Does my bomb look big in this? Britain's nuclear choices after trident

International Affairs

Volumn 80, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Clarke, Michael ^a,b  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b House of Commons Defence Committee   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84862045688     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00365.x     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. Delivering security in a changing world: Defence White Paper, cm 6041-1, 13 December 2003, para. 3.11.
2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 486. These four boats were commissioned between 1993 and 1999.
3. The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999 (London: Stationery Office, 1998), para. 62.
4. 'Minimum deterrent' is defined in Strategic Defence Review, paras 60-61, The addition of 'credible' is offered by The Strategic Defence Review: supporting essays (London: Stationery Office, 1998), p. 5-5, para. 13.
5. 'Minimum deterrent' is defined in Strategic Defence Review, paras 60-61, The addition of 'credible' is offered by The Strategic Defence Review: supporting essays (London: Stationery Office, 1998), p. 5-5, para. 13.
6. Numbers of UK nuclear warheads and their yields during the 19705 and 19805 were indicated, though not offered as precise figures, in Strategic Defence Review: supporting essays,p. 5-3, fig.1.
7. UK SSBNs can leave their Scottish bases and slip by a number of routes into the deep waters of the Atlantic or the North Sea. The only reliable way for an adversary to detect an SSBN is to track it with a hunter-killer submarine somewhere near its base. But the hunter-killer has to be exceptionally fast and quiet to keep in contact, and the SSBN is normally escorted by a hunter-killer of its own and can be routed through an underwater (and movable) 'avenue' of sensors as it enters deep water that will detect the pursuer. These advantages are not available to many other naval powers.
8. 5 was tested after the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was in place certainly indicates a yield of less than 150kt. See H. Beach, J. Finney, T. Milne, R. S. Pease and J. Rotblat, An end to UK nuclear weapons?, British Pugwash Paper, 2002, p. 4.
9. Missile range is listed as 7,500nm (12,000km) in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The military balance, 2003-2004 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 228, but other sources suggest a range greater than 4,000 nautical miles is more accurate, even with reduced payloads. Accuracy listed in Charles Heyman, The armed forces of the United Kingdom, 2001-2002 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books, 2001), p. 38. This is expressed as the 'circular error probable': the radius within which 50 per cent of all warheads will land.
10. Missile range is listed as 7,500nm (12,000km) in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The military balance, 2003-2004 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 228, but other sources suggest a range greater than 4,000 nautical miles is more accurate, even with reduced payloads. Accuracy listed in Charles Heyman, The armed forces of the United Kingdom, 2001-2002 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books, 2001), p. 38. This is expressed as the 'circular error probable': the radius within which 50 per cent of all warheads will land.
11. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 298.
12. 177 bombs were finally dismantled by August 1998.
13. Based on 16 tubes in use. Ohio class Trident boats are designed for 24 tubes, giving a possible maximum loading of 192 warheads per boat - more than the entire UK stockpile.
14. The UK has title to 58 missiles from the US, officially announced as representing 10 for testing, 4 for spares and 44 for operational deployment, as required by whichever of the UK's SSBNs is in service at a given time: House of Commons Debates, 30 July 1998, cols 448-9. The missile bodies are collected from, and returned to, the US base in King's Bay, Georgia in an efficient leasing arrangement. The warhead stockpile was announced at 'fewer than 200' in Strategic Defence Review: supporting essays, p. 5-2, para. 9. A figure of 185 would allow for the full equipping of three boats if ever necessary and a reasonable margin for testing and rotation.
15. The UK has title to 58 missiles from the US, officially announced as representing 10 for testing, 4 for spares and 44 for operational deployment, as required by whichever of the UK's SSBNs is in service at a given time: House of Commons Debates, 30 July 1998, cols 448-9. The missile bodies are collected from, and returned to, the US base in King's Bay, Georgia in an efficient leasing arrangement. The warhead stockpile was announced at 'fewer than 200' in Strategic Defence Review: supporting essays, p. 5-2, para. 9. A figure of 185 would allow for the full equipping of three boats if ever necessary and a reasonable margin for testing and rotation.
16. Strategic Defence Review: supporting essays, fig. 1, p. 5-3.
17. A total of 4.4 tonnes of plutonium (0.3 tonnes of it weapons grade) and 9,000 tonnes of non-highly enriched uranium was placed under EURATOM and IAEA safeguards: Strategic Defence Review: supporting essays, p. 5-10, para. 26.
18. Lawrence Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons (London: Macmillan, 1980).
19. All figures from IISS, Military balance, 2003-2004, pp. 228-9.
20. Israel modified US-supplied Harpoon cruise missiles, made them nuclear-capable and installed them in German-supplied Dolphin class submarines, purchased in 1998, giving it an SSGN capability. See Los Angeles Times, 12 Oct. 2003.
21. India appears to be planning to adapt an upgraded Charlie-1 class SSGN submarine of 6,000 tonnes and fit it with the 300km-range Sagarika missile to make it an SSBN. See 'South Asia's nuclear navies', Strategic Comments 9: 9, Nov. 2003.
