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Volumn 101, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 885-968

Mental disorder and criminal law

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EID: 84857545497     PISSN: 00914169     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (54)

References (316)
  • 1
    • 84857547684 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • When I wish to refer to all the doctrines generically, I will summarily term them "criminal competence and responsibility. "
  • 2
    • 84857547535 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • I use the term "people with mental disorder" advisedly. Although it is more cumbersome than the term "the mentally disordered, " it is the preferred, more respectful way of referring to such people because it avoids treating them as equivalent to their disorder. For a more specific example, it is preferable to refer to a "person with schizophrenia" rather than a "schizophrenic. " I recognize that it is common to refer to people with physical disease in the essentializing form, such as a "diabetic" rather than a "person with diabetes. " Nevertheless, because as the next Part describes, mental disorder is diagnosed behaviorally rather than mechanistically, the essentializing locution carries the risk of undermining respect for the sufferer's personhood and of stigmatizing the person unduly. Despite these considerations, I will also refer to the behavior that justifies the label of mental disorder as "crazy behavior. " This locution betokens no disrespect towards sufferers. For legal purposes, it is simply the most descriptive and neutral and least question-begging term that can be used. See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 527, 547-54 (1978).
  • 3
    • 84857549630 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental Disorders, 4th Edition-Text Revision xxxi (2000) [hereinafter, DSM-IV-TR or simply DSM]. DSM-V is currently in development and will probably be published in 2013. The generic definition is not likely to be substantially changed, however. For the most current working definition proposed by the DSM-V working group charged with developing the generic definition, see Proposed Revision, Am. Psychiatric Ass'n (May 18, 2010), http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=465 (providing essentially the same criteria listed separately as "features"). The major difference is that the proposed revision also provides a set of "other considerations, " but no guidance is given about how they are to be used.
  • 4
    • 84857620585 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental Disorders, 4th Edition-Text Revision xxxi (2000) [hereinafter, DSM-IV-TR or simply DSM]. DSM-V is currently in development and will probably be published in 2013. The generic definition is not likely to be substantially changed, however. For the most current working definition proposed by the DSM-V working group charged with developing the generic definition, see Proposed Revision, Am. Psychiatric Ass'n (May 18, 2010), http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=465 (providing essentially the same criteria listed separately as "features"). The major difference is that the proposed revision also provides a set of "other considerations, " but no guidance is given about how they are to be used.
  • 5
    • 84857619161 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at xxxi.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521
  • 6
    • 84857549629 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at xxxii-xxxiii, xxxvii.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521
  • 7
    • 84857558116 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Even delirium, dementia, and similar disorders, which were previously classified as "organic disorders, " are diagnosed behaviorally. An organic abnormality must only be assumed and need not be identified. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 135.
  • 8
    • 70450209648 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Whither DSM-V?
    • note
    • Allen Frances, Whither DSM-V?, 195 Brit. J. Psychiatry 391, 391 (2009). Many studies do find differences between patients with mental disorders and controls, but the differences are too small to be used diagnostically. But see generally John P. A. Ioannidis, Excess Significance Bias in the Literature on Brain Volume Abnormalities, Archives Gen. Psychiatry (Apr. 4, 2011), http://archpsyc.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/archgenpsychiatry.2011.28v1.pdf (claiming, based on a meta-analysis of studies of brain volume abnormalities in patients with mental disorders, that many more studies than should be expected found statistically significant results and that this can be best explained by bias in the reporting of the data).
    • (2009) Brit. J. Psychiatry , vol.195 , pp. 391
    • Frances, A.1
  • 9
    • 84857558114 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Michael W. Eysenck, Psychology: An International Perspective 856 (2004).
  • 10
    • 84857549628 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See generally Carl F. Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience (2007) (arguing for a multifield, multilevel explanatory scheme within neuroscience and more generally).
  • 11
    • 33750075299 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility
    • note
    • Mechanisms are actions and mental states that cannot be in part explained or rationalized by the agent's reasons for action. For example, addiction to a substance is centrally defined by the signs of persistent seeking and using the substance. See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 Law & Contemp. Probs. 165, 176 (2006). Even if seeking and using are signs of a disease that has genetic, anatomical, and physiological causes, they are nonetheless actions. Indeed, all intentional action has genetic, anatomical, and physiological causes, whether or not the action is the sign of a disease. The addict has an exceptionally powerful desire-a craving-to consume the addictive substance, believes that consuming it will satisfy that craving by avoiding pain, causing pleasure, or some combination of the two, and therefore forms and acts on the intention to seek and to use the substance. Such explanatory practical syllogisms are the mark of all intentional actions.
    • (2006) Law & Contemp. Probs , vol.69 , pp. 165-176
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 12
    • 84857549627 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See generally Richard J. McNally, What is Mental Illness? (2011) (providing a nuanced, scholarly analysis of the nature of mental disorder, including the role of culture in
  • 13
    • 84857549631 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Michael W. Eysenck, Psychology: An International Perspective 856 (2004).
  • 14
    • 84857558113 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See generally Carl F. Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience (2007) (arguing for a multifield, multilevel explanatory scheme within neuroscience and more generally).
  • 15
    • 33750075299 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility
    • note
    • Mechanisms are actions and mental states that cannot be in part explained or rationalized by the agent's reasons for action. For example, addiction to a substance is centrally defined by the signs of persistent seeking and using the substance. See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 Law & Contemp. Probs. 165, 176 (2006). Even if seeking and using are signs of a disease that has genetic, anatomical, and physiological causes, they are nonetheless actions. Indeed, all intentional action has genetic, anatomical, and physiological causes, whether or not the action is the sign of a disease. The addict has an exceptionally powerful desire-a craving-to consume the addictive substance, believes that consuming it will satisfy that craving by avoiding pain, causing pleasure, or some combination of the two, and therefore forms and acts on the intention to seek and to use the substance. Such explanatory practical syllogisms are the mark of all intentional actions.
    • (2006) Law & Contemp. Probs , vol.69 , pp. 165-176
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 16
    • 84857547536 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See generally Richard J. McNally, What is Mental Illness? (2011) (providing a nuanced, scholarly analysis of the nature of mental disorder, including the role of culture in Kutchins & Stuart A. Kirk, Making Us Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders (1997).
  • 17
    • 85014707190 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Neither Desert nor Disease
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 Legal Theory 265 (1999). The formulation that follows in the text expands on my earlier formulation to encompass competence as well as responsibility issues.
    • (1999) Legal Theory , vol.5 , pp. 265
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 18
    • 84857619162 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Subpart VI. A, infra, discusses a major exemplar of such "gap-filling, " the allegedly civil, involuntary commitment of mentally abnormal sexually violent predators. Kutchins & Stuart A. Kirk, Making Us Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders (1997).
  • 19
    • 85014707190 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Neither Desert nor Disease
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 Legal Theory 265 (1999). The formulation that follows in the text expands on my earlier formulation to encompass competence as well as responsibility issues.
    • (1999) Legal Theory , vol.5 , pp. 265
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 20
    • 84857549633 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Subpart VI. A, infra, discusses a major exemplar of such "gap-filling, " the allegedly civil, involuntary commitment of mentally abnormal sexually violent predators.
  • 21
    • 84857619163 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (holding that proof that a defendant has a "serious difficulty in controlling [his] behavior" is a constitutionally required independent criterion for the involuntary civil commitment of a mentally abnormal sexually violent predator); see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 (1994).
  • 22
    • 84857547562 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. ").
  • 23
    • 0036751613 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 1060-62 (2002).
    • (2002) Va. L. Rev. , vol.88 , pp. 1060-1062
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 24
    • 84857547561 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Am. Bar Ass'n, Criminal Justice Standards Committee, ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards § 7-6.1 cmt. (1984).
  • 25
    • 0020628981 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, reprinted in 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 681 (1983).
  • 26
    • 84857620579 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • One of the first criminal law theoreticians to argue for the necessity of an independent control test was Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the great English criminal law historian, theorist, judge, and public intellectual. See 2 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 170 (1883). Fitzjames's rationale was that self-control difficulties flow from the inability of the agent to keep long term consequences in mind and to guide one's conduct by them. Note, however, that this is a classic rationality problem.
