Why performance-based contracting failed in Uganda - An " open-box" evaluation of a complex health system intervention

Social Science and Medicine

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 377-383

  Ssengooba, Freddie ^a,b   McPake, Barbara ^c   Palmer, Natasha ^b  

^a MAKERERE UNIVERSITY   (Uganda)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE AND TROPICAL MEDICINE   (United Kingdom)

^c QUEEN MARGARET UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Case study; Health program evaluation; Health system; Performance based contracting; Uganda

Indexed keywords

HEALTH CARE; HEALTH POLICY; HEALTH SERVICES; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT; POLICY REFORM;

ARTICLE; CASE STUDY; FINANCIAL BONUS PAYMENT; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; HEALTH CARE DELIVERY; HEALTH CARE FINANCING; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HEALTH CENTER; HEALTH SERVICE; LEARNING CURVE; MEDICAL AUDIT; PERFORMANCE BASED CONTRACTING; PROSPECTIVE STUDY; REWARD; THEORY; UGANDA; WORKLOAD;

CONTRACT SERVICES; HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH; HUMANS; MANAGEMENT AUDIT; OUTCOME AND PROCESS ASSESSMENT (HEALTH CARE); PROSPECTIVE STUDIES; QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE; UGANDA;

UGANDA;

EID: 84861338583     PISSN: 02779536     EISSN: 18735347     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.02.050     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. Annerstedt M. Transdisciplinarity as an Inference technique to achieve a better understanding in the health and environmental sciences. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2010, 7(6):2692-2707.
2. Astbury B., Leeuw F. Unpacking black boxes: mechanisms and theory building in evaluations. American Journal of Evaluation 2010, 31:363. 10.1177/1098214010371972.
3. Basinga P., Gertler P.J., et al. Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation. Lancet 2011, 377(9775):1421-1428.
4. Bokhour B.G., Burgess J.F., Hook J.M., White B., Berlowitz D., Guldin M.R., et al. Incentive implementation in physician practices: a qualitative study of practice executive perspectives on pay for performance. Medical Care Research Review 2006, 63(1 Suppl.):73S-95S.
5. Conservatives.com One World Conservatism: A Conservative agenda for international development 2011, Policy Green Paper Number 11 London. http://Conservatives.com.
6. Systems thinking for health systems strengthening. Alliance for health policy and systems research 2009, World Health Organization (WHO), Geneva. D. De Savigny, A. Taghreed (Eds.).
7. Performance incentives for global Health: Potential and Pitfalls 2009, Center for Global Development, Washington DC. R. Eichler, R. Levine, Performance-based Incentive Working Group (Eds.).
8. Eldridge C., Palmer N. Performance-based payment: some reflections on the discourse, evidence and unanswered questions. Health Policy and Planning 2009, Accessed 07.02.09.
9. Galvin R.S. Evaluating the performance of Pay-for-Performance. Medical Care Research and Review 2006, 63(Suppl. 1 Feb):126S-130S.
10. Gibson J.L., Martin D.K., Singer P.A. Priority setting in hospitals: fairness, inclusiveness, and the problem of institutional power differences. Social Science & Medicine 2005, 61:2355-2362.
11. Goddard M., Mannion R., Smith P. Enhancing performance in health care: the theoretical perspective on agency and the role of information. Health Economics 2000, 9:95-107.
12. Gonzalez C.P., Barrera M., et al. The cultural adaptation of prevention interventions: resolving tensions between fidelity and fit. Prevention Science 2004, 5:41-45.
13. Grol R.P.T.M., Bosch M.C., Hulscher M.E.J.L., Eccles M.P., Wensing M. Planning and studying improvement in patient care: the use of theoretical perspectives. The Milbank Quarterly 2007, 85(1):93-138.
14. Kalk A. Rwanda's health system: some concerns. The Lancet 2008, 372(9651):1729.
15. Kelly M., McDaid D., Ludbrook A., Powell J. Economic appraisal of public health interventions 2005, Briefing Paper, Health Development Agency, National Health Service UK, London.
16. Lawler E.E. Pay and organizational effectiveness: A psychological view 1971, McGraw-Hill, New York.
17. Lawler E.E. Pay for performance: making it work. Compensation Benefits Review 1989, 21:55-60.
18. Leykum L.K., Pugh J., Lawrence V., Parchman M., Noel P.H., Cornell J., et al. Organizational interventions employing principles of complexity science have improved outcomes for patients with Type II diabetes. Implementation Science 2007, 2(28):2-28.
19. Loevinsohn B., Harding A. Buying results? Contracting for health service delivery in developing countries. The Lancet 2005, 366(9486):676-681.
20. Lundberg M. Client satisfaction and the perceived quality of primary health care in Uganda. Are you being served? New tools for measuring service delivery 2010, 313-342. The World Bank, Washington DC. S. Amin, J. Das, G. Goldstein (Eds.).
21. Lundberg M., Marek T., Pariyo G. Contracting for primary health care in Uganda 2007, Ministry of Health, Kampala.
22. McNamara P. Provider-specific report cards: a tool for health sector accountability in developing countries. Health Policy Planning 2006, 21(2):101-109.
23. Meessen B., Musango L., et al. Reviewing institutions of rural health centres: the Performance Initiative in Butare, Rwanda. Tropical Medicine & International Health 2006, 11(8):1303-1317.
24. Meessen B., Kashala J.-P.I., et al. Output-based payment to boost staff productivity in public health center: contracting in Kabutare district, Rwanda. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2007, 85:108-115.
25. Mooney G., Ryan M. Agency in health care: getting beyond first principles. Journal of Health Economics 1993, 12:125-135.
26. Morgan L. Some days are better than others: Lessons learned from Uganda's first results-based financing pilot result-based financing 2010, World Bank. http://www.rbfhealth.org.
27. Pawson R., Tilley N. How to construct realistic data. Realistic evaluation 2004, SAGE Publication Ltd, London. R. Pawson, N. Tilley (Eds.).
28. Plsek P.E., Wilson T. Complexity, leadership, and management in healthcare organisations. British Medical Journal 2001, 323:746-749.
29. Rosenfield P.L. The potential of transdisciplinary research for sustaining and extending linkages between the health and social sciences. Social Science & Medicine 1992, 35:1343-1357.
30. Rusa L., Schneidman M., et al. Rwanda: performance-based financing in the public sector. Performance incentives for global health: potential and Pitfalls 2009, Center for Global Development, Washington DC. R. Eichler, R. Levine, Performance-based Incentive Working Group (Eds.).
31. Soeters R., Griffiths F. Improving government health services through contract management: a case from Cambodia. Health Policy Plan 2003, 18(1):74-83.
32. Soeters R., Habineza C., et al. Performance-based financing and changing the district health system: experience from Rwanda. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2006, 84(11):843-889.
33. Ssengooba, F. (2010). Performance-based contracting: A case study of non-profit hospitals in Uganda Department of Global Health (p. 253). London: University of London, PhD.
34. Teleki S.S., Damberg C.L., Pham C., Berry S.H. Will financial incentives stimulate quality improvement? Reactions from frontline physicians. American Journal of Medical Quality 2006, 21(6):367-374.
35. Yanagisawa S., Mey V., et al. Comparison of health-seeking behaviour between poor and better-off people after health sector reform in Cambodia. Public Health 2004, 118(1):21-30.
36. World Bank The frameworks for service provision. World Development Report 2004: Making services work for poor people 2003, 46-53. Washington DC. World Bank (Ed.).
37. World Bank, Ministry of Health Contracting for health service Delivery: Health facility Questionnaire, Wave-1 2004 2004, Ministry of Health, Kampala.