Optimal mechanisms for selling information

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 92-109

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Kleinberg, Robert ^b   Paes Leme, Renato ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

mechanism design; revenue maximization; selling information

Indexed keywords

MECHANISM DESIGN; MONEY TRANSFERS; ONLINE MARKETPLACES; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; PARTIAL INFORMATION; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS; USER DATA; USER INFORMATION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN; OPTIMIZATION;

SALES;

EID: 84863504403     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2229012.2229024     Document Type: Conference Paper

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