Right-sizing international criminal justice: The hybrid experiment at the Special Court for Sierra Leone

International Affairs

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 2004, Pages

  Dougherty, Beth K ^a  

^a BELOIT COLLEGE   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84862355930     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00385.x     Document Type: Review

References (84)

1. According to the official ICTR website (www.icty.org), twenty-three persons are on trial, 22 await trial and 10 are still at large.
2. According to the official ICTY website (www.icty.org), 91 indictees have appeared in proceedings, of which 26 are at the pre-trial stage, and an additional 20 indictees are at large.
3. Interview with member of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, The Hague, 29 Oct. 2003.
4. Report of the Secretary General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (New York: United Nations, 6 Feb. 1997), UN Doc. A/51/789, summary.
5. Statement of Rwanda's Prosecutor General Gerald Gahima, United Nations, New York, 10 Sept. 2003, UN press release SC/7889.
6. For a detailed look at the origins of the war and the emergence of the RUF, see Paul Richards, Fighting for the rain forest: war, youth and resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 1996); Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Bush path to destruction: the origins and character of the Revolutionary United Front', Journal of Modern African Studies 33: 4, Dec. 1995.
7. For a detailed look at the origins of the war and the emergence of the RUF, see Paul Richards, Fighting for the rain forest: war, youth and resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 1996); Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Bush path to destruction: the origins and character of the Revolutionary United Front', Journal of Modern African Studies 33: 4, Dec. 1995.
8. Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, 'The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: a revolt of the lumpenproletariat', in Christopher Clapham, ed., African guerrillas (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), pp. 191-2.
9. See the Human Rights Watch reports, Sowing terror: atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 1998), and Getting away with murder, mutilation, and rape (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 1999).
10. See the Human Rights Watch reports, Sowing terror: atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 1998), and Getting away with murder, mutilation, and rape (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 1999).
11. Human Rights Watch, Sowing terror, p. 5
12. I b i d.
13. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Sierra Leone (hereafter cited as Report of the UNHCHR) (New York: United Nations, 7 Aug. 2002), UN Doc. A/57/284, para. 9.
14. The most detailed investigations to date of crimes of sexual violence are Human Rights Watch, We'll kill you if you cry: sexual violence in the Sierra Leone conflict (New York: Human Rights Watch, Jan. 2003), and Physicians for Human Rights, War-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone: a population based assessment (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, Jan. 2002).
15. The most detailed investigations to date of crimes of sexual violence are Human Rights Watch, We'll kill you if you cry: sexual violence in the Sierra Leone conflict (New York: Human Rights Watch, Jan. 2003), and Physicians for Human Rights, War-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone: a population based assessment (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, Jan. 2002).
16. Report of the UNHCHR, para. 33.
17. Report of the Secretary General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereafter cited as Report of the Secretary General) (New York: United Nations, 4 Oct. 2000), UN Doc. S/2000/915, para. 26(c).
18. Peter Salama, Bruce Laurence and Monica L. Nolan, 'Health and human rights in contemporary humanitarian crises: is Kosovo more important than Sierra Leone?', British Medical Journal, 319: 7224, 11 Dec. 1999, p. 1570.
19. World Bank, A world free of poverty (Washington DC: World Bank, Apr. 2002).
20. All statistics following in this paragraph drawn from the United Nations Development Program, Human development index (New York: United Nations, 2002).
21. Fifth report of the Secretary General on the Mission in Sierra Leone (New York; United Nations, 31 July 2000), UN Doc. S/2000/751, para. 9.
