How convenient! The epistemic rationale of self-validating belief systems

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 341-364

  Boudry, Maarten ^a   Braeckman, Johan ^a  

^a GHENT UNIVERSITY   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Cognitive Constraints; Cultural Selection; Epidemiology of Beliefs; Epistemic Defense Mechanisms; Immunizing Strategies; Self Validating Belief Systems

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860133120     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.579420     Document Type: Article

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