  • 27
    • 84857518208 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • H.L.A. Hart recognized this over a half-century ago. H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science 95, 99 (Sidney Hook ed., 1958), reprinted in, H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 28 (1st ed. 1968) [hereinafter Hart, Punishment and Responsibility].
  • 28
    • 84857613235 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • I shall only write about rationality problems in what follows, but for those who believe that a control criterion is justified, the same set of considerations apply.
  • 29
    • 84857620580 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • E.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735,774-75 (2006).
    • (2006) Clark v. Arizona , vol.548 , pp. 774-775
  • 30
    • 0008450373 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 n.3 (1997).
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 346
  • 31
    • 84857553663 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
    • (1979) Addington v. Texas , vol.441
  • 32
    • 84857620578 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
  • 33
    • 84857600632 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
  • 34
    • 84857613238 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Cases of suspected malingering are an exception.
  • 35
    • 84857558109 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • I term this the "clear cut" problem. See Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation?: An Essay on Neuroscience and Law, in Law and Neuroscience 529, 540 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011). Scientists do not go on "fishing expeditions" for data. Virtually all studies of potential interest to the law involve some behavior that has already been identified as of interest and the point of the study is to identify that behavior's causes or correlates. There is usually some bit of behavior, such as addiction, schizophrenia, or impulsivity that they would like to understand better. To do this properly presupposes that they have identified and validated the behavior under investigation. On occasion, the science might suggest that the behavior is not well-characterized or is biologically or causally indistinguishable from other, seemingly different behavior. In general, however, the existence of legally relevant behavior will already be apparent. For example, some people are grossly out of touch with reality. If, as a result, they do not understand right from wrong, we excuse them because they lack such knowledge. We might learn a great deal about the causes or correlates of such abnormalities, but we already knew without any scientific data that these abnormalities existed and we had a firm view of their normative significance. In such cases, the scientific data might be quite sensitive to the already clearly identified behaviors precisely because the behavior is so clear. Less clear behavior is simply not studied or the overlap between less clear behavior and the behavioral controls is greater. Thus, the markers of clear cases will provide little guidance to resolve behaviorally ambiguous cases of legally relevant behavior. For example, suppose in an insanity defense case the question is whether the defendant suffers from a major mental disorder such as schizophrenia. In extreme cases, the behavior will be clear and no scientific data will be necessary, except perhaps for convergent validity. In the future, we may be able to use various tests to resolve ambiguous cases more successfully, but for now we cannot.
  • 36
    • 84857613237 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See generally Morse, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)2, at 530-42 (explaining the function and structure of all mental health laws). These laws are discussed in detail in the various subparts infra.
  • 37
    • 84857620581 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (quoting Model Penal Code at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 10 1960).
  • 38
    • 34248325225 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology
    • note
    • I discuss these issues in virtually everything I write about criminal responsibility and competence. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 25 Behav. Sci. & L. 203, 209 (2007). My critics accuse me of repeating myself. I plead guilty and will continue to recidivate until people stop making these errors.
    • (2007) Behav. Sci. & L , vol.25 , pp. 203-209
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 39
    • 84857518211 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 209. By free will, I am referring to metaphysical libertarianism, the view that people can act uncaused by anything other than themselves. This is sometimes referred to as "contra-causal freedom, " "agent origination, " or like terms. This meaning is the strongest sense of free will and is a god-like power. 35 and accompanying text. When a criminal statute includes a term such as acting "freely" or against the "will, " which might be thought to refer to the strong sense of free will, it refers to an ordinary excusing condition such as compulsion. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code, § 261.2 (2010) (defining rape as sexual intercourse "against a person's will") & § 261.6 (defining adequate consent to sexual contact as "acting freely and voluntarily").
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 209
  • 40
    • 84857600638 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See generally John Earman, A Primer on Determinism (1986). Determinism means, roughly, that all events are caused by the laws of nature operating on prior states of the world. There are, however, many ways of conceptualizing determinism. It is possible to conceptualize a fully causal universe as probabilistic rather than deterministic, which is why the locution "universal causation" is used.
  • 41
    • 84857558110 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., Moore, 486 F. 2d at 1139. Moore appealed from a conviction for possession of heroin by claiming that he was entitled under common law criminal responsibility principles to a compulsion excuse because he was an addict and was therefore acting under compulsion when he possessed heroin. Moore essentially claimed that his behavioral controls were impaired. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 1144. This is a standard type of excusing claim, as the plurality opinion recognized, but it then went on to equate loss of control with lack of free will. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 1145-46. The plurality appeared to recognize that it was using lack of free will as a synonym for a traditional excusing condition, but using the free will locution lends itself to anxieties about the more radical critique. If the opinion did not use the term, free will, no change in the substantive analysis would have followed and much clarity would have been gained by limiting the analysis to whether recognizing a defense for impaired behavioral controls was a wise legal outcome.
  • 42
    • 84857620584 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See generally Robert Kane, Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction (2006) (providing a complete, balanced account of the debate).
  • 43
    • 33748316576 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • In Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal Law
    • note
    • Part VII infra addresses this challenge directly. See generally Katrina L. Sifferd, In Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal Law, 25 Law & Phil. 571 (2006) (providing an extensive defense of the use of folk psychology that underpins criminal law and claiming that criminal law does not need a substitute).
    • (2006) Law & Phil. , vol.25 , pp. 571
    • Sifferd, K.L.1
  • 44
    • 84857600633 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1587, 1592-94 (1994).
  • 45
    • 84255172493 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Powerful Particulars: The Real Reason the Behavioral Sciences Threaten Criminal Responsibility
    • note
    • See, e.g., Anders Kaye, Powerful Particulars: The Real Reason the Behavioral Sciences Threaten Criminal Responsibility, 37 Fl. St. U. L. Rev. 539 (2010).
    • (2010) Fl. St. U. L. Rev. , vol.37 , pp. 539
    • Kaye, A.1
  • 46
    • 33750142170 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses
    • note
    • Anders Kaye, Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses, 83 Neb. L. Rev. 1116 (2005).
    • (2005) Neb. L. Rev. , vol.83 , pp. 1116
    • Kaye, A.1
  • 47
    • 84857518209 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • E.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, in Law & the Brain 207, 217-18 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006).
  • 48
    • 84857620583 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Characterizing an excusing claim by the cause of that claim perpetuates the fundamental psycholegal error. For example, in United States v. Moore, discussed Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)35, the concurrence variously characterized Moore's claim as an "addiction" or "drug dependence" defense. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1160, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J., concurring). Judge Leventhal did recognize that impaired behavioral control was the heart of Moore's claim, at 1178, but such characterizations of defenses based on causes tends to beg the question of responsibility. The question is not whether Moore's unlawful possession of heroin was caused (in part) by his addiction. Of course it was. The questions are whether there ought to be a defense of impaired self-control in this type of case and, if so, did Moore meet its criteria? Simply being an addict does not answer the latter question. Lack of control must be proven independently.
  • 49
    • 84857600634 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • DSM, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)3, at 365-68. Diagnostic features include elevated mood, inflated self-esteem, decrease in need for sleep, and an increase in goal-directed functioning.
  • 50
    • 0037008485 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children
    • note
    • Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297 Science 851 (2002).
    • (2002) Science , vol.297 , pp. 851
    • Caspi, A.1
  • 51
    • 84857600635 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 853.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 853
  • 52
    • 84857518210 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See John Parry, Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony 89 (2009).
  • 53
    • 84857558111 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure 249-55, 315-51 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the test in the context of search and seizure and self-incrimination).
  • 54
    • 84857546178 scopus 로고
    • note
    • E.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (waiver of the right to a trial must be knowing and voluntary). Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Godinez characterized the standard as "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. " Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 403.
