Informed desire and the ambitions of libertarian paternalism

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 647-658

  Qizilbash, Mozaffar ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859106133     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0620-8     Document Type: Article

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