Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning: Part I: Essays

Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning: Part I: Essays

Volumn 1, Issue , 2007, Pages 1-394

  Baker, G P ^a   Hacker, P M S ^a  

^a ST JOHN S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84860918460     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9780470752807     Document Type: Book

References (63)

1. J. S. Mill: 'It seems proper to consider a word as the name of that which we intend to be understood by it when we use it' (System of Logic, Bk. I, ch. ii, sect. 1).
2. B. Russell: 'Words all have meaning, in the simple sense that they are symbols which stand for something other than themselves' (PrM 47).
3. Russell: 'The relation of a word to its meaning is of the nature of a causal law governing our use of the word and our actions when we hear it' (AM 198).
4. W. E. Johnson, Logic (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1921), Part I, ch. VI, sect. 7.
5. Waismann's Thesen: 'A definition remains within language. Ostension steps outside language and connects signs with reality' (WWK 246).
6. M. Schlick: 'We conclude that there is no way of understanding any meaning without ultimate reference to ostensive definitions' ('Meaning and Verification', repr. in his Gesammelte Aufsätze, p. 341).
7. W. V. Quine: 'What characterizes direct ostension, then, is that the term which is being ostensively explained is true of something that contains the ostended point' ('Ontological Relativity', repr. in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 39).
8. R. Carnap: 'ostensive definitions: here the term is defined by the stipulation that the objects comprehended by the term must have a certain relation (for instance, congruence or likeness) to a certain indicated object' (Logical Syntax of Language (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1937), p. 80).
9. Thomas Reid: 'The simplest operations of our minds must all be expressed by words [that cannot logically be defined]. No man can explain by a logical definition what it is to think, to apprehend, to believe, to will, to desire. Every man who understands the language has some notion of the meaning of those words; and every man, who is capable of reflection, may, by attending to the operations of his own mind, which are signified by them, form a clear and distinct notion of them' (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2002), pp. 19f.).
10. Thus Noam Chomsky: 'To know a language, I am assuming, is to be in a certain mental state, which persists as a relatively steady component of transitory mental states. What kind of mental state? I assume further that to be in such a mental state is to have a certain mental structure consisting of a system of rules and principles that generate and relate mental representations of various types' (Rules and Representations (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980), p. 48).
11. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952), ch. 2. Hare's motivation was a logic of imperatives. Philosophers who advocated the programme of constructing a theory of meaning for a natural language and who adopted one or another variant of this form of analysis were, e.g., D. Davidson and M. A. E. Dummett.
12. R. Carnap: 'ostensive definitions: here the term is defined by the stipulation that the objects comprehended by the term must have a certain relation (for instance, congruence or likeness) to a certain indicated object' (Logical Syntax of Language (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1937), p. 80); and Quine: 'One learns by ostension what presentations to call yellow: that is, one learns by hearing the word applied to samples. All he has to go on, of course, is the similarity of further cases to samples' ('Natural Kinds', p. 121.)
13. 'On Denoting', repr. in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 4 (Routledge, London, 1994), p. 415.
14. A. Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, tr. J. Dickoff and P. James (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1964), Pt. II, chs 1-3.
15. J. Bentham, Chrestomathia, ed. M. J. Brown and W. H. Burston, repr. in Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983), Appendix IX, p. 400.
16. N. Chomsky, Language and the Problems of Knowledge (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1988), p. 136.
17. D. Davidson, 'Semantics for Natural Languages', repr. in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), p. 56.
18. M. A. E. Dummett, 'Can Analytic Philosophy be Systematic and Ought it to be?', in Truth and Other Enigmas (Duckworth, London, 1978), p. 451.
19. M. A. E. Dummett, 'What is a Theory of Meaning?', in Mind and Language, ed. S. Guttenplan (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975), p. 112.
20. N. Chomsky, 'Review of Skinner's Verbal Behaviour', Language, 35 (1959), pp. 57f.
21. J. Fodor and J. J. Katz, 'What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Language?', in Philosophy and Linguistics, ed. C. Lyas (Macmillan and St Martin's Press, London, 1971), p. 282.
22. S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980), pp. 54f.
23. A. Arnauld, The Art of Thinking: The Port Royal Logic (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1964), Pt II, ch. 16.