22. Report of the Secretary General, para. 74.
23. Ibid., para. 9.
24. 'It was a coup... 10 witnesses to nail Johnny Paul and co.', Standard Times (Sierra Leone), 19 Feb. 2003.
25. Letter dated 12 Jan. 2001 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council (New York: United Nations, Jan. 2001), UN Doc. S/2001/40, para. 12.
26. Report of the Secretary General, para. 19.
27. Daniel J. Macaluso, 'Absolute and free pardon: the effect of the amnesty provision in the Lomé Peace Agreement on the jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone', Brooklyn Journal of International Law 27, 2001, pp. 364-5.
28. Ibid., p. 365
29. Human Rights Watch, Getting away with murder, mutilation, and rape, p. 3.
30. Interview with David Scheffer, US Ambassador for War Crimes (1997-2001), 15 May 2003, Washington DC.
31. I b i d.
32. The Management Committee comprises representatives of Canada, the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Lesotho, Nigeria, the UN Office of Legal Affairs and Sierra Leone.
33. Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone (New York: United Nations, 16 Oct. 2000), UN Doc. S/2000/992, para. 48.
34. Report of the Secretary General, para. 59.
35. Letter dated 22 Dec. 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary General (New York: United Nations, Dec. 2000), S/2000/1234.
36. Letter dated 12 Jan. 2001, paras 10-13.
37. Report of the Secretary General, para. 58; Nicole Fritz and Alison Smith, 'Current apathy for the coming anarchy: building the Special Court for Sierra Leone', Fordham International Law Journal 25: 391, Dec. 2001, p. 421.
38. Report of the Secretary General, para. 58; Nicole Fritz and Alison Smith, 'Current apathy for the coming anarchy: building the Special Court for Sierra Leone', Fordham International Law Journal 25: 391, Dec. 2001, p. 421.
39. Letter dated 15 July 2001 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council (New York: United Nations, July 2001), UN Doc. S/2001/693.
40. I b i d.
41. Twelfth report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (New York: United Nations, 13 Dec. 2001), UN Doc. S/2001/11:95, para. 70.
42. Fritz and Smith, 'Current apathy for the coming anarchy', p. 421.
43. Interview with members of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), United Nations, New York, 6 May 2003.
44. Report of the Secretary General, para. 29.
45. The indictments against Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie were later dismissed because both men had died; Johnny Paul Koroma is presumed alive but is not in the court's custody; Charles Taylor also remains at large.
46. Interview with members of the OLA; interviews with members of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, The Hague, 29-31 Oct. 2003. ICTY staffers noted that the selection process at the ICTY often resulted in judges being selected who had no experience on the bench.
47. The following analysis is based on the interview with Scheffer.
48. Interview with members of the OLA.
49. Report of the Secretary General, para. 27.
50. Save the Children - Sweden, 8 Nov. 2000, as quoted in Ilene Cohn, 'The protection of children and the quest for truth and justice in Sierra Leone', Journal of International Affairs 55: 1, Fall 2001, p. 7.
51. Save the Children - Sweden, 8 Nov. 2000, as quoted in Ilene Cohn, 'The protection of children and the quest for truth and justice in Sierra Leone', Journal of International Affairs 55: 1, Fall 2001, p. 7.
52. Human Rights Watch, Justice and the Special Court (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1 Nov. 2000).
53. Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, '"Why we fight": voices of youth combatants in Sierra Leone', Africa 68: 2, Spring 1998, p. 187.
54. PRIDE, Ex-combatant views of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court in Sierra Leone (Freetown: PRIDE, 12 Sept. 2002), p. 8.
55. David Pratt, 'Sierra Leone: the forgotten crisis', 23 Apr. 1999, p. 29, www.sierra-leone.org.
56. Peters and Richards, '"Why we fight"', p. 187.
57. Report of the Secretary General, para. 35; Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone, para. 50.
58. Report of the Secretary General, para. 35; Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone, para. 50.
59. Amnesty International, The statute of the Special Court must make all recruitment of children under 15 a crime (New York: Amnesty International, 20 Oct. 2000); Sierra Leone: recommendations on the draft statute of the Special Court (New York: Amnesty International, 14 Nov. 2000), p. 13.
