Creating a mammalian-transmissible A/H5N1 influenza virus: Social contracts, prudence, and alternative perspectives

Journal of Infectious Diseases

Volumn 205, Issue 11, 2012, Pages 1636-1638

  Osterholm, Michael T ^a,b,c   Relman, David A ^d,e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b MPH Program at San Antonio   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA MEDICAL SCHOOL   (United States)

^d Division of Infectious Diseases   (United States)

^e STANFORD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

RECOMBINANT DNA;

BIOENGINEERING; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; BIOMEDICINE; BIOTECHNOLOGY; CENSORSHIP; DUAL USE RESEARCH; FATALITY; FERRET; GOVERNMENT; HISTORY; INFLUENZA VIRUS A H5N1; MAMMAL; MEDICAL ETHICS; NONHUMAN; ORGANIZATION; PRACTICE GUIDELINE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUBLIC HEALTH; PUBLICATION; RESEARCH; REVIEW; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK BENEFIT ANALYSIS; SAFETY; SOCIAL ASPECT; UNITED STATES; VIRUS MUTATION; VIRUS STRAIN; VIRUS TRANSMISSION;

ANIMALS; BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH; DISEASE TRANSMISSION, INFECTIOUS; FERRETS; HUMANS; INFLUENZA A VIRUS, H5N1 SUBTYPE; NETHERLANDS; ORTHOMYXOVIRIDAE INFECTIONS; PUBLICATIONS; SECURITY MEASURES; UNITED STATES; ZOONOSES;

EID: 84861078290     PISSN: 00221899     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jis259     Document Type: Review

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