    • (1993) Godinez v. Moran , vol.509
  • 55
    • 84866654936 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
    • (1986) Colorado v. Connelly , vol.479 , pp. 157
  • 56
    • 84857620582 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 160.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 160
  • 57
  • 58
    • 84857518212 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 161.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 161
  • 59
    • 84857600636 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 159. Of course, Connelly did not explicitly waive his right to remain silent, but his uncoerced confession had precisely this effect.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 159
  • 60
    • 84857600639 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 167.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 167
  • 61
  • 62
    • 84857549645 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • I know of no study that examined this precise question, but standards for competence in the criminal justice system are generally low. See, e.g., Norman G. Poythress, Richard J. Bonnie, John Monahan, Randy Otto & Steven K. Hoge, Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies 50 (2002) (claiming that only 10-30% of defendants referred for competence evaluation are found incompetent, a number characterized as infrequent).
  • 63
    • 0025548462 scopus 로고
    • Psychological Evaluation of the Consent to Search
    • note
    • Henry J. Steadman, Beating a Rap? Defendants Incompetent to Stand Trial 7 (1979) (finding that in one full year only 539 defendants were found incompetent to stand trial in New York State). Poythress et al.'s and Steadman's data are entirely consistent with the general belief based on experience that the standards are low. We do not know how many confessions or consents to search are the result of severe mental disorder in the absence of police misconduct, but indirect evidence that the standard is low is provided by the general finding that appellate courts seldom overturn a finding of voluntariness absent police misconduct. James S. Wulach, Psychological Evaluation of the Consent to Search, 18 J. Psychiatry & L. 319, 327 (1990).
    • (1990) J. Psychiatry & L , vol.18 , pp. 319-327
    • Wulach, J.S.1
  • 64
    • 84857547537 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • For example, independent evidence the police discovered prior to the confession may be sufficient to link the defendant to the crime.
  • 65
    • 84857547687 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Most traditional involuntary civil commitment has abandoned indefinite terms of commitment and terms infrequently exceed six months. Samuel Jan Brakel, John Parry & Barbara A. Weiner, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 72 (3d ed. 1985); see, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5250 & 5300 (West 2010) (providing that people who are dangerous to others as a result of mental disorder may be committed for fourteen days, but can be detained for an additional 180 days if necessary). This is hardly lengthy confinement for a person who may have committed a serious crime and may still be quite dangerous.
  • 66
    • 84857547685 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Some dangerous people might still be uncommittable. Imagine a defendant who invalidly waives his rights as a result of mental disorder and the State needs the evidence to obtain a conviction. Between the waiver and the commitment, however, the defendant regains his mental health and is no longer committable. I assume that, as a technical matter, such a person would have to be released. I also assume that it would virtually never happen.
  • 67
    • 84857547686 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See infra subpart VI. A, for a discussion of sexual predator commitments.
  • 68
    • 84857549632 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Some jurisdictions already have special forms of lengthy commitment for certain classes of especially dangerous people who have been charged with a crime but have not been convicted, and who are non-responsible and dangerous to others. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5008(h)(1)(B) & 5350 (West 2010) (providing for "conservatorships" for people who are permanently incompetent to stand trial; conservatorships are for a year and may be renewed annually; the placement may be in a secure facility if necessary). The people committed in such cases are genuinely not responsible, and thus properly qualify for disease jurisprudence, unlike the case of most subjects of sexual predator commitments, which I discuss in subpart VI. A, infra.
  • 69
    • 84857515113 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible
    • note
    • See Steadman, James Forman Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 331 (2009)6, at 39. Steadman also found that hearings generally were routinized and brief. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 45-48. I know of no more recent data that contradicts these observations and they are entirely consistent with my experience. There are exceptions if the defendant retains his own expert or is entitled to name one. See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 1369 (a) (2010) (a defendant not challenging his own competence may name an evaluator).
    • (1997) N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change , vol.33 , pp. 346
    • Steadman Jr., J.F.1
  • 70
    • 84857529837 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
    • (1981) Estelle v. Smith , vol.451 , pp. 454
  • 71
    • 84857549647 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 463.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 463
  • 72
    • 84857619164 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 468-69.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 468-469
  • 73
    • 84857547560 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 468.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 468
  • 74
    • 84857547538 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 462.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 462
  • 75
    • 84857619164 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 468-69.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 468-469
  • 76
    • 84857547688 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Abraham S. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 124 (1967) ("Though the cases say again and again that expert testimony is not 'essential' to raise the insanity defense, it is clear that a persuasive case is unlikely to be made on lay testimony alone. "). Although a guilty verdict will typically be upheld even if the defense presents unanimous expert testimony that the defendant was legally insane and the prosecution rebuts this testimony only with lay witnesses and cross-examination, such cases are rare at the trial level. See Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 453 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that it is difficult to succeed without expert witnesses, but that appellate courts uphold verdicts based on lay testimony "not infrequently").
  • 77
  • 78
    • 84857549634 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
  • 79
    • 84857547540 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 77.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 77
  • 80
    • 84857547539 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 83-84.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 83-84
  • 81
    • 84857619165 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 83.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 83
  • 82
    • 84857529819 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 800 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
    • (2006) Clark v. Arizona , vol.548
  • 83
    • 79952921825 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
    • (1978) Lockett v. Ohio , vol.438
  • 84
    • 84857547543 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • E.g., United States v. Osoba, 213 F. 3d 913 (6th Cir. 2000).
    • United States v. Osoba , vol.213 , pp. 913
  • 85
    • 84857547542 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
  • 86
    • 84857547541 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963, 963-64 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
  • 87
    • 84857549636 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Parry, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)46, at 131-32.
  • 88
    • 84857547689 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • I address below the question of whether the same opportunity must be provided to the prosecution if the defendant chooses to introduce mental health testimony at sentencing.
  • 89
    • 84857530346 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473 (1981).
    • (1981) Estelle v. Smith , vol.451
  • 90
    • 84857547544 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967).
    • (1967) Pope v. United States , vol.372 , pp. 710
  • 91
    • 84857547690 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic Evaluation, 31 Emory L.J. 71, 103 (1981).
  • 92
    • 84857549637 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting the claim that the State does not need an independent evaluation).
  • 93
    • 84857547547 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • E.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986).
  • 94
    • 84857547546 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
  • 95
    • 84857619181 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975). Some refer to Dusky v. United States as the crucial precedent, but Dusky was simply an interpretation of the federal statute and not a constitutional case. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
  • 96
    • 84857619167 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241(c) (2006) ("unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense").
  • 97
    • 84857547545 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Cal. Penal Code § 1369(a) (West 2010) ("defendant's ability or inability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner as a result of mental disorder").
  • 98
    • 84857547691 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law, § 730.10.1 (West 2010) ("[A] defendant who has a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense").
  • 99
    • 0026731837 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 Behav. Sci. & L. 291 (1992). Professor Bonnie has drawn an influential distinction between the capacity to proceed and decisional capacity in the criminal justice system. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 298. The defendant incompetent to stand trial requires competence to continue the criminal process; the defendant pleading guilty must be competent to make a current decision about whether to waive his right to trial and attendant rights. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) The distinction has been criticized because implicit in a finding of competence to proceed is that the defendant will have to make decisions as the process continues. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397-400 (1993) (finding no significant difference between the two standards). It is nonetheless a useful distinction, as it focuses more precisely on what is at stake.
  • 100
    • 79953208245 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
    • (1966) Pate v. Robinson , vol.383 , pp. 375
  • 101
    • 84857547550 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975). Some refer to Dusky v. United States as the crucial precedent, but Dusky was simply an interpretation of the federal statute and not a constitutional case. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
  • 102
    • 84857547549 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241(c) (2006) ("unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense").
  • 103
    • 84857547692 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Cal. Penal Code § 1369(a) (West 2010) ("defendant's ability or inability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner as a result of mental disorder").
  • 104
    • 84857619170 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law, § 730.10.1 (West 2010) ("[A] defendant who has a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense").
