The downgrading effect of abuse of power on trust and collective action in Bulgaria's irrigation sector

Institutions and Sustainability: Political Economy of Agriculture and the Environment-Essays in Honour of Konrad Hagedorn

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 223-242

  Theesfeld, Insa ^a  

^a LEIBNIZ INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES IAMO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bulgaria; Collective action theory; Heterogeneity of participants; Irrigation; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857115414     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9690-7_11     Document Type: Chapter

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