Why Germany wanted EMU: The role of Helmut kohl's Belief System and the Fall of the Berlin Wall

German Politics

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 34-52

  van Esch, Femke ^a  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84858320501     PISSN: 09644008     EISSN: 17438993     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2012.655012     Document Type: Article

References (142)

1. Charlemagne, 'The Ultimate EU Slur: Call Your Opponent a Nationalist', The Economist, 3 March 2010, available from www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/&pos;05/euro_crisis (accessed January 2012).
2. Der Spiegel, 'Merkel's Greece Deal "Betrays the Concept of Europe" ', 26 March 2010, available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,685840,00.html (accessed January 2012).
3. Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Frieden, 'The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification: An Analytical Introduction', Economics and Politics 5/2 (2010), pp.85-105.
4. C. Randall Henning, 'Monetary Integration: The Case of Europe', International Organization 52/3 (1998), pp.537-573.
5. Mattias Kaelberer, 'Deutsche Mark Nationalism and Europeanized Identity: Exploring Identity Aspects of Germany's Adoption of the Euro', German Politics 14/3 (2005), pp.283-296.
6. Peter H. Loedel, Deutsche Mark Politics: Germany in the European Monetary System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
7. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
8. Wayne Sandholtz, 'Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht', International Organization 47/1 (1993), pp.1-39.
9. Erich R. Staal, 'European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma', ZEI Discussion Papers C45 (1999).
10. Eichengreen and Frieden, 'The Political Economy'; Dorothee Heisenberg, 'Taking a Second Look at Germany's Motivation to Establish Economic and Monetary Union: A Critique of "Economic Interests" Claims', German Politics 14/1 (2005), pp.95-109.
11. Martin Marcussen, 'The Dynamics of EMU Ideas', Cooperation and Conflict 34/4 (1999), pp.383-411.
12. Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
13. Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans-Joachim Knopf and Klaus Roscher, 'To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union', European Journal of International Relations 5/2 (1999), pp.147-187.
14. Sandholtz, 'Choosing Union', p.25.
15. Karl Kaltenthaler, 'German Interests in European Monetary Integration', Journal of Common Market Studies 40/1 (2002), pp.69-87.
16. This argument is not uncommon in the literature. Some argue that the fall of the BerlinWall incited a quid pro quo between France and Germany, others that it triggered a further (voluntary) Westbindung by Germany. Overall, no agreement exists on whether and how this event played a role. Moreover, there is a marked lack of empirical and systematic research into this matter.
17. Michael J. Baun, 'The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France and European Integration', Political Science Quarterly 110/4 (1995), pp.605-625.
18. William M. Chandler, 'German Influence in Shaping EMU: Still a Tamed Power?', in Amy Verdun (ed.), The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp.201-214.
19. Staal, 'European Monetary Union', p.10.
20. Carsten Hefeker, Interest Groups and Monetary Integration: The Political Economy of Exchange Regime Choice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
21. Moravcsik, The Choice, pp.38-45.
22. Eichengreen and Frieden, 'The Political Economy'; Jeffrey A. Frieden, 'Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance', International Organization 45/4 (1991), pp.440-451.
23. Sandholtz, 'Choosing Union'; Staal, 'European Monetary Union'.
24. Henning, 'Monetary Integration', pp.548, 563-565.
25. Loedel, Deutsche Mark Politics, pp.93-108.
26. Staal, 'European Monetary Union'.
27. Henning, 'Monetary Integration', p.566.
28. Eichengreen and Frieden, 'The Political Economy'.
29. Staal, 'European Monetary Union'.
30. Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (Delors Committee), Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EU, April 1989).
31. Femke A.W.J., Van Esch, 'Mapping the Road to Maastricht: A Comparative Study of German and French Pivotal Decision Makers' Preferences Concerning the Establishment of a European Monetary Union during the Early 1970s and Late 1980s', Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen, Faculty of Management Sciences, 2007, pp.35-356.
32. Heisenberg, 'Taking a Second Look'.
33. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas, pp.33-42.
34. Sandholtz 'Choosing Union', p.25.
35. Thomas Pedersen, Germany, France, and the Integration of Europe: A Realist Interpretation (London and New York: Pinter, 1998).
36. Dorothee Heisenberg, The Mark of the Bundesbank: Germany's Role in European Monetary Cooperation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), pp.6-9.
37. Staal, 'European Monetary Union'.
38. Joseph M. Grieco, 'Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union', in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatement and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp.290-304.
39. Marcussen, 'The Dynamics of EMU Ideas', p.400.
40. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas; Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation of EMU: An Epistemic Community', European Journal of Public Policy 6/2 (1999), pp.308-328.