  • 105
    • 0026731837 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 Behav. Sci. & L. 291 (1992). Professor Bonnie has drawn an influential distinction between the capacity to proceed and decisional capacity in the criminal justice system. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 298. The defendant incompetent to stand trial requires competence to continue the criminal process; the defendant pleading guilty must be competent to make a current decision about whether to waive his right to trial and attendant rights. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) The distinction has been criticized because implicit in a finding of competence to proceed is that the defendant will have to make decisions as the process continues. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397-400 (1993) (finding no significant difference between the two standards). It is nonetheless a useful distinction, as it focuses more precisely on what is at stake.
  • 106
    • 80052347978 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible
    • note
    • Poythress et al., James Forman Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 331 (2009)6, at 45-46.
    • (2009) N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change , vol.33 , pp. 3316
    • Poythress1    Forman Jr., J.2
  • 107
    • 84857567514 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 51, 93-95 (finding that defendants with schizophrenia were the most impaired, but also finding some overlap among the diagnostic groups).
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 51
  • 108
    • 84857619171 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). In practice, defense counsel will have the best access to the defendant and will be primarily responsible for raising the issue.
  • 109
    • 80052347978 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible
    • note
    • Poythress et al., James Forman Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 331 (2009)6, at 42 (noting that commentators, but not forensic clinicians and judges, disapprove of this practice).
    • (2009) N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change , vol.33 , pp. 3316
    • Poythress1    Forman Jr., J.2
  • 110
    • 80052347978 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible
    • note
    • Steadman, James Forman Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 331 (2009)6, at 54 (noting that the court agreed with the mental health recommendation in 92% of cases, a result consistent with other studies).
    • (2009) N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change , vol.33 , pp. 3316
    • Steadman Jr., J.F.1
  • 111
    • 84857547551 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). In some jurisdictions, trial competence treatment can be performed in the local jail. See Cal. Penal Code § 1369.1(a) (West 2010).
  • 112
    • 84857547693 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Parry, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)46, at 116 (2009).
  • 113
    • 80052347978 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible
    • note
    • Poythress et al., James Forman Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 331 (2009)6, at 49-50.
    • (2009) N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change , vol.33 , pp. 3316
    • Poythress1    Forman Jr., J.2
  • 114
    • 84857619172 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. If the examining or treating mental health professionals unanimously conclude that an incompetent defendant cannot be restored, then the state will have to use some other means, such as civil commitment, to restrain a permanently incompetent defendant who is believed to still be dangerous.
  • 115
    • 84857619173 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 741.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 741
  • 116
    • 84857549638 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • E.g., ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Standard 7-4.13 (1989).
  • 117
    • 0038388665 scopus 로고
    • A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea
    • note
    • Robert Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 66 (1972). I apologize in advance to the many other excellent scholars who have written about this.
    • (1972) U. Chi. L. Rev. , vol.40 , pp. 66
    • Burt, R.1    Morris, N.2
  • 118
    • 84857549640 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See text at note 59, supra. If there were no possibility whatsoever that the prosecution could ever succeed, then perhaps equal protection might require the State to treat incompetent and competent defendants similarly. In that case, only traditional involuntary civil commitment would be available.
  • 119
    • 84857549639 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See text at If there were no possibility whatsoever that the prosecution could ever succeed, then perhaps equal protection might require the State to treat incompetent and competent defendants similarly. In that case, only traditional involuntary civil commitment would be available.
  • 120
    • 84857547694 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Prescription of psychotropic medication is usually empirically-based because there are few established links between a specific diagnostic assessment and a specific drug. The therapist typically starts with one from among a class of drugs that has the highest benefit-cost profile. After a trial of a few months, if the patient does not respond, a different drug is tried, and so on. If the patient who is incompetent as a result of psychosis associated with schizophrenia has not responded to any drug over the course of six months, then the therapist can order clozapine. Clozapine is effective with a high percentage of non-responders but has extremely dangerous, potentially fatal side effects that require careful monitoring. If the patient still fails to respond, then it is reasonably safe to conclude that none of the available drug therapies is likely to restore the person's contact with reality. See Beng-Choon Ho et al., Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders, in Textbook of Clinical Psychiatry 379, 414 (Robert E. Hales & Stuart C. Yudofsky eds., 4th ed. 2003). See generally Lauren B. Marangell et al., Psychopharmacology and Electroconvuslve Therapy, in at 1047.
  • 121
    • 84857547553 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Suppose the defendant competently refuses to take psychotropic medication, thus preventing the government from restoring his or her trial competence. It is perfectly possible that a defendant with mental disorder might be incompetent to stand trial but competent to refuse medication. Crazy thinking can be relatively domain-specific, diminishing competence in some areas of functioning and not in others. It is also possible that the defendant will be incompetent to refuse. The law is not entirely clear about the government's right to override an incompetent refusal of a committed person, but I shall argue that the government should have the right to treat defendants incompetent to stand trial whether or not they are competent to refuse treatment.
  • 122
    • 80052347978 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible
    • note
    • Most defendants are restored to competence within six months. Poythress et al., James Forman Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 331 (2009)6, at 51. Nonetheless, the potential for lengthy commitment remains and can be abused.
    • (2009) N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change , vol.33 , pp. 3316
    • Poythress1    Forman Jr., J.2
  • 123
    • 84857619180 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
  • 124
    • 84857549641 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court decided under what conditions a prisoner could be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). The Court noted that everyone has a substantial liberty interest in being free from unwanted medical interventions. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 221-22. The Court held, however, that prisoners could be forcibly medicated for their own safety or the safety of others if medication was medically appropriate and the prisoner posed a danger to himself or others. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 227. I will discuss Harper in greater detail in subpart V. B, infra.
  • 125
    • 84857619174 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Sell, 539 U.S. at 178.
  • 126
    • 84857547554 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 180-81. Whether the medication will have an adverse effect on the fairness of trial because it alters the defendant's behavior negatively, such as impairing communication abilities, is an important issue. See at 185-86. Anti-psychotic medication at proper dosage levels typically does not sedate the defendant or otherwise impair a person's abilities. Rather, if effective, it restores cognitive functioning and should enhance the defendant's performance. On the other hand, it may make the defendant appear "normal" to the judge or jury, which might undermine a claim that the defendant was legally insane, or it might alter the defendant's demeanor in a prejudicial way. Such possibilities especially concerned Justice Kennedy. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142-45 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). These potential difficulties could be alleviated by expert testimony and judicial instructions. In an extreme case, however, the Sell criteria will not be met.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 180-181
  • 127
    • 84857549642 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Sell, 539 U.S. at 181-82. The Court expressed a preference for justifying medication according to the Harper criteria. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
  • 128
    • 77954524428 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
    • (1963) Brady v. Maryland , vol.373 , pp. 83
  • 129
    • 84857619175 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
  • 130
    • 84857619176 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 400. In his concurrence in Godinez, Justice Kennedy characterized the requirement as "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. " Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 400
  • 131
    • 84857547701 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
  • 132
    • 84857547697 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Parentalism is a gender-neutral synonym for paternalism.
  • 133
    • 84857547696 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
  • 134
    • 84857547695 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
  • 135
    • 84857547559 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 165.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 165
  • 136
    • 0036779677 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An Examination of the Relationship Between Competency to Stand Trial, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights, and Psychopathology
    • note
    • See Jodi L. Viljoen et al., An Examination of the Relationship Between Competency to Stand Trial, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights, and Psychopathology, 26 Law & Hum. Behav. 481 (2002) (demonstrating that some defendants are incompetent to plead or to stand trial for reasons other than mental disorder).
    • (2002) Law & Hum. Behav. , vol.26 , pp. 481
    • Viljoen, J.L.1
  • 137
    • 84935322651 scopus 로고
    • Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1984).
    • (1984) J. Crim. L. & Criminology , vol.75 , pp. 1
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 138
    • 84857547555 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 548 U.S. 735 (2006). All the facts in the following description are taken from the Court's opinion.
  • 139
    • 84857549643 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Richard Moran, Knowing Right from Wrong: The Insanity Defense of Daniel McNaughtan 10 (2000) (quoting McNaughtan's first statement to the magistrate after his arrest). Professor Moran provides a full account of the case, including its social, political, and legal context, and the correct spelling of the defendant's last name, which was actually "McNaughtan. " See at xi.
