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Volumn 102, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 914-940

Carrot or stick? The evolution of reciprocal preferences in a haystack model

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EID: 84862505346     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.2.914     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (11)

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