The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 110, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 407-443

  Petersen, Mitchell A ^a   Rajan, Raghuram G ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862244566     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2118445     Document Type: Article

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