Market power in emissions trading: Strategically manipulating permit price through fringe firms

Applied Energy

Volumn 96, Issue , 2012, Pages 203-211

  Tanaka, Makoto ^a   Chen, Yihsu ^b  

^a NATIONAL GRADUATE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES   (Japan)

^b Embedded Systems and Automation Laboratory   (United States)

Author keywords

Cap and trade; Cournot fringe; Electricity; Market power

Indexed keywords

COSTS; ELECTRICITY; INDUSTRY;

CALIFORNIA; CAP-AND-TRADE; COURNOT; COURNOT MODEL; COURNOT-FRINGE; ELECTRICITY MARKET; EMISSION PERMITS; EMISSION RATES; EMISSIONS TRADING; MARKET POWER; SYSTEM CONDITIONS;

COMMERCE;

ELECTRICITY GENERATION; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENERGY MARKET; MITIGATION; NUMERICAL MODEL; STANDARD (REGULATION);

CALIFORNIA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84861697537     PISSN: 03062619     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2011.08.049     Document Type: Article

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