Human dignity and its impact on german substantive criminal law and criminal procedure

Israel Law Review

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 575-591

  Lagodny, Otto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG   (Austria)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84860630622     PISSN: 00212237     EISSN: 20479336     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S002122370001606X     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. G. Dürig, “Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwurde”, (1956) 81 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 117
2. today still accepted, cf. K. Stern, “Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Munich, 1988) III/l Allgemeine Lehren der Grundrechte, §58 III 2, at 35–39.
3. In general, see the in-depth analysis of C. Enders, “Die Meuschenwürde in der Verfassungs-ordnung” (Tübingen, 1997).
4. See infra Part IV.
5. For more details, see O. Lagodny, “Strafrecht vor den Schranken der Grundrechte” (Tubingen, 1996) 77–135
6. G. Staechelin, “Strafgesetzgebung im Verfassungsstaat” (Berlin, 1998) 50 and 111 and subs.
7. I. Appel, “Verfassung und Strafe” (Berlin, 1998) 433 and subs.
8. This article will not deal with the constitutionality of sanctions. With regard to the death penalty which was abolished in Germany by the constitution (art. 102 GBL), discussion was based on the question whether art. 102 GBL is a so-called “eternal” guarantee which may never be abolished according to art. 79, para. 3 GBL. As to life-long imprisonment, see (1978) 45 D.F.C.C. at 187 and subs.; (1993) 86 Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter: D.F.C.C.) at 288 and subs.
9. For more detail, see O. Lagodny, D.F.C.C., at 94
10. subs., 129 and subs. Also (1997) 96 D.F.C.C. 245
11. W. Schild, “Strafbegriff und Grundgesetz”, in A. Eser, U. Schittenhelm and H- Schumann, eds., Festschrift fur Theodor Lenckner zum 70. Geburtstag (Munich, 1998) 287, at 310
12. referring also to W. Schild, Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung (Heidelberg/Hamburg, 1983) 96, and subs.
13. Also I. Appel, Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung, at 490 and subs., who mainly differs in calling the power to blame (“Vorwurfsermachtigung”): (the power to) “primary sanction” (“Primarsanktion”).
14. As far as criminal procedure is concerned, a distinction between the guilty verdict and the sentencing turns out to be of constitutional relevance in discussions on Germany, albeit such a distinction will not be mandatory. See: O. Lagodny, Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung, at 108 and subs.
15. Also I. Appel, Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung, at 499–500.
16. See O. Lagodny, Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung, at 98–128
17. see also: G. Staechelin, Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung, at 114
18. I. Appel, Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung, at 490 and subs.
19. Also I. Appel, Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung, at 570 n. 137 observes this.
20. Hence, his critics (at 569 note 133 and at 312 note 32) and that of Staechelin, Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung, at 51,164 and subs, that I deal too much with the prohibition resp. my proposal leaves to little specifics of criminal law, are not convincing.
21. See e.g., (1979) 59 D.F.C.C. at 290, 332
22. (1982) 57 D.F.C.C. at 139, 159
23. (1983) 62 D.F.C.C. at 1,50.
24. See also (1969) 25 D.F.C.C. at 1,19; 30,292,319
25. (1975) 37 D.F.C.C. at 1, 21; 39, 210, 230
26. (1978) 47 D.F.C.C, at 109, 117
27. (1986) 71 D.F.C.C. at 206, 215.
28. See e.g., (1963) 13 D.F.C.C. at 97, 113
29. (1979) 50 D.F.C.C. at 205, 212
30. (1986) 71 D.F.C.C. at 206, 215
31. (1994) 90 D.F.C.C. at 145, 183.
32. See (1988) 77 D.F.C.C. at 77, 84; 81, 70
33. see also G. Staechelin, D.F.C.C., at 137 and subs.
34. E.g., (1985) 67 D.F.C.C. at 151, 173
35. (1988) 76 D.F.C.C. at 1, 51.
36. R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Frankfurt a.M., 1986) 122 and subs., esp. 146 and subs.
37. As to the new criticism of Alexis theory, see C. Enders, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 302–310.
38. As to the dispute on the scope of art. 2, para. 1 GBL, see (1990) 80 D.F.C.C. at 137, 153 and 169
39. see: O. Lagodny, D.F.C.C., at 90–94
40. Appel, D.F.C.C., at 319–328.
41. See also G. Jakobs, “Bookreview”, (1998) 110 Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (hereinafter: ZStW) 717–725, at 718 and subs.
42. The decision (1990) 80 D.F.C.C. at 367 and subs, leaves some doubt whether the court regards notes in a diary as belonging to this nucleus. The background was that such notes were the only evidence in a murder case. Although this decision concerned a procedural question, one could draw consequences as to substantive law because it had to deal with the limits of a state's intrusion into privacy.
43. (1993) 88 D.F.C.C. at 203, 252, 254 and subs.
44. See: O. Lagodny, D.F.C.C., at 262 and subs.
45. One of the few consequences which may be drawn at this step is that it is not constitutional to punish behaviour which is justified by objective cricumstances of which the actor is not aware, see: O. Lagodny, “Grundrechtliche Vorgaben für einen Straftatbegriff, in J. Arnold, B. Burkhardt, W. Gropp and Hg. Koch, eds., Grenzüberschreitungen Beiträge zum 60. Geburtstag von. Albin Eser, (Freiburg, 1995) 27–37.
