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Volumn 94, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 823-837

Government insurance program design, incentive effects, and technology adoption: The case of skip-row crop insurance

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Federal Crop Insurance; Insurance design; Insurance pricing; Nonparametric methods; Risk management; Skip row corn; Technology adoption; Yield risk

Indexed keywords

AGRONOMY; CROP PRODUCTION; DATA SET; EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT; ESTIMATION METHOD; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INCENTIVE; INSURANCE SYSTEM; MODEL TEST; MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS; TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 84862900418     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: 14678276     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aas018     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (23)

References (17)
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    • Atwood, J.1    Shaik, S.2    Watts, M.3
  • 3
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    • The market for "lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism"
    • Akerlof, G.A. 1970. The Market for "Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3): 488-500.
    • (1970) The Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.84 , Issue.3 , pp. 488-500
    • Akerlof, G.A.1
  • 4
    • 0000260962 scopus 로고
    • Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care
    • Dec
    • Arrow, K.J., "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," The American Economic Review, 53-5(Dec., 1963): 941-973.
    • (1963) The American Economic Review , vol.53 , Issue.5 , pp. 941-973
    • Arrow, K.J.1
  • 6
    • 0000139691 scopus 로고
    • Moral hazard and observability
    • Spring
    • Hölmstrom, B., "Moral Hazard and Observability," The Bell Journal of Economics, 10-1(Spring, 1979): 74-91.
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    • Hölmstrom, B.1
  • 7
    • 0037756148 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Risk aversion and incentive effects
    • Dec
    • Holt, C.A., and S.K. Laury. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," The American Economic Review, 92-5(Dec. 2002):1644-55.
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    • Holt, C.A.1    Laury, S.K.2
  • 8
    • 85088344722 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Should the government provide insurance for catastrophes? Comments on a paper by J. David Cummins
    • July/August
    • Jaffee, D., "Should the Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes? Comments on a Paper by J. David Cummins," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 88-4 (July/August 2006):337-379.
    • (2006) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review , vol.88 , Issue.4 , pp. 337-379
    • Jaffee, D.1
  • 12
    • 84960565386 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information
    • Nov
    • Rothschild, M., and J. Stiglitz, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90-4(Nov., 1976): 629-649.
    • (1976) The Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.90 , Issue.4 , pp. 629-649
    • Rothschild, M.1    Stiglitz, J.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.