Deference to the executive in the United States after September 11: Congress, the courts, and the office of legal counsel

Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 213-244

  Posner, Eric A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859851443     PISSN: 01934872     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 15-16 (2007) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE].
2. Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 301 (2009).
3. see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L. J. 1255 (1988).
4. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 32-34, 208 (2007).
5. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 5-7, 10-12 (2010).
6. See POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 510-11 (2004) (describing detention of U. S. citizen without the filing of charges);
8. Rebecca Cathcart, Immigration Officials Arrest 905 in California Sweep, N. Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008, at A15;
9. David S. Cloud, Concerns Led to Revisions, Rumsfeld Says, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A16 (describing United States use of coercive interrogation techniques);
10. Carol J. Williams, Wiretapping Lawsuit May Have Its Day in Court, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at A9.
11. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 507 (permitting detention of an American citizen without a full criminal trial).
12. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 401-05 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 531-34.
14. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005);
15. John Yoo, Unitary, Executive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1935 (2009) (book review).
16. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 155-58 (tent. ed. 1958). The speed limit example below is drawn from this text.
17. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557, 588 (1993).
18. See Steven A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879 (2007);
19. see also Ellen Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial Decisions, 54 SMU L. REV. 9 (2001).
20. This problem is famous from labor relations. Workers who seek to pressure employers without going on strike (which in certain cases may be illegal) have frequently adopted the strategy of "work-to-rule", where they follow the rules or protocols of their job in a literal-minded way rather than use them as presumptions. The result is that they become extremely unproductive while maintaining deniability, though no one is fooled. See generally Karl O. Moene, Unions' Threats and Wage Determinations, 98 ECON. J. 471 (1988).
21. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html).
22. As occurred with the TARP law. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1625 (2009).
23. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1405-08 (2009).
24. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., OLC, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA, Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative, 3-4 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Interrogation Memorandum], available at http://s3.amazonaws. com/nytdocs/docs/151/151.pdf.
25. See Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 904 (2008) (discussing wiretapping and money-transfer tracking programs).
26. E.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., OLC, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U. S. C. 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002);
27. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., OLC, to David S. Kris, Associate Deputy Att'y Gen., Re: Constitutionality of Amending Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to Change the "Purpose" Standard for Searches 1, 3 (Sept. 25, 2001).
28. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688 (2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism]
29. Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, "Hostilities", the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 64-65 (2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Libya] (again disputing Professor Ackerman's assertion that the OLC's analysis is unreliable but without taking a stance on the impact of that analysis on the scope of executive power).
30. For similar skepticism, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L. J. 2314, 2335-38 (2006).
31. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010) [hereinafter Morrison, Stare Decisis] (and citations therein).
32. See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 501 (1993).
33. Cf. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1722-23.
34. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1722.
35. See Cornellia T. L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 716-17 (2005) ("[T]he more critically OLC examines executive conduct, the more cautious its clients are likely to be in some cases about seeking its advice.").
36. See Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 41, at 1501.
37. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1722 ("[I]f OLC says yes too readily to its clients, it will no longer be useful to them", because its opinions must "be taken seriously as a sober work of legal analysis by officials not precommitted to the outcome" to mollify critics.").
38. There is a second twist to the analysis. The President and the OLC have developed a mechanism for limiting the downside of negative advice. That is the process under which the OLC first gives the President legal advice orally and privately, and then memorializes it in writing only if it is favorable (or otherwise if the President consents). If this system worked perfectly, then the OLC would enable the President to engage in all L policies without affecting his ability to engage in I policies. As a result of OLC advice, Congress will drop its opposition to Policy L; while in the absence of OLC advice, Congress's opposition to Policy I will remain moderate because of its uncertainty about whether Policy I is illegal. As a result of OLC's participation in executive branch decisionmaking, the political opposition to Policy L drops to zero, while political opposition to Policy I remains unchanged. See Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 41, at 1468-70. It would be wrong to exaggerate the significance of this mechanism. If the OLC never publicly gave the executive negative advice, then it would lose its credibility, and if the executive offers no OLC defense for certain actions when it has done so in the past, Congress and others will naturally infer that the OLC has privately given negative advice to the President. So for certain types of actions, Congress will expect an OLC opinion and draw a negative inference if none is forthcoming.
39. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39 at 1732-33;
40. Morrison, Libya, supra note 39, at 67-68. Still, the President's freedom to deny OLC's opinion to Congress creates some noise in the system, as it is always possible that the OLC failed to give advice rather than gave negative advice, and all this works to the executive's advantage.
41. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U. S. Attorneys: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 218-20 (2007) [hereinafter Comey Testimony] (statement of James B. Comey, former Deputy Attorney General).
42. See Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 41, at 1501-02 (noting the "generally pro-executive tenor in OLC opinions").
43. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1717-18.
44. see also Comey Testimony, supra note 54, at 218-20.
45. See, e.g., Morrison, Libya, supra note 39, at 65. Former OLC officials report that OLC has on numerous occasions provided a classified no, which the President has complied with. See, e.g., Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1718. It is impossible to argue with someone who cites secret evidence. Without doubting their sincerity, one can question whether they know the complete story, or have thought about the evidence systematically and considered alternate hypotheses. In any event, dependent as I am on public sources, my argument will proceed accordingly.
46. Comey Testimony, supra note 54, at 214-15 (discussing "reevaluation" of electronic surveillance program).
47. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1726 n. 144.
48. See, e.g., Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 32, at 14 (insisting that only harmless insects can be used and that subjects be informed that the insects cannot cause death or severe suffering).
49. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1741.
50. Morrison, Libya, supra note 39, at 74.
51. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 25 (D. C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring) (arguing that the triggering of the War Powers Resolution involves a nonjusticiable political question, and collecting cases).
52. see also POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing weaknesses of judicial decisionmaking).
53. See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2010).
54. See LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 91 (2000).
55. See 50 U. S. C. A. § 1544 (b) (Supp. 2009).
56. Authority to Use U. S. Military Forces in Somalia., 16 Op. O. L. C. 6-7 (1992).
57. Deployment of U. S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O. L. C. 173, 173-75 (1994).
58. Proposed Deployment of Troops into Bosnia, 19 Op. O. L. C. (1995), http://www.justice.gov/olc/bosnia2.htm.
59. Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O. L. C. 1, 3-4 (2000).
60. See Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 32.
61. See O. L. C., Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Attorney General, December 30, 2004, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
62. See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O. L. C. 1 (April 1, 2011).
63. White House Admin., United States Activities in Libya 25(2011), available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/ObamaLibyaJustification.pdf.
64. See S. C. Res. 83
65. ¶ 7, U. N. SCOR, 5th Year, U. N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev. 1 at 5 (June 27, 1950);
66. S. C. Res. 82, ¶4-7, 8-10, U. N SCOR, 5th Year, U. N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev. 1 at 4 (June 25, 1950).
67. See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War Power, N. Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A1.