Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 201-215

  Boffa, Federico ^a   Panzar, John ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MACERATA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

^c NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Co ownership; Regulation; Vertically related industries

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857919502     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-011-9157-0     Document Type: Article

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