Do External Grants to District Governments Discourage Own Revenue Generation? A Look at Local Public Finance Dynamics in Ghana

World Development

Volumn 40, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 1054-1067

  Mogues, Tewodaj ^a   Benin, Samuel ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

Africa; Decentralization; Ghana; Intergovernmental transfers; Internally generated revenues; Local public finance

Indexed keywords

DECENTRALIZATION; ECONOMIC GROWTH; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; INCENTIVE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; PANEL DATA;

GHANA;

EID: 84858614322     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.12.001     Document Type: Article

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