Prizes and patents: Using market signals to provide incentives for innovations

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 147, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 781-801

  Chari, V V ^a   Golosov, Mikhail ^b   Tsyvinski, Aleh ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic growth; Innovations; Mechanism design; Patents; Prizes

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857985114     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.04.004     Document Type: Article

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