24. Spinoza, Improvement of the Understanding, I. 31, in The Chief works of Benedict de Spinoza, tr. R. H. M. Elwes (Dover, New York, 1955), vol. 2.
25. Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, ed. and tr. Hans Aarsleff (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001), I. 2-7.
26. J. S. Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 7 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1973), I, viii, §5.
27. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960), p. 7.
28. Russell, 'On Scientific Method in Philosophy' (1914), repr. in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 8 (Allen and Unwin, London, 1986), p. 66.
29. Dugald Stewart, Philosophical Essays (Creech and Constable, Edinburgh, 1810), p. 218.
30. A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (1st edn 1818) (Dover, New York, 1958), vol. 1, p. 97, see also p. 154, and vol. 2, p. 380.
31. Wilhelm von Humboldt, On Language (1836) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999), pp. 50f. Interestingly, Wittgenstein uses the same metaphor of 'multiplicity of faces with common features' in his 'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough' (GB 143).
32. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1885), §20.
33. For the amusing exchange of letters, see W. S. Churchill, My Early Life (Fontana, London, 1959), pp. 223ff.
34. N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984), p. 46.
35. Wittgenstein did not advert to the deleterious impact of technological advance on philosophical reflection. The invention of clockwork had a powerful impact on the thought that organisms are mere machines, and on the conception of determinism that dominated eighteenth-century thought. More recently, the invention of the computer has wrought havoc with our thought about the brain and mind - no longer a central telephone exchange and its operator, the brain is now a computer, and the mind its software.
36. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, p. 28.
37. See A. J. Ayer, Part of My Life (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978), p. 305. Malcolm reports Wittgenstein twice insisting indignantly that philosophy is a 'different technique' from psychoanalysis (ibid., p. 48).
38. 'On the Methods of Theoretical Physics', p. 11.
39. 'On the Question of the Objective Existence of Processes in Inanimate Nature', p. 67.
40. 'On the Development of the Methods of Theoretical Physics in Recent Times', p. 77.
41. 'On Statistical Mechanics', p. 167.
42. Goethe, Italian Journey, tr. W. H. Auden and Elizabeth Mayer (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970).
43. N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984), p. 43.
44. Goethe, Maximen und Reflexionen, ed. Max Hacker (Weimar, 1907), no. 575 (Spengler also quotes this remark in Decline of the West, vol. i, p. 156).
45. F. Waismann, 'How I See Philosophy', repr. in How I See Philosophy, ed. R. Harré (Macmillan, London, 1968). This late paper was written in opposition to Wittgenstein, in order to stake out Waismann's own distinctive position.
46. G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (Allen and Unwin, London, 1953), pp. 276f.
47. Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and its Limits (Allen and Unwin, London, 1948), p. 165.
48. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. IV.
49. W. James, The Principles of Psychology (Holt, New York, 1890), vol. i, p. 253.
50. R. Quirk, S. Greenbaum, G. Leech and J. Svartvik, A Grammar of Contemporary English (Longman, London, 1974), pp. 39f, 92ff.
51. J. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968), p. 315.
52. See A. J. P. Kenny, Action, Emotion and the Will (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963), pp. 171ff.
53. N. Chomsky, 'Some Empirical Assumptions in Modern Philosophy of Language', in Philosophy, Science and Method: Essays in Honour of Ernest Nagel, ed. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M. White (St Martin's Press, New York, 1969), p. 277.
54. N. Chomsky, Language and Mind (Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1968), p. 12.
55. Chomsky, 'Some Empirical Assumptions in Modern Philosophy of Language', p. 281. (This is part of his criticism of Wittgenstein's 'behaviourism'.)
56. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. i, pp. 281f.
57. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1968), pp. 82ff.
58. D. Bolinger, Aspects of Language, 2nd edn (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, New York, 1975), p. 187 (quoting S. Locke, D. Caplan and L. Kellar, A Study in Neurolinguistics (Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, ill., 1973), p. 10).
59. See in particular M. Ayers, The Refutation of Determinism (Methuen, London, 1968); A. J. P. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power (Blackwell, Oxford, 1976); A. White, Modal Notions (Blackwell, Oxford, 1976).
60. A. J. P. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power (Blackwell, Oxford, 1976); A. White, Modal Notions (Blackwell, Oxford, 1976).
61. The distinction is Kenny's, in Will, Freedom and Power, p. 10.
62. Hume, Treatise, Bk I, pt. iii, sect. xiv.
63. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, pp. 86, 88.