  • 140
    • 84857547556 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 772 (2006).
  • 141
    • 84857547698 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 774-78.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 774-778
  • 142
    • 43449113262 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1071 (2007). The decision was disappointing but not unsurprising after Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1966), in which the Court upheld Montana's complete exclusion of admittedly relevant and probative voluntary intoxication evidence to negate mens rea on the grounds that the state had valid policy reasons for doing so and that a criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to have relevant and probative evidence admitted. Voluntary intoxication is of course distinguishable from mental disorder because the latter is not the defendant's fault, but the Court's deference to the state rule and justification for it was generalizable.
  • 143
    • 84857549644 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Morse, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)2, at 600-25.
  • 144
    • 84857619178 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious 68 Va. L. Rev. 973 (1982) (providing a detailed critique of psychodynamic psychology and forensic testimony that is based on this theory of behavior).
  • 145
    • 47549089735 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Ethics of Forensic Practice: Reclaiming the Wasteland
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, The Ethics of Forensic Practice: Reclaiming the Wasteland, 36 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 206 (2008) (claiming that forensic practice is not an ethical wasteland, but recommending major changes to practice). Although there are still major problems with forensic mental health testimony, I believe the situation is much improved since I first addressed this, largely as a result of the creation of specialty boards in both forensic psychology and psychiatry and the general professionalization of the field.
    • (2008) J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. , vol.36 , pp. 206
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 146
    • 84857547558 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
  • 147
    • 84857619179 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 896-903.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 896-903
  • 148
    • 84857547557 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523, 526-33 (Ohio 1982) (partially conflating the mens rea and partial responsibility variants of diminished capacity and suggesting that the legislature and not the court should adopt this "defense") (quoting Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 92 (D.C. 1976).
  • 149
    • 84857547700 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Henry J. Steadman et al., Before and After Hinckley: Evaluating Insanity Defense Reform 84-85, 144-46 (1993). This study found that shifting the burden of persuasion caused a decline in the number of insanity pleas raised and that the presence of a major mental disorder was a necessity for success. It also found, however, that among the very few defendants in New York who did raise the defense, the success rate increased. This seemingly paradoxical effect was almost certainly caused because the defense was probably raised in only the clearest cases after proving insanity became more difficult.
  • 150
    • 84857547699 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Henry J. Steadman et al., Before and After Hinckley: Evaluating Insanity Defense Reform 84-85, 144-46 (1993). This study found that shifting the burden of persuasion caused a decline in the number of insanity pleas raised and that the presence of a major mental disorder was a necessity for success. It also found, however, that among the very few defendants in New York who did raise the defense, the success rate increased. This seemingly paradoxical effect was almost certainly caused because the defense was probably raised in only the clearest cases after proving insanity became more difficult.
  • 151
    • 0041431706 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, The "New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome, " 14 Crim. Just. Ethics 3 (1995). For example, H.L.A. Hart has suggested general individuation of reasonable person standards for negligence, but recognized that the individuation would be a matter of mitigation or excuse and not of "subjective justification. " Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Lance Tapley, The Worst of the Worst: Supermax Torture in America, Boston Rev., Nov./Dec. 2010, at 153-54. The most common doctrinal examples of the attempt to individuate the reasonable person standard are in cases of self-defense and in cases concerning the reduction from murder to manslaughter if the defendant was legally adequately provoked and killed in the heat of passion.
  • 152
    • 84857594855 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Model Penal Code § 4.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
  • 153
    • 84857549626 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735,749-53 (2006) (providing a description of the various rules and the number of jurisdictions that adopt each).
  • 154
    • 84857551196 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • M'Naghten's Case, (1843), 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
  • 155
    • 84857551195 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Clark, 548 U.S. at 749-53.
  • 156
    • 84857543210 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 742.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 742
  • 157
    • 84857619159 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • For a full account of the case, including substantial excerpts from the trial testimony, see Richard C. Bonnie et al., A Case Study in the Insanity Defense-The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr. (2d ed. 2008).
  • 158
    • 84857530355 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003).
    • (2003) State v. Bethel , vol.66 , pp. 840
  • 159
    • 84857619158 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Utah v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996).
    • (1996) Utah v. Mace , vol.921 , pp. 1372
  • 160
    • 84918564274 scopus 로고
    • note
    • State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1993).
    • (1993) State v. Cowan , vol.861 , pp. 884
  • 161
    • 84857551198 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • State v. Winn, 828 P.2d 879 (Idaho 1992). Nevada also abolished the defense, but the Nevada Supreme Court held that abolition was unconstitutional. Finger v. Nevada, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001).
  • 162
    • 84857549624 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Steadman et al., Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)30, at 85
  • 163
    • 84857551197 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Clark, 548 U.S. at 745-46.
  • 164
    • 84857551200 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer & Carol S. Steiker, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 884 (8th ed. 2007).
  • 165
    • 33746609812 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Who is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity
    • note
    • Deborah W. Denno, Who is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 1 (2003) (providing a complete account of the case).
    • (2003) Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y , vol.10 , pp. 1
    • Denno, D.W.1
  • 166
    • 84857551199 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • E.g., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 4.01, at 166, 169-70 (1985).
  • 167
    • 0023951812 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Douglas Mossman, United States v. Lyons: Toward a New Conception of Legal Insanity, 16 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 49, 54-57 (1988). 145ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)21.
  • 168
    • 84857594856 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)21.
  • 169
    • 84857551203 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Herbert Fingarette & Ann Fingarette Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility 148-53 (1979).
  • 170
    • 84857520386 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Morse, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)20.
  • 171
    • 84857520385 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Against Control Tests, in Criminal Law Conversations 449 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009). The latter was a "target" chapter that challenged proponents of control tests to provide the psychological process or mechanism that produced lack of control capacity and that could be the focus of testimony about it. Five critics responded to the chapter, but not one even remotely suggested a mechanism or process.
  • 172
    • 84920095837 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Science and Criminal Responsibility, in The Impact of Behavioral Sciences on Criminal Law 241 (Nita Farahany ed., 2009) (providing a fuller account).
  • 173
    • 84857551202 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • The "gold standard" for measuring psychopathy is Robert D. Hare, The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (2d ed. 2003). An earlier, influential clinical description is Hervey Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity (5th ed. 1988). Although psychopathy is a well-validated diagnostic entity, it is not included in DSM-IV. Psychopathic characteristics can be of greater or lesser severity. My discussion will assume that a potentially excusable defendant is severely psychopathic.
  • 174
    • 84857551201 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kevin S. Douglas et al., Risk for Criminal Recidivism: The Role of Psychopathy, in Handbook of Psychopathy 533, 534 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006) (urging caution on methodological grounds).
  • 175
    • 84857594858 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Thomas A. Widiger, Psychopathy and DSM-IV Psychopathology, in Handbook of Psychopathy 156, 157-59 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006) (noting that there is strong overlap between psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), but the relation is asymmetric.
  • 176
    • 84857551204 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • APD is more prevalent among prisoners and virtually all prisoners who score high on psychopathy meet the criteria for APD, but not the reverse). Psychopathy must be distinguished from APD, which is included in the DSM. DSM, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)3, at 701-06. APD is diagnosed on the basis primarily of repetitive antisocial conduct. There are only two psychological criterion among the diagnostic criteria, lack of remorse and impulsivity, but neither needs to be present to make the diagnosis. Psychopathy, by contrast, always includes psychological criteria. As a result, psychopathy might plausibly be a candidate for a mental disorder that would support an insanity defense, but APD would clearly not qualify. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
  • 177
    • 84857520388 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Model Penal Code § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
  • 178
    • 84857520387 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Indeed, the Model Penal Code makes clear that its provision did not exclude a mental condition "so long as the condition is manifested by indicia other than repeated antisocial behavior. " Model Penal Code and commentaries § 4.01(2), at 164 (1985).
  • 179
    • 77952606905 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility
    • note
    • See Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility, 1 Neuroethics 205 (2008) (providing a fuller account).