60. Amnesty International, The statute of the Special Court must make all recruitment of children under 15 a crime (New York: Amnesty International, 20 Oct. 2000); Sierra Leone: recommendations on the draft statute of the Special Court (New York: Amnesty International, 14 Nov. 2000), p. 13.
61. Amnesty International, Sierra Leone.
62. Interview with members of the OLA.
63. Micaela Frulli, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone: some preliminary comments', European Journal of International Law 11:4, 2000, n. 49.
64. Letter dated 12 Jan. 2001, paras 7-8, contains the amended language for Article 7. Although this letter is in response to the letter from the Security Council dated 22 Dec. 2000, the Security Council letter makes no mention of changes to Article 7.
65. Interview with members of the OLA.
66. IRINnews.org, 4 Nov. 2002.
67. Interviews with personnel at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and at UNICEF, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20-21 Nov. 2003.
68. As cited in Michael P. Scharf, 'The tools for enforcing international criminal justice in the new millennium: lessons from the Yugoslav tribunal', DePaul Law Review 49: 295, Summer 2000, p. 936.
69. Letter dated 12 July 2001.
70. Interviews with members of the Registry, SCSL, Freetown, 19 Nov. 2003.
71. I b i d.
72. Payam Akhavan, 'Beyond impunity: can international criminal justice prevent future atrocities?', American Journal of International Law 95, Jan. 2001, p. 30.
73. Amnesty International, The UN Security Council must make the Special Court effective and viable (New York: Amnesty International, 13 Feb. 2001).
74. For a discussion of the 'American angle', see The Special Court for Sierra Leone: promises and pitfalls of a "new model" (Brussels: International Crisis Group Africa Briefing, 4 Aug. 2003), pp. 14-17. The charge is ironic, given the tense relationship between Crane and the Bush administration. Crane's support in Washington is primarily in Congress, and the administration was clearly unhappy with the handling of the Taylor indictment and the subsequent (Nov. 2003) congressional reward for his arrest. The claim that the court is dominated by Americans also does not stand up to scrutiny; 32% of the court's professional staff is Sierra Leonean, and the Americans and Canadians each represent about 20%. Some have argued that the administration sees the SCSL as an alternative to the ICC, but its failure to use the hybrid model for the Iraq Special Tribunal suggests it finds even limited international involvement in a criminal tribunal unpalatable.
75. Interview with SCSL Registrar Robin Vincent, Freetown, 19 Nov. 2003.
76. Interview with SCSL Prosecutor David Crane, Freetown, 21 Nov. 2003; interview with Vincent.
77. Interview, 29 Oct. 2003, The Hague.
78. Interview with members of the OLA.
79. In early 2004 the SCSL ruled in favour of the joinder motion, but instead of two groups, the court stated that there should be three: thus the RUF, AFRC and CDF indictees are to be tried together.
80. Stuart Beresford and A. S. Muller, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone: an initial comment', Leiden Journal of International Law 14, 2001, p. 641.
81. Fritz and Smith, 'Current apathy for the coming anarchy', p. 418.
82. Scharf, 'The tools for enforcing international criminal justice in the new millennium', pp. 945-6.
83. The court's handling of the Taylor indictment was widely criticized, among others by prominent US and UNAMSIL officials. The timing of the indictment was seen as potentially disrupting the peace process in Liberia, and it embarrassed the African heads of state who had invited Taylor to the talks. Some accused the Prosecutor of failing to understand the realities of West African politics; others complained about the secrecy surrounding the unsealing of the indictment. UNAMSIL, for example, was not informed in advance, and Ghana received less than 24 hours' notice. The bad feelings were exacerbated by the US Congress's posting a reward for Taylor's arrest in November 2003 and by Interpol's 'red notice' the following month. The Nigerians reacted angrily - the court's critics argue Nigeria will never turn Taylor over in the face of obvious high-profile pressure - and an irritated Bush administration refused to endorse the reward.
84. Interview with members of the OLA.