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Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 29-35

Negotiating M&As under uncertainty: The influence of managerial flexibility on the first-mover advantage

Author keywords

Flexibility; Game theory; Merger Acquisition; Negotiation; Real option; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords


EID: 84857462566     PISSN: 15446123     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2011.09.002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (13)

References (16)
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    • A dynamic model of corporate acquisitions. EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4060. Available at SSRN
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    • (2003)
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  • 7
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    • Harris, E.G.1
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    • Harsanyi, J.1    Selten, R.2
  • 9
    • 0742320288 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The timing and terms of mergers motivated by economies of scale
    • Lambrecht B.M. The timing and terms of mergers motivated by economies of scale. Journal of Financial Economics 2004, 72:41-62.
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    • Lambrecht, B.M.1
  • 10
    • 33947230076 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A theory of takeovers and disinvestment
    • Lambrecht B.M., Myers S.C. A theory of takeovers and disinvestment. Journal of Finance 2007, 62:809-845.
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    • Lambrecht, B.M.1    Myers, S.C.2
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    • The bargaining problem
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    • Real options valuation of managerial flexibility in optimally structured M&A deals
    • Pawlina G. Real options valuation of managerial flexibility in optimally structured M&A deals. M&A Review 2002, 11:568-575.
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.