    • (2008) Neuroethics , vol.1 , pp. 205
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 180
    • 84857543211 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 Ind. L.J. 719, 746-47 (1992). For an intermediate position, see Walter Glannon, Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath, 1 Neuroethics 158 (2008) (arguing that psychopaths are capable of instrumental reasoning and are capable of being guided by moral considerations to some degree, but their cognitive and affective impairments warrant mitigation).
  • 181
    • 77952004602 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and Rational Self-Governance
    • note
    • Paul J. Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and Rational Self-Governance, 39 Rutgers L.J. 349 (2008). The argument in the text follows Litton.
    • (2008) Rutgers L.J. , vol.39 , pp. 349
    • Litton, P.J.1
  • 182
    • 84857594860 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 382.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 382
  • 183
    • 84857520389 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); see Part VI. B infra.
  • 184
  • 185
    • 84857551205 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 76 (1992).
    • (1992) Foucha v. Louisiana , vol.504
  • 186
    • 84857594859 scopus 로고
    • note
    • E.g., United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
    • (1991) United States v. Marble , vol.940 , pp. 1543
  • 187
    • 84857549625 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Sexual predator commitments are discussed in subpart VI.A. The same conceptual and constitutional concerns would apply if a legislature attempted to create a special form of commitment for some psychopaths.
  • 188
    • 84857619160 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777, 795-801 (1985) (rejecting various consequential and practical arguments for abolition). It is possible that abolishing the defense will increase social safety because it will deter both some severely mentally ill defendants who would succeed with the defense of legal insanity and some normal defendants who might think that they can fake the defense. See Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Lance Tapley, The Worst of the Worst: Supermax Torture in America, Boston Rev., Nov./Dec. 2010, at 48-49 (conceding that abolition of all excuses might increase social safety, but arguing that the cost to individual rights would be too high). Such deterrent benefit is entirely speculative, however, and in the case of abolishing the insanity defense, the likelihood of achieving these benefits is tiny.
  • 189
    • 84857551207 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 538 U.S. 735, 743-44 (2006).
  • 190
    • 84857543212 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • In addition to the mens rea alternative if the insanity defense is abolished, Professor Christopher Slobogin's "integrationist" proposal for abolition should be briefly mentioned because it is the only serious contemporary scholarly proposal and interesting in its own right. Christopher Slobogin, Minding Justice: Laws That Deprive People with Mental Disability of Life and Liberty 51-60 (2006). This proposal would allow the defendant to use evidence of mental disorder to indicate that he would have been justified or excused if the facts had been as he believed them to be. The proposal depends, however, on adopting a subjectivized view of justification that is unacceptable if the distinction between justification and excuse is to be preserved. It would also fail to acquit many disordered defendants who have substantial rationality defects. Professor Slobogin rejects rationality impairments as the basis for legal insanity, but he then inconsistently uses lesser rationality to argue that juveniles are less responsible than adults. The integrationist proposal has been subject to a great deal of criticism. See Criminal Law Conversations, Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)44, at 173-92.
  • 191
    • 84857594862 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Morse & Hoffman, Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)23, at 1123-31. No legislature has seriously entertained adopting the proposal.
  • 192
    • 84857551209 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Steadman et al., Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)30, at 102-20 (describing the verdict as a compromise).
  • 193
  • 194
    • 84857547524 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
  • 195
    • 84857547525 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 579-80, 586-887. In fact, Justice Thomas's entire majority opinion relies on the validity of this assumption.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 579-580
  • 196
    • 84857547523 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • This form of commitment is discussed in subpart VI. B, infra.
  • 197
    • 33750112256 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 289 (2003). I will use the terms "partial responsibility" and "diminished responsibility" interchangeably, but the former should be preferred because there is no extant legal doctrine by that name with which the proposed doctrine could be confused. Diminished responsibility is probably more accurately descriptive, but there does exist a doctrine with which the proposal might be confused. See Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 52 (Eng.) (discussing criteria for "diminished responsibility"). This section came into force on October 4, 2010 as a result of Statutory Instrument No. 2010/816.
    • (2003) Ohio St. J. Crim. L. , vol.1 , pp. 289
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 198
    • 84857549620 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • The defendant could also plead in the alternative any other mitigating or full affirmative defense, such as legal insanity.
  • 199
    • 84857549621 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The English doctrine of "diminished responsibility, " which is quite expansive, is likewise limited to reducing murder to manslaughter. See Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 52 (Eng.). See generally George Mousourakis, Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses (1998).
  • 200
    • 84857619145 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Partial Excuses to Murder (Stanley Meng Heong Yeo ed., 1991).
  • 201
    • 84857619144 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
  • 202
    • 84857547671 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 318-19. Note that these are largely rationality considerations
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 318-319
  • 203
    • 84857547528 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (2004).
  • 204
    • 84857547527 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • The Supreme Court confirms this in the case of juveniles. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (declaring unconstitutional application of capital punishment to juveniles who committed capital murder at the age of sixteen or seventeen). The Court listed those characteristics of adolescents, such as impulsivity, ill-considered action, and susceptibility to peer pressure, as diminishing juveniles' culpability and cited Atkins for the proposition that lesser culpability should lead to lesser punishment, at least in the capital punishment context. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 569-71. The factors used in both Atkins and Roper to justify diminished responsibility are best understood, I believe, as rationality considerations. In the case of juveniles, lesser rationality results from developmental immaturity rather than from an abnormality.
  • 205
    • 84857619148 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Once again, the English "diminished responsibility" doctrine operates similarly and is similarly limited.
  • 206
    • 84857547672 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft1962).
  • 207
    • 84857549623 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Lower courts have essentially employed the test for competence to be executed adopted by the Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), which requires that the prisoner is able to understand what sentence is being imposed and why. Some lower courts and commentators have also imposed or suggested further requirements. Parry, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)46, at 103-04.
  • 208
    • 84857619157 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Washington v. Harper, 494. U.S. 210, 225-27 (1990).
  • 209
    • 84857619147 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See John Parry, Civil Mental Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony: A Comprehensive Reference for Lawyers, Judges, and Mental Disability Professionals 478-79 (2010) (describing parens patriae criteria); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5150 (authorizing commitment for people who are "gravely disabled" as a result of mental disorder) and § 5008(h)(1)(A) (defining grave disability as a "condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter").
  • 210
    • 84857547530 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Harper, 494 U.S. at 225-29.
  • 211
    • 84857532343 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 233-36; see also at 250-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 233-236
  • 212
    • 84857619156 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
  • 213
    • 84857547682 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
  • 214
    • 33144461067 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
    • (2002) Atkins v. Virginia , vol.536 , pp. 304
  • 215
    • 33750130266 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
    • (2005) Roper v. Simmons , vol.543 , pp. 551
  • 216
    • 84857547533 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • In Graham, the Court explicitly relied on the Roper factors discussed, and also reemphasized that juveniles were not yet fully mature and might change as normal maturation occurred. Nonetheless, lack of rational capacity was the primary ground. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-227.
  • 217
    • 84857547534 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • In Graham, the majority relied on Roper's conclusion that adolescents are relevantly different, but cited amicus briefs for the proposition that the adolescent brain was not yet fully mature. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 2026. This has produced irrational exuberance among those who want courts to take more account of neuroscience evidence. The Court referred generally to neuroscience to support its conclusion that nothing in the science of adolescent development in the intervening five years changed the Roper conclusion, but no one had argued to the contrary. Arguments in support of juvenile LWOP in non-homicide cases were based entirely on other normative and empirical arguments, and thus, I submit, the neuroscience was dictum.
  • 218
    • 0000975826 scopus 로고
    • The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
    • note
    • I borrow this term from the economic literature on enforcement, which notes that equal punishments for crimes of different seriousness produces crimes of greater seriousness. See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 526, 527 (1970).
    • (1970) J. Pol. Econ , vol.78 , pp. 526-527
    • Stigler, G.J.1
  • 219
    • 84857547529 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • For a discussion of substance abuse, see John Monahan et al., Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and violence 94 tbl.5.1, 141 (2001). For psychopathy, see at 65-72.
