Congress in court

UCLA Law Review

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 914-968

  Frost, Amanda ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84862658350     PISSN: 00415650     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (123)

1. Letter From Attorney Gen. to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23,2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/ll- ag-223.html
2. Press Release, John Boehner, Speaker of the House, House Will Ensure DOMA Constitutionality is Determined by the Court (Mar. 9, 2011) ("House General Counsel has been directed to initiate a legal defense of [the Defense of Marriage Act].").
3. Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U. S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at Al ("[I]t is rare for an administration not to defend the constitutionality of a statute ")
4. Jennifer Steinhauer, House Republicans Move to Uphold Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,2011, at A16.
5. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Applications for a Stay at 1, Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011) (Nos. 11 Al, 11A2), 2011 WL 2630156 ( The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, respectfully files this brief as amicus curiae in support of the applications for a stay of execution.
6. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 551 (2010) (No. 09-529), 2010 WL 3426282 ("In response to this Court's invitation, the Solicitor General tiled a brief at the petition stage on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae ").
7. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311,2330-31 (2006).
8. Cf. Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558,570 (2003).
9. Robert Pear, Bauats Objects to Recess Appointment, N.Y. TIMES BLOG-THE CAUCUS (Jury 7, 2010,3:33 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes
10. Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Amicus Curiae Edward M. Kennedy, Pro Se, in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees' Motion to Disqualify a Member of the Court on the Ground That His Recess Appointment Is Invalid, Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-16424), 2004 WL 3S89829. Briefs filed on behalf of individual members of Congress have had little influence over judicial decisions, as is discussed in more detail in Part E.B.
11. 556 U.S. 1(2009).
12. Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
13. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2008)
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16. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1154 (2006)
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18. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,1405-09 (1988)
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20. THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 40 (2004) (reporting that from 1995 to 2003, the Supreme Court struck down an average of 3.67 federal statutes per year, more than double the average for the Warren Court)
21. Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001)
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57. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 325 (1994)
58. also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. LJ. 1083,1098-1100 (2008)
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63. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,607 (2000)
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71. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. LJ. 1945,1949 (1997).
72. United States ex rel Attorney Gen. v. DeL & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909). Like many others
73. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189,1205 (2006), I do not believe the Court issues an improper advisory opinion when engaging in classical avoidance.
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81. Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE LJ. 447,466-69 (2009)
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110. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002).
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112. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1,2-3 (1998)
113. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,442 (1965).
114. John F. Manning, Comtitutional Structure and Judicid Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612,647-48 (1996).
115. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)
116. Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 178 (1993)
117. Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. & POL. 639, 643 (1993).
118. Barry Friedman, ADifferentDialogue The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1990)
119. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution From the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. LJ. 1,30-31 (2003).
120. Cf. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 7-8 (1997)
121. William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term Fore-word: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26,28-29 (1994).
122. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ. 319, 343 (1989).
123. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 10 (2008)