Ownership risk and the use of common-pool natural resources

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 242-259

  Laurent Lucchetti, Jérémy ^a   Santugini, Marc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

^b HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Common pool resource; Expropriation; Extraction behavior; Ownership risk; Property rights; Tragedy of the commons

Indexed keywords

COMMON-POOL RESOURCE; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ELASTICITY OF DEMAND; EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE; EXPROPRIATION; PROPERTY RIGHT; THEORETICAL MODELS; TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS;

INDUSTRY; NATURAL RESOURCES;

LAKES;

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; NATURAL RESOURCE; OWNERSHIP; PROPERTY RIGHTS; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK FACTOR;

EID: 84857032988     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2