41. Marcussen, 'The Dynamics of EMU Ideas', p.402.
42. Robert Axelrod, 'The Cognitive Mapping Approach to Decision Making', in Robert Axelrod (ed.), Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp.3-17.
43. Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer, 'Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations', Mershon International Studies Review 42/ 1 (1998), pp.63-96.
44. For an elaborate description of the method used.
45. Van Esch, 'Mapping the Road to Maastricht', ch.4.
46. A decision-maker prefers policies that are linked to a positively evaluated goal by only positive relationships or an even amount of negative relations, or to a negatively evaluated goal by an uneven amount of negative relations. Decision-makers' preferences are indeterminate when linked to policy by a path containing one or more zero signs.
47. The cognitive maps may be obtained from the author's website: http://www.uu.nl/rebo/medewerkers/FAWJvanEsch
48. Including E6/E9/E14/M2/P2/R3.
49. Including E7/E10/E11/M1.
50. Including C1/-L1/P1/S2/C3/H3.
51. Including E2/E3/W1/E13/S3.
52. Including concepts directly following concepts referring to European integration: E1/E2/E4/E8/L2/P1.
53. Including concepts directly following concepts referring to European integration: F1/F2/F4/G4/P4/P5/F7/G8/O1/R2/R3.
54. Kaltenthaler, 'German Interests'.
55. Heisenberg L, The Mark of the Bundesbank; Kaltenthaler, 'German Interests'.
56. Risse et al., 'To Euro or Not to Euro?', p.168.
57. Risse et al., 'To Euro or Not to Euro?', p.167;.
58. Kenneth H.F. Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.260-263.
59. Van Esch, 'Mapping the Road to Maastricht'.
60. Risse et al., 'To Euro or Not to Euro?'.
61. Kaelberer, 'Deutsche Mark Nationalism and Europeanized Identity'.
62. Van Esch, 'Mapping the Road to Maastricht'.
63. Femke A.W.J., Van Esch, 'The Rising of the Phoenix: Building the European Monetary System on a Meeting of Minds', L'Europe en Formation 353/4 (2009), pp.133-148.
64. The distinction between these groups is not clear-cut. Members of the political elite generally supported the Bundesbank's ordo-liberal policies, while members of the German financial elite are overall 'Good Europeans'.
65. Risse et al., 'To Euro or Not to Euro?', pp.167-169.
66. However, if forced to choose, their choices will contradict.
67. Eckart Gaddum, Die deutsche Europapolitik in den 80er Jahren: Interessen, Konflikte und Entscheidungen der Regierung Kohl (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1994), p.68.
68. Kenneth H.F. Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (New York: Longman, 1994), p.117.
69. Gaddum, Die deutsche Europapolitik, pp.322-344.
70. Andrem Szász, The Road to European Monetary Union (London: MacMillan Press, 1999), pp.89-92.
71. Neither the Bundesbank, nor the Ministries of Economic and Financial Affairs are present during European Council meetings.
72. David R. Cameron, 'Creating Supranational Authority in Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policy: The Sources and Effects of EMU', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.204, note 28.
73. Dyson, Elusive Union, p.128.
74. Wilhelm Schönfelder and Elke Thiel, Ein Markt - Ein Währung: Die Verhandlungen zur Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994).
75. Agence Europe, Europe, Daily Bulletin (Luxembourg: Agence Internationale d'Information pour la Presse), 10 May 1988, p.6.
76. Dyson and Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, p.333.
77. Gaddum, Die deutsche Europapolitik, pp.348, 351-352.
78. Joachim Bitterlich, Das Europa der Zukunft (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2004), p.21;
79. Dyson, Elusive Union, p.128.
80. Gaddum, Die deutsche Europapolitik, p.353.
81. David R. Cameron, 'Transnational Relations and the Development of European Economic and Monetary Union', in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.48.
82. Niels Thygesen, 'The Delors Report and European Economic and Monetary Union', International affairs 65/4 (1989), p.640.
83. DzDPS Hanns J., Küsters L and Daniel Hofmann (eds), Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/1990 (München: Oldenburg, 1998), p.308.
84. Schönfelder and Thiel, Ein Markt, pp.55-56.
85. Later that year, Kohl cited the December elections as the reason for refusing to commit to an early start date. However, at the time of the June meetings, the date for the elections had not yet been set, Dzdps et al., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, p.454.
86. For map, see authors website, http://www.uu.nl/rebo/medewerkers/FAWJvanEsch
87. Patricia Clough, Helmut Kohl: Ein Porträt der Macht (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998), pp.27, 35.
88. Kenneth H.F. Dyson, 'Chancellor Kohl as Strategic Leader: The Case of Economic and Monetary Union', in Clay Clemens and William E. Paterson (eds), The Kohl Chancellorship: Special Issue of German Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp.42-43.
89. Dyson and Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, p.256.
90. Klaus Hofmann, Helmut Kohl, Kanzler des Vertrauens: Eine politische Biographie (Bonn: Aktuell, 1984), pp.24, 81.
91. All concepts referring to European integration are valued positively and have an above-average centrality and saliency of 7.2 and 9.9. Moreover, the two core concepts in the map both refer to European integration (E5/S1).
92. The Establishment of EMU (E6) has a well above-average centrality of 6 and saliency of 7.