22. Strategic Defence Review: supporting essays, p. 5-2, para. 12.
23. I b i d.
24. Michael Clarke, 'De-alerting and the British nuclear deterrent', UNIDIR Newsletter, no. 38, Aug. 1998, pp. 23-4.
25. Ibid., p. 25.
26. Beach et al., An end to nuclear weapons?, pp. 6-7.
27. For the background on British public opinion and nuclear weapons see Peter M. Jones and G. Reece, British public attitudes to nuclear defence (London: Macmillan, 1990).
28. Quoted in Beach et al., An end to nuclear weapons?, p. 25.
29. MORI Public Opinion Newsletter, 1983-2001, recorded the salience of nuclear issues dropping among the British public to less than 5 per cent by 1990 with nothing more than very small blips since then. See Beach et al., An end to nuclear weapons?, p. 24.
30. MORI Public Opinion Newsletter, 1983-2001, recorded the salience of nuclear issues dropping among the British public to less than 5 per cent by 1990 with nothing more than very small blips since then. See Beach et al., An end to nuclear weapons?, p. 24.
31. Philip Gould, The unfinished revolution (New York: Little, Brown, 1998).
32. Such as the Devonshire Dock Hall in Barrow, begun in 1977 for SSBN construction. See MoD, Trident: thirty years of the Polaris sales agreement (London, HMSO, 1993), p. 6.
33. Beach et al., An end to nuclear weapons?, pp. 9-10.
34. See Patricia Lewis, 'The United Kingdom', in Eric Arnett, ed., Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1994); Eric Arnett, 'The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban', in Stockhom International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 715.
35. See Patricia Lewis, 'The United Kingdom', in Eric Arnett, ed., Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1994); Eric Arnett, 'The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban', in Stockhom International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 715.
36. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994, cm 2550, London, 1994, p. 19.
37. Sir Michael Quinlan, 'Weapons of mass destruction: threat and response', inaugural lecture in the Quinlan Lecture Series, International Policy Institute, King's College London, 8 May 2002.
38. The Polaris sales agreement was signed in April 1963, following Macmillan's summit with President Kennedy at Nassau in December 1962. This has been the basis of the UK's ability ever since to operate an SSBN force.
39. See foreword by the Prime Minister in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction: the assessment of the British government (London: Stationery Office, Sept. 2002), and the Prime Minister in House of Commons Debates, 24 Sept. 2002.
40. See foreword by the Prime Minister in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction: the assessment of the British government (London: Stationery Office, Sept. 2002), and the Prime Minister in House of Commons Debates, 24 Sept. 2002.
41. On the extent of strategic potential see Avigdor Haselkorn, 'Iraq's bio-warfare option', Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense, Strategy, Practice and Science 1: 1, 2002, pp. 1-8.
42. Steven Everts, 'Iran: the next big crisis', Prospect 93, Dec. 2003, pp. 46-9.
43. Beach et al., An end to nuclear weapons?, p. 4.
44. Strategic Defence Review, para. 60.
45. The Ministry of Defence, in its Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995, cm 2800 (London: HMSO, 1996), stated that a robust substrategic capability could be expected when Vigilant enters service, which it did in 1998. See p. 38.
46. SIPRI Yearbook 2001, p. 471.
47. Clarke, 'De-alerting and the British nuclear deterrent', p. 24.
48. This assumption, it should be noted, is vigorously disputed by some analysts. See M. MccGwire, 'Shifting the paradigm', International Affairs 78: 1, January 2002, pp. 12-13.
49. See e.g. Colin McInnes, Trident: the only option? (London: Brasseys, 1986). Original costs of cruise missiles were surprisingly high in the 1980s but they have fallen a good deal since.
50. See R. Betts, ed., Cruise missiles: technology, strategy, politics (Washington DC: Brookings, 1981).
51. See House of Commons Defence Committee, The Strategic Defence Review: minutes of evidence, HC 138-1, 30 July 1997, p. 17.
52. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994, cm 2550 (London: HMSO, 1994), p. 19; Malcolm Rifkind, 'The role of nuclear weapons in UK defence strategy', in Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1994 (London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, 1994), p. 28.
53. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994, cm 2550 (London: HMSO, 1994), p. 19; Malcolm Rifkind, 'The role of nuclear weapons in UK defence strategy', in Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1994 (London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, 1994), p. 28.
54. Steven Simon and David Benjamin, 'America and the new terorism', Survival 42: 1, 2000, pp. 59-75.
55. CSIS Report, Protecting against the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, vol. 2: The challenges (Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jan. 2003), p. 74.
56. US Government, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC, 17 Sept. 2002), p. 15.
57. Strategic Defence Review, para. 60.
58. See e.g. Robert Jervis, 'The compulsive empire', Foreign Policy, July/August, 2003, p. 86.
59. See Philip Bobbitt, The shield of Achilles: war, peace and the course of history (London: Penguin, 2002).
60. Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Strategic trends (several studies in related volumes) (Shrivenham: JDCC, March 2003).
61. See e.g. Christopher Coker, Humane warfare: the new ethics of postmodern war (London: Routledge, 2001).