A study on the multi-task incentive mechanism for the service provider

China Communications

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 79-83

  Li, Lei ^a   Xin, Zhanhong ^a  

^a BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS   (China)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Incentive mechanism; Principal agent analysis; Service provider

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861500482     PISSN: 16735447     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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