46. (1993) 86 D.F.C.C. at 28, 35 and subs.
47. Cf. only T. Lenckner, in A. Schönke and H. Schroder, Strafgesetzbuch (Munich, 25th ed., 1997) annotations 8 and subs, before section 13.
48. The discussions about the concept of “Rechtsgut” reminds me of the “tû-tû”-analogy which Alf Ross, A. Ross, Tû-Tû. (1956/1957) 70 Harvard L.R. 812 and subs, used to analyse the concept of guilt.
49. See O. Lagodny, Harvard L.R., at 145–162 and 288–317,424–445
50. and also I. Appel, Harvard L.R., at 206–207, 336–390.
51. G. Staechelin, Harvard L.R., at 120 and passim, tries to lift the question of “Rechtsgut” to a higher level from a different constitutional concept
52. i.e., E. Grabitz, “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäβigkeit in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts”, (1977) 98 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 568 and subs., which has not been accepted in constitutional doctrine. Therefore, his approach to promulgate a concretization of the concept of proprtionality which is specific for criminal law is not convincing as long as we analyse criminal law on the basis of accepted doctrine in constitutional law.
53. See Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts II B.
54. (1994) 90 D.F.C.C, at 145 and subs. This was a landmark decision on the punishability of purchasing minor quantities of cannabis for personal consumption. The court held that punishing such special cases would be unproportional unless there were procedural solutions for dropping such cases. Before this decision, the Federal Constitutional Court practised a control of criminal law provision which was based on rather vague principles derived from a so-called principle of punishment according to the principle of guilt (“Grundsatz schuldangemessenen Strafens) which did not fit into the general practice of the court outside the area of criminal law
55. see: O. Lagodny, D.F.C.C, at 66–70.
56. See O, Lagodny, D.F.C.C, at 318–321
57. I. Appel, D.F.C.C, at 175 and subs. 179.
58. See: O. Lagodny, D.F.C.C, at 165–366.
59. (1994) 90 D.F.C.C. at 145,173 and subs.
60. cf. also (1990) 80 D.F.C.C. at 244,255
61. (1987) 73 D.F.C.C, at 206, 253.
62. (1971) 20 D.F.C.C. at 323, 331.
63. U. Weber, “Die Vorverlegung des Strafrechtsschutzes durch Gefahrdungs- und Unternehmensdelikte”, in Die Vorverlegung des Strafrechtsschutzes durch Gefahrdungs- und Unternehmensdelikte, H.-H. Jescheck, ed., Supplementary to Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (Berlin, 1987) 1, 31.
64. See e.g., (1990) 80 D.F.C.C. at 182, 185
65. (1968) 22 D.F.C.C. at 49, 81
66. (1968) 23 D.F.C.C. at 113, 126
67. (1970) 27 D.F.C.C. at 18, 29.
68. D.F.C.C. II B and III B.
69. (1970) 28 D.F.C.C. at 175, 188
70. (1980) 51 D.F.C.C. at 60, 74
71. Federal Constitutional Cort (1977) 30 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at 2207.
72. As to the distinction between norms which have a clear-cut yes/no-answer based on a “if… then…” pattern and principles which are meant only to optimize conficting interests in the sense of “more/less”, see Alexy, D.F.C.C., at 75 and subs.
73. See: O, Lagodny, D.F.C.C., at 430–445, 480–488, 519–520.
74. This is the result of bringing together again the control of the prohibition and the power to blame and to punish which Staechelin, D.F.C.C., at 51,164 and subs., misses. His critics might be influenced by the fact that these results are too “weak”, i.e., not in the sense of clear-cut unconstitutionality, from the point of view of his “Rechtsguts”-approach
75. see D.F.C.C.
76. See D.F.C.C.
77. See G. Heine, “Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Unternehmen” (Baden-Baden, 1995) 27 and subs.
78. See Lagodny, “Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Unternehmen”, at 519 and subs.
79. As to this problem see in general: T. Kleinknecht and L. Meyer-Goβner, Strafprozeβordnung (Munich, 44th ed., 1999) annotation 1–5 to section 110 a with further references.
80. G. Jakobs, Strafprozeβordnung, at 719 and subs.
81. See W. Schild, Strafprozeβordnung, at 290 and subs, who explicitly denies that punishment (“Strafe”) may be justified in the sense of constitutional law by the principle of proportionality.
82. See also I. Appel, Strafprozeβordnung, at 48 and subs., 305 and subs., reporting comparable tendencies in criminal law.
83. As to the ignorance of the present legislator, see the realistic and frightening mirror which M. Hettinger, “Entwicklungen im Strafrecht und StrafVerfahrensrecht der Gegenwart” (Heidelberg, 1997) shows us.
84. In addition, actual changes in the criminal law by the “6. Strafrechtsreformgesetz” (6th law of criminal law reform), Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt], 1998 Volume I, pages 164 and subs., have caused a tremendous wave of critique because it was passed nearly out of the blue with enormous incoherency due to the lack of sufficient analysis, see K. Lackner and K. Kühl, “Das Sechste Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts - Eine kritische Einführung” (Munich, 1998) VI-IX with further references.