  • 220
    • 84857547531 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Douglas et al., Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)50, at 534.
  • 221
    • 84857547673 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Widiger, Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)51, at 157-59.
  • 222
    • 79957857382 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). See also notes 127-128, supra.
    • (1983) Barefoot v. Estelle , vol.463 , pp. 880
  • 223
    • 79952096274 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment
    • note
    • Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 38, 39 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793193.
    • (2011) Current Directions Psychol. Sci , vol.20 , pp. 38-39
    • Skeem, J.L.1    Monahan, J.2
  • 224
    • 84857547674 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
  • 225
    • 84857619150 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
  • 226
    • 84857619149 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Skeem & Monahan, Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)94, at 39.
  • 227
    • 84857547676 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
  • 228
    • 84857547677 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
  • 229
    • 84857547678 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
  • 230
    • 84857547675 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Skeem & Monahan, Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)94, at 39.
  • 231
    • 84857547532 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
  • 232
    • 84857619153 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
  • 233
  • 234
    • 84857619152 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
  • 235
    • 84857549622 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 958-59.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 958-959
  • 236
    • 84857547681 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 958.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 958
  • 237
    • 84857619155 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 960.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 960
  • 238
    • 84857547680 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993).
  • 239
    • 84857619154 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring).
  • 240
    • 84857547679 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • DSM notes that the typical onset of schizophrenia occurs between the late teens and mid-thirties, but that late onset is also possible. DSM, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)3, at 307.
  • 241
    • 84857619146 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • I confess that I am deeply ambivalent about the issues in this subpart. I oppose capital punishment and one part of me wants to make any argument possible to abolish it. Another part, however, recognizes that it has constitutional status and I therefore try to make arguments in light of that status.
  • 242
    • 84895655211 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human Dignity
    • note
    • Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 257, 277 (2007).
    • (2007) Ohio St. J. Crim. L , vol.5 , pp. 257-277
    • Bonnie, R.J.1
  • 243
    • 84857551208 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring).
  • 244
    • 84857543213 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • DSM notes that the typical onset of schizophrenia occurs between the late teens and mid-thirties, but that late onset is also possible. DSM, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)3, at 307.
  • 245
    • 84857520390 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • I confess that I am deeply ambivalent about the issues in this subpart. I oppose capital punishment and one part of me wants to make any argument possible to abolish it. Another part, however, recognizes that it has constitutional status and I therefore try to make arguments in light of that status.
  • 246
    • 84895655211 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human Dignity
    • note
    • Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 257, 277 (2007).
    • (2007) Ohio St. J. Crim. L , vol.5 , pp. 257-277
    • Bonnie, R.J.1
  • 247
    • 84857543214 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 477 U.S. 399, 425-27(1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
  • 248
    • 84857551210 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949-50 (2007).
    • (2007) Panetti v. Quarterman , vol.551 , pp. 949-950
  • 249
    • 84857594861 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 950, 958 (requiring that the prisoner must be able to offer his own psychiatric testimony as a counterweight to the State's evidence).
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 950
  • 250
    • 84857520391 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 610 So. 2d 746, 770 (La. 1992).
  • 251
    • 84857594863 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003).
  • 252
    • 84857543215 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
  • 253
    • 84857520393 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 319 F.3d at 1027.
  • 254
    • 84857594865 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See at 1025-27.
  • 255
    • 84857594864 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
  • 256
    • 84857526436 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 731.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 731
  • 257
    • 84857520392 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • A state could surely permit an employee without a medical degree but with the proper training to administer the drugs.
  • 258
    • 84857551212 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 521 U.S. at 710.
  • 259
    • 71949125928 scopus 로고
    • note
    • Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
    • (1990) Washington v. Harper , vol.494 , pp. 210
  • 260
    • 84857551211 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
  • 261
    • 84857513198 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 360.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 360
  • 262
    • 84857594867 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 365-66. The statutes provide that these commitments may be triggered simply by a charge of a sexual offense or incompetence to stand trial for such an offense, but in practice they are imposed post-conviction and sentence.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 365-366
  • 263
    • 84857594866 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
  • 264
    • 84857551213 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 411-12.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 411-412
  • 265
    • 84857520394 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 413.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 413
  • 266
    • 84857520395 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 415.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 415
  • 267
    • 84857594869 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • In dissent, Justice Scalia claimed that Hendricks necessarily meant that lack of control was implicit in the mental abnormality standard because Hendricks's commitment was upheld. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
  • 268
    • 84857543216 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Consider the remarks of Justice Owen Dixon of Australia in King v. Porter: [A] great number of people who come into a Criminal Court are abnormal. They would not be there if they were the normal type of average everyday people. Many of them are very peculiar in their dispositions and peculiarly tempered. That is markedly the case in sexual offenes [sic]. Nevertheless, they are mentally quite able to appreciate what they are doing and quite able to appreciate the threatened punishment of the law and the wrongness of their acts, and they are held in check by the prospect of punishment. (1933) 55 CLR 182, 187 (Austl.).
  • 269
    • 84857520397 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • The implicit non-responsibility standard is the lack of rational (or control) capacity. See supra subpart II. B (discussing the general rationale for treating people with mental disorder specially). Moreover, professionals do not prefer to treat dangerous people who are not obviously suffering from a major disorder.
  • 270
    • 84857594871 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • E.g., Morse, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)20.
  • 271
    • 0032275577 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability
    • note
    • Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 250 (1998).
    • (1998) Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. , vol.4 , pp. 250
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 272
    • 84857594868 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(a) (West 2010).
  • 273
    • 79957528538 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521
  • 274
    • 84857520396 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409-11 (2002).
    • (2002) Kansas v. Crane , vol.534 , pp. 409-411
  • 275
    • 84857594870 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See supra subpart II. C and notes 145-46.
  • 276
    • 84857543217 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • DSM-IV-TR, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)3, at 685-86.
  • 277
    • 84857543218 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Examination of the criteria for personality disorders in DSM-IV confirms that sufferers experience no substantial rationality deficits akin to those with psychotic disorders. In many cases, the conduct that is the basis for the diagnosis does not per se cause the person distress. For example, an agent whose conduct warrants the diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder may be distressed by the reactions of the police, creditors, and others, but the conduct itself might not be distressing. Similarly, many sexually violent predators are not distressed by their desires, but they are distressed by the condemnation and punishment that society and the law impose. Moreover, the degree of distress or impairment such disorders cause is very much a function of the particular social, moral, and legal regime in which the person lives, which once again suggests the highly value-relative nature of the judgment of disorder in these cases.
  • 278
    • 84857551214 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
  • 279
    • 84857520400 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(b) (2010).
  • 280
    • 84857594873 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (majority opinion), 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 373-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
  • 281
    • 84921556382 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • The meaning of volition is controversial in philosophy and psychology. See Michael S. Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and Its Implications for Criminal Law 113-65 (2d ed. 2010) (providing the most extensive discussion of volition in the legal literature, criticizing the view that volitions are desires, and arguing that a volition is an intention to execute a basic action).
  • 282
    • 84857594874 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02.
  • 283
    • 84857520401 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2002).
    • (2002) Kansas v. Crane , vol.534 , pp. 412-413
  • 284
    • 84857520394 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 413.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 413
  • 285
    • 84857619138 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • In his dissent in Crane, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for the vagueness of the control standard it adopted. He conceded that the mental abnormality or personality disorder criterion and the resulting propensity for violence criterion were both coherent and, with the assistance of expert testimony, within the capacity of a normal jury to determine. But he chided the majority's control standard as being so vague that it will give trial judges "not a clue" about how to charge juries. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He speculated that the majority offered no further elaboration because "elaboration... which passes the laugh test is impossible. " Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) Justice Scalia wondered whether the test was a quantitative measure of loss-of-control capacity or of how frequently the inability to control arises. In the alternative, he questioned whether the standard was "adverbial, " a descriptive characterization of the inability to control one's penchant for sexual violence. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 424. The adverbs he used as examples were "appreciably, " "moderately, " "substantially, " and "almost totally. " Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) According to Justice Scalia, none of these could provide any guidance. He was correct.
  • 286
    • 84857594875 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Such cases would probably be marked by an alleged predator's history that is entirely inconsistent with a colloquial control problem and by patently deficient expert testimony. I assume, however, that such cases would be rare, especially if there were a history of sexual predation.
  • 287
    • 84857520404 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Dana Anderson & R. Karl Hanson, Static-99: An Actuarial Tool to Assess Risk of Sexual and Violent Recidivism Among Sexual Offenders, in Handbook of Violence Risk Assessment 251, 255-260, 262 (Randy K. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds., 2010) (reviewing the most widely used sexual recidivism instrument and finding an average "medium to large" effect size by conventional standards, but noting that absolute recidivism rates are unknown and that there is large variability in the effect size among the studies, and recommending caution in cases in which accurate probability estimates are needed).
  • 288
    • 84857551216 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Skeem & Monahan, Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)94.
  • 289
    • 84857551215 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (applying the right to the assistance of a mental health professional in the criminal justice process).
  • 290
    • 84857608085 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002).
    • (2002) Kansas v. Crane , vol.534
  • 291
    • 84857520403 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Indeed, Crane himself was sentenced to a relatively brief term of imprisonment as a result of a plea bargain under circumstances that might otherwise have justified a prison term of thirty-five years to life. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 287 (Kan. 2000).
  • 292
    • 84857520402 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (holding that the Eighth Amendment contains only a narrow proportionality principle applied to term-of-years sentences).
  • 293
    • 84857547666 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • This objection also bears a stunning resemblance to past claims that the insanity defense should be abolished because defendants acquitted by reason of insanity are incarcerated in any case. See Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 Yale L.J. 853, 864-70 (1963). These claims were misguided for the same reasons that it is important to distinguish responsible from non-responsible sexual predators.
  • 294
    • 84857520399 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Parry, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)46, at 168-70.
  • 295
    • 84857619140 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
  • 296
    • 84857594872 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 365.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 365
  • 297
    • 84857547517 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 367-68; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 367-368
  • 298
    • 84857547515 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Jones, 463 U.S. at 367.
  • 299
    • 84857580098 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 368-69.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 368-369
  • 300
    • 84857549616 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
  • 301
    • 84857547667 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 81. Justice O'Connor partially concurred. She noted that an insanity acquittee had been found to have committed the prima facie case beyond a reasonable doubt. She then wrote cryptically, as follows: It might therefore be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity [sic] if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness.... [A]cquittees could not be confined as mental patients absent some medical justification for doing so; in such a case the necessary connection between the nature and purposes of confinement would be absent. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also noted that the seriousness of the crime should also affect whether the state's interest in continued confinement would be strong enough. See at 88. If the subject is no longer mentally disordered and therefore no longer non-responsible, it is hard to imagine what possible "medical justification" there could be for continuing civil commitment to protect the public. It is not clear from the O'Connor concurrence if she would require some finding of mental abnormality, as did the statute upheld in Kansas v. Hendricks, to make the commitment analogous to traditional civil commitment. 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997). If not, however, then five Justices of the Supreme Court, the four Foucha dissenters and Justice O'Connor, would have been willing to countenance pure preventive detention, at least of a person who had committed a crime without being responsible and who continued to be dangerous. For an attempt to apply Justice O'Connor's suggestion, see State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94, 109 (Wis. 1995) (permitting continued confinement if there were a medical justification and the subject was still dangerous, but limiting the term to the maximum sentence for the crime charged). Needless to say, I believe that this practice is simply criminal punishment by other means. The "medical justification" criterion is a transparent and fraudulent attempt to bring this type of commitment within the disease justification for preemptive confinement. The limitation on the term of the commitment to the maximum term for the crime charged is simply a salve to the legislative conscience and a signal that the continued commitment is punitive.
    • (1997) Kansas v. Hendricks , vol.521 , pp. 81
  • 302
    • 84857619142 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Parry, Nicholas J. G. Winter, Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion 4 (2008)82, at 476-77 (discussing the criteria for commitments for dangerousness, which do not include a finding of prima facie guilt for a criminal offense or the equivalent thereof). Parry notes that the trend in standard involuntary civil commitments for dangerousness is away from requiring overt, recent acts and threats and towards more purely predictive criteria. In practice, however, commitment is common for threatening behavior, including verbal threats. Less serious assaults and thefts may also lead to civil commitment, although they are often processed through the criminal justice system. In my experience, seriously violent conduct is virtually always processed through the criminal justice system. Moreover, traditional civil commitment requires only the lower, clear and convincing burden of persuasion. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
  • 303
    • 84857549615 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Cal. Penal Code § 1026.2(e)-(f) (West 2010).
  • 304
    • 84857619141 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363-65 (1983) (discussing the need for a showing of both mental disorder and dangerousness to justify these commitments and apparently assuming that the fact of an insanity acquittal supplies a link between the two criteria, but not explicitly requiring the causal link at the time of commitment).
  • 305
    • 84857547518 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • I recognize that a narrow interpretation of the standards for legal insanity would not excuse the person because he would neither be justified nor excused if the facts were as he believed them to be. On a broader reading, however, the defendant is not a rational agent and might have a plausible claim for legal insanity. Accompanying text.
  • 306
    • 84857549618 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-33.
  • 307
    • 84857547670 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Greene & Cohen, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)41, at 218.
  • 308
    • 84857549617 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Morse, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)29, at 529-33. See generally Robert Audi, Action, Intention and Reason 109-78 (1993) (providing an account of practical reason).
  • 309
    • 84857619143 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Greene & Cohen, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)41, at 217-18 (internal citation omitted).
  • 310
    • 84857547669 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002); see also Daniel M. Wegner, Précis of the Illusion of Conscious Will, 27 Behav. & Brain Sci. 649 (2004). The précis is followed by open peer commentaries and a response from Professor Wegner. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) at 679. In more recent work, Professor Wegner appears to have softened the radical interpretation of his claim, which is that we, as agents, are not really "controllers" whose mental processes cause action. Daniel M. Wegner, Who Is the Controller of Controlled Processes?, in The New Unconscious 19, 32 (Ran R. Hassin et al. eds., 2005) ("This theory is mute on whether thought does cause action. "). On the other hand, Professor Wegner seems ambivalent and unwilling to give up the radical interpretation. See at 27 (arguing that the "experience of conscious will is normally a construction" and referring to mental causation as "apparent"). This apparent ambivalence is present in the work of others.
  • 311
    • 84857547519 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Morse, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003), at 214-16 (discussing the meaning of compatibilism and its relation to criminal law).
  • 312
    • 84857547521 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • For example, we have no idea how the brain enables the mind. Paul R. McHugh & Phillip R. Slavney, The Perspectives of Psychiatry 11-12 (2d ed. 1998).
  • 313
    • 77950022552 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience
    • note
    • See Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 1, 19-34 (2008).
    • (2008) Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. , vol.9 , pp. 19-34
    • Morse, S.J.1
  • 314
    • 84857547668 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Greene & Cohen, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction 1 (2003)41, at 218.
  • 315
    • 84857520398 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • A clear implication of the disappearing person argument is that it would not be fair to punish dangerous people because no one deserves punishment (or anything else). We might need to deprive dangerous people of their liberty to ensure social safety, but then we would be morally bound to compensate for the unfairness of restraining liberty by making the conditions of confinement (or other restraints) sufficiently positive. In other words, a regime of "funishment" would be morally required. Saul Smilansky, Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio, 30 Law & Phil. 353, 355 (2011). I leave the perverse incentives this would create to the reader's imagination, but defenders of the disappearing person view would be required to institute funishment and somehow to avoid the perverse incentives. Smilansky's argument is directed at hard determinists, but it is a fortiori directed at those who make the disappearing person claim, as long as the latter can make any moral claims at all. 279 and accompanying text.
  • 316
    • 42949177470 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • I was first prompted to this line of thought by a suggestion Mitch Berman made in the context of a discussion of determinism and normativity. Mitchell Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 Ethics 258, 271 n.34 (2008).


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