Mobile opportunistic commerce: Mechanisms, architecture, and application

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2008, Pages 1069-1076

  Kamar, Ece ^a   Horvitz, Eric ^b   Meek, Chris ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction design; Economically motivated agents; Electronic markets

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMMERCE; COSTS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; SALES;

AUCTION DESIGN; AUCTION MECHANISMS; BUYERS AND SELLERS; DYNAMIC MARKET; ELECTRONIC MARKET; MOBILE SETTINGS; MULTI-ATTRIBUTES;

MOBILE COMMERCE;

EID: 84862060506     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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