93. Kohl distinguishes as many concepts referring to intergovernmental as supranational decision making. While valuing all of them positively, the latter are valued higher in terms of both centrality and saliency (see Tables A1 and A2).
94. Clough, Helmut Kohl, pp.62, 138.
95. Dyson and Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, p.257.
96. Kohl's map includes four concepts that refer to ordo-liberal economic considerations, compared to three 'Keynesian' concepts. Moreover, the saliency and centrality of ordo-liberal considerations are more than twice those of the Keynesian concepts.
97. Kohl distinguished four concepts referring to friendly Franco-German relations (F1/F2/F4/S4), which he associates positively with various intergovernmental and supranational modes of European integration.
98. Countering the 'partition of Germany' (P4) is the most important political goal of European integration with the above-average centrality of 6 and saliency of 8.
99. From the most central and salient economic and political goals served by further European integration, the economic goals (P1, E8) are intermediate goals which lead further into other, political, goals. The main political goals of peace (P5) and German reunification (P4) are the ultimate goals; they are not followed by higher goals.
100. Dyson, 'Chancellor Kohl as Strategic Leader', p.39.
101. Dyson and Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, p.308.
102. Dyson and Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, p.334.
103. Gaddum, Die deutsche Europapolitik.
104. Helmut Kohl, (2000) Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (München: Ullstein, 2000).
105. Philip D. Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
106. Agence Europe, 16 October 1989, p.4.
107. Dzdps, et al., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, p.460.
108. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p.95.
109. Dzdps, et al., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, p.308.
110. Dzdps, et al., p.298.
111. Dzdps, et al., pp.470-473.
112. Dzdps, et al., p.683.
113. Helmut Kohl, 'The Community and a United Germany', Europe Documents 1607 (1990), pp.1-2.
114. Agence Europe, 9 April 1990, p.15.
115. Agence Europe, 19 April 1990, p.3.
116. Dyson, Elusive Union, p.141.
117. Matthieu L.L., Segers and Femke A.W.J., Van Esch, 'Behind the Veil of Budgetary Discipline: The Political Logic of the Budgetary Rules in EMU and SGP', Journal of Common Market Studies 45/5 (2007), pp.1089-109.
118. Dzdps, et al., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, p.1545.
119. Agence Europe, No. 5149, p.3.
120. Szász, The Road to European Monetary Union, pp.159-160.
121. Schönfelder and Thiel, Ein Markt, p.104.
122. Agence Europe, 18 October 1990, p.6.
123. Colette Mazzucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union (New York: Garland Publishing, 1997), p.80.
124. Agence Europe, 24/25 Sept. 1990, p.1.
125. Dyson and Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, pp.396-397.
126. Mazzucelli, France and Germany, p.199.
127. While the Bundesbank may be considered a veto player in European monetary integration, the German Basic Law grants the government the right to determine the scope of its currency area and negotiate international monetary agreements.
128. Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit.
129. Twenty-two rather than eighteen of forty-six concepts refer to European integration, three of which are valued high above-average (S1/E6/P2, see Table A2).
130. The concept of the 'Political Unification of Europe' (P2) became the third 'supranational' concept at the core of Kohl's belief system. The sum of their centrality and saliency values is 99, that of the intergovernmental concepts is 24. In the first map, these were respectively 46 and 38.
131. The centrality and saliency of the concept 'Partition of Germany' (P4) doubled. Moreover, in the second map, in addition to the reciprocal relationship between European integration and German reunification from the first map, several more are identified (E6-/E10-/E11-/G2-P4; G8-G7; G6-/E10-/E11-G8; P4-P2; G7-G8).
132. The number of economic goals drops from six to two, and relative centrality and saliency drop to less than one-fifth of the rates in the first map. At the same time, the relative centrality and saliency of political consequences almost doubles (see Table 1).
133. In addition to the increased centrality and saliency of P4, Kohl now mentions three additional concepts, referring to the reforms in Eastern Europe and (possible) German reunification (F7/G8/R2).
134. Quentin Peel, 'Deliberation by Chancellor Risks Confusion on Several Points', Financial Times, 12 May 2011, p.2.
135. Wolfgang Münchau, 'The Political Constraints of the Eurozone', Financial Times, 15 Feb. 2010, p.7.
136. Ralph Atkins, 'Greek Dilemma Piles Pressure on Merkel', Financial Times, 22 March 2010, p.3.
137. Wolfgang Münchau, 'Germany Pays for Merkel's Miscalculations', Financial Times, 11 May 2011, p.9.
138. Jerel A. Rosati, 'A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy', in Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K.Hey and Patrick J. Haney (eds), Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p.54.
139. Van Esch, 'Mapping the Road to Maastricht'.
140. Financial Times Magazine, 'What the Philosopher Saw', 1 May 2010, p.16.
141. Der Spiegel, 'Merkel's Greece Deal'.
142. Quentin Peel, 'A Test of Strength', Financial Times, 12 April 2011, p.9.