Damages under the necessity doctrine

Issues in Legal Scholarship

Volumn , Issue 7, 2005, Pages

  Gordley, James ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861276152     PISSN: 15398323     EISSN: 15398323     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1539-8323.1064     Document Type: Review

References (104)

1. 124 N.W. 121 (Minn. 1910). The court's familiarity with nautical terminology was limited. The court, and consequently later commentators, refer to the pier as a "dock." A dock is the parking place next to a pier. The court refers to the ship as a "boat." A boat is a vessel small enough to be placed aboard a ship. The court says that while the vessel was moored with its bow to the east, a wind coming from the northeast was striking it on the starboard side. Imagine facing east and feeling a wind from the northeast blow against your right side.
2. Joel Feinberg, "Voluntary Euthenasia and the Inalienable Right to Life," Philos. & Pub. Affairs 7 (1978), 93, 102.
3. Stephen D. Sugarman, "The 'Necessity' Defense and the Failure of Tort The Case Against Strict Liability for Damages Caused While Exercising Self-help in an Emergency" (2005): Article 1. http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss7/art1, p. 2.
4. Stephen D. Sugarman, "The 'Necessity' Defense and the Failure of Tort The Case Against Strict Liability for Damages Caused While Exercising Self-help in an Emergency" Ibid. 116-17.
5. Stephen D. Sugarman, "The 'Necessity' Defense and the Failure of Tort The Case Against Strict Liability for Damages Caused While Exercising Self-help in an Emergency" Ibid. 103-06.
6. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 263 (1965).
7. Ibid. Official Comment d.
8. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
9. W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (15th ed. 1998), 180-83 (England); Western Suburbs Hospital v. Currie, (1987) 9 N.S.W.R. 511, 523-24 (Australia);
10. Boris Starck, Henri Roland & Laurent Boyer, Obligations 1. Responsabilité délictuelle (4th ed., 1991), §§ 300-01 (France);
11. Hein Kötz, Deliktsrecht (3rd ed., 1983), 61 (Germany);
12. E.g., Richard Posner, "A Theory of Negligence," J. Legal Stud. 1 (1972), 29, 32-33.
13. James Gordley, "Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition," in D. Owen, ed., Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law: A Collection of Essays (1995), 131 at 145-51;
14. Karl Larenz & Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts II/2 (13th ed., 1994), 413-14.
15. Gordley, "Tort Law" 145-46.
16. Stark, Roland & Boyer, Responsabilité délictuelle §§ 300-01;
17. Francois Terré, Philippe Simler & Yves Lequette, Droit civil Les obligations (7th ed., 1999), § 704.
18. Stark, Roland & Boyer, Responsabilité délictuelle § 300;
19. Terré, Simler & Lequette, Les obligations § 704.
20. e ch. civ., 8 April 1970, JCP 1970. J.136
21. cited by Terré, Simler & Lequette, Les obligations § 704, n. 2.
22. Tribunal d'instance, Charolles, 13 March 1970, JCP 1970.J.16354
23. cited by Stark, Roland & Boyer, Responsabilité délictuelle § 301, n. 154 (who note that although there was a "state of necessity," liability was imposed under French rules governing strict liability).
24. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense" 59
25. paraphrasing W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed., 1984), 148.
26. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense"59.
27. Ruiz v. Formann, 514 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App. 1974).
28. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 74, n. 61
29. Wood v. United Airlines, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1962).
30. 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
31. Kötz,Deliksrecht 61.
32. Reichsgericht, 29 Apr. 1926, RGZ 113, 301.
33. Bundesgerichtshof, 30 Oct. 1984, Vers R 1985, 66.
34. R. Walter Dunz, Note to Bundesgerichtshof, 10 Oct. 1984, Vers R 1985, 66.
35. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense"58.
36. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense" 10-12.
37. Francis Bohlen, "Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality," Harv. L. Rev. 39 (1926), 307.
38. Francis Bohlen, Harv. L. Rev. Ibid. 316.
39. Restatement of Torts §§ 197, 263 (1934).
40. Restatement of Torts (Second) §§ 197, 263 (1965).
41. Restatement of Restitution § 122 (1937).
42. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense" 39.
43. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense" Ibid.11.
44. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense" Ibid. 15.
45. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense" Ibid. 17.
46. James Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991), 69-111;
47. Gordley, "Tort Law" 131;
48. James Gordley, "The Principle Against Unjustified Enrichment," in Klaus Luig, Haimo Schack & Herbert Wiedemann, eds, Gedächtnisschrift für Alexander Lüderitz (2000), 213.
49. Robert Feenstra, "Grotius' Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment as a Source of Obligation: its Origin and its Influence on Roman-Dutch Law," in E.J.H. Schrage, ed., Unjust Enrichment (1995), 197.
50. This passage had been included in a compilation of authorities which was a primary authority for the canon lawyers, the Decretum of Gratian. It appears at D.47 c.8.
