Antitrust and innovation: Where we are and where we should be going

Antitrust Law Journal

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 749-756

  Hovenkamp, Herbert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857177948     PISSN: 00036056     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (23)

1. See generally CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION (forthcoming 2011).
2. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46-72 (2008).
3. See Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567 (2006).
4. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008) (proposing use of statutory default rules to limit special interest capture).
5. See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2010) (arguing that the majority of tying arrangements produce welfare gains and net consumer benefits).
6. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009).
7. Daniel A. Crane, Per se Illegality for Reverse Patent Settlements?, 61 ALA. L. REV. 575 (2010).
8. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37 (2009).
9. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ch. 7 (2d ed. 2010).
10. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247 (2007).
11. E.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (dominant producer of steel conduit manipulates standards organization so as to deny approval to plaintiffs innovative PVC conduit).
12. Am. Soc'y Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (dominant manufacturing firms manipulate standard setting society so as to deny certification of plaintiffs innovative valve).
13. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Microsoft pressuring Intel to refrain from developing Java-enabled processor).
14. In patents, see Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187 (2000).
15. U.S.C. § 261 (territorial restrictions); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938) (customer division agreement via field-of-use restriction).
16. E.g., Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 104-06 (2d Cir. 2010)
17. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065-68 (11th Cir. 2005).
18. Cf. Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Concerted Refusals to License Intellectual Property Rights, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 21, 22 (2011) (examining dispute over a joint venture patent license for an unused claim entered into to prevent the claim from blocking other patents in the license), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/201l/01/Hovenkamp-Online-Article.pdf.
19. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
20. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
21. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
22. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 905 (2010) (proposing a concept of IP injury that limits IP remedies to harms relating to diminishing innovation incentives).
23. JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383 (1935).