System and evolution in corporate governance

Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 111-130

  Deakin, Simon ^a   Carvalho, Fabio ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b International consulting firm   (Brazil)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859864179     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (26)

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