51. Glossa Ordinaria to Gratian, Decretum to D. 47 c.8 to Commune.
52. Dig. 9.2.2 pr.
53. Here is how these situations were described by a medieval lawyer (as it happens, a canonist): "There are cases in which one is allowed to pass through another's field: if there is a servitude, C. 3.34.11, or if one wants to dig up one's own treasure, Dig. 10.4.19 (at the end), if my fruit fell into your field, D. 43.27.1, when I am looking for a fugitive, Dig. 11.4.4... and when a public road is destroyed, Dig. 8.6.14.1." Glossa ordinaria to Gratian, Decretum ad D. 1, c. 2.
54. Dig. 9.2.49.1.
55. Politics II. v.
56. Summa theologiae II-II Q. 66, a. 2.
57. Summa theologiae II-II Q. Ibid. a. 7.
58. Leonardus Lessius, De iustitia et iure, ceterisque virtutibus cardinalis libri quatuor (Paris, 1628), lib. 2, cap. 12, dub. 12;
59. Ludovicus de Molina, De iustitia et iure tractatus (Venice, 1614), disp. 20;
60. Domenicus Soto, De iustitia et iure libri decem (Salamanca, 1553), lib. 5, q. 3, a. 4;
61. Hugo Grotius, De iure belli acpacis libri tres (de Kanter-van Hetting Tromp, eds., Leiden, 1939), II.ii.6-7;
62. Samuel Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium libri octo (Amsterdam, 1688), II.vi.5.
63. Lessius, De iustitia et iure lib. 2, cap. 12, dub. 12;
64. Molina, De iustitia et iure disp. 20;
65. Soto, De iustitia et iure lib. 5, q. 3, a. 4;
66. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis II.ii.6-7;
67. Pufendorf, De iure naturae II.vi.5.
68. De iustitia et iure lib. 2, cap. 12, dub. 12.
69. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis II.ii.2, 6-9
70. a.
71. b;
72. Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II, Q. 61, a. 2.
73. a.
74. Politics V Ibid. II.v;
75. Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II, Q. 66, a. 2.
76. a.
77. Nicomachean Ethics V Ibid.
78. Thomas Aquinas, In decem libros ethicorum Aristoteles expositio (A. Pirotta, ed., Maritti, 1934), 1ib. V, lectio vi, no. 952.
79. That has been shown convincingly by my late colleague David Daube, Roman Law Linguistic, Social and Philosophical Aspects (1969), 131-56. Interestingly, that interpretation of the issue Aristotle was addressing was accepted by Aquinas himself.
80. Aquinas, In decem libros ethicorum Aristoteles expositio lib. V, lectio xiii, no. 1043.
81. More technically, negligence (negligentia) was a lack of solicitude (sollicitudo) or diligence (diligentia). Solicitude or diligence was the virtue that enables the alert, adroit performance of the "chief act" of prudence, praecipere, which could be translated as "to command" or "to execute." Prudence required three "acts": to take counsel or to consider what should be done (consiliari); to judge or decide what should be done (iudicare); and to execute this decision (praecipere). See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 47, aa. 8-9; Q. 54, aa. 1-2; Q. 64, a. 8.
82. Ioannes de Lugo, Disputationum de iustitia et iure (Lyon, 1670), I, disp. 8, sec. 3; Lessius De iustitia et iure lib. 2, cap. 7, dubs. 2 & 6;
83. Molina De iustitia et iure II, disp. 698.
84. Gordley, "Tort Law" 137-51.
85. Summa theologiae II-II, Q. 62, a. 6.
86. Molina, De iustitia et iure disp. 718, no. 2;
87. Lessius, De iustitia et iure lib. 2, cap. 14, dub. 1, no. 3;
88. Grotius, De iure bellis acpacis II.&.5;
89. Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium IV.xiii.9.
90. Gordley, "Principle Against Unjustified Enrichment" 213;
91. James Gordley, "The Purpose of Awarding Restitutionary Damages A Reply to Professor Weinrib," Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1 (2000), 39.
92. Oberlandesgericht, Hamm, 30 May 1940, DR 1940, 1188.
93. Reichsgericht, 29 April 1926, RGZ 113, 301.
94. Friedmann, "Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property of the Commission of a Wrong," Colum. L. Rev. 80 (1980), 504 at 509.
95. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense" 36.
96. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense" Ibid. 37.
97. Sugarman, "Necessity Defense" Ibid. 35.
98. 72As George Palmer puts it, when the plaintiff recovers for unjust enrichment, the defendant's gain must have been "the product of the legally protected interest that was invaded." George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution 1 (1978), § 2.10. The tort in question, Peter Birks says, must have "the purpose of preventing disapproved modes of enrichment."
99. Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985), 328. The question thus arises, when a gain is product of a protected legal interest, or a tort has the purpose of preventing enrichment.
100. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). See
101. Keeton, et. al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 630-32, 637-41.
102. John P. Dwyer & Peter S. Menell, Property Law and Policy: A Comparative Institutional Perspective (1998), 739.
103. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905)(owner of farm can condemn right of way for irrigation ditch); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906)(mine owner can condemn right of way for aerial bucket line).
104. The American Law of Property A Treatise on the Law of Property in the United States (1952), §§ 8.31-8.43.