The governance of a fragile Eurozone;La gobernanza de una frágil eurozona

Revista de Economia Institucional

Volumn 13, Issue 25, 2011, Pages 13-41

  de Grauwe, Paul ^a  

^a Universidad de Lovaina e investigador del CEPS   (Brazil)

Author keywords

European central bank; Eurozone; Government debt crisis; Lender of last resort; Monetary union; Multiple equilibria

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857510508     PISSN: 01245996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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