Rachel ^b   Stoddard, Gregory ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

equilibria computation; social networks

Indexed keywords

AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION; COMPLETE LATTICES; CONSUMPTION LEVELS; CONVEX COST; LATTICE STRUCTURES; LUXURY GOODS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NETWORK CONNECTIVITY; NETWORK EFFECTS; NETWORK STRUCTURES; PEER GROUPS; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; PRIMARY OBJECTIVE; SOCIAL NETWORKS; SOCIAL STATUS; SPILLOVER EFFECTS; STATUS SYMBOLS;

ADHESION; DYNAMICS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 84863509336     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2229012.2229063     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (17)

1. ASHLAGI, I., KRYSTA, P., AND TENNENHOLTZ, M. 2008. Social context games. Internet and Network Economics, 675-683.
2. ACM Journal Name, Vol. 2, No. 3, Article 1, Publication date: May 2010.
3. BALLESTER, C. AND CALVÓ-ARMENGOL, A. 2007. Moderate interactions in games with induced complementarities. Unpublished manuscript, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
4. BRAMOULLE, Y. AND KRANTON, R. 2007. Public goods in networks. Journal of Economic Theory 135, 1, 478-494.
5. BRANDT, F., FISCHER, F., HARRENSTEIN, P., AND SHOHAM, Y. 2009. Ranking games. Artificial Intelligence 173, 2, 221-239.
6. CLARK, A. AND OSWALD, A. 1998. Comparison-concave utility and following behaviour in social and economic settings. Journal of Public Economics 70, 1, 133-155.
7. CONITZER, V. AND SANDHOLM, T. 2004. Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '04. ACM Press, New York, New York, USA, 51.
8. FRANK, R. 1985. Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status. Oxford University Press.
9. GALEOTTI, A., GOYAL, S., JACKSON, M. O., VEGA-REDONDO, F., AND YARIV, L. 2009. Network Games. Review of Economic Studies 77, 1, 218-244.
10. GHIGLINO, C. AND GOYAL, S. 2010. Keeping up with the neighbors: social interaction in a market economy. Journal of the European Economic Association 8, 1, 90-119.
11. GHOSH, A. AND MAHDIAN, M. 2008. Charity auctions on social networks. In Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1019-1028.
12. HAAGSMA, R. AND VAN MOUCHE, P. 2010. Equilibrium social hierarchies: A non-cooperative ordinal status game. The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10, 1, 1-47.
13. MERTON, R. 1938. Social structure and anomie. American sociological review 3, 5, 672-682.
14. MILGROM, P. AND ROBERTS, J. 1990. Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1255-1277.
15. STARK, O. AND WANG, Y. 2005. Towards a theory of self-segregation as a response to relative deprivation: steady-state outcomes and social welfare. Economics and happiness: Framing the analysis, 223-242.
16. TRUYTS, T. 2010. Social status in economic theory. Journal of Economic Surveys 24, 1, 137-169.
17. VEBLEN, T. 1965. The Theory of the Leisure Class. 1899. AM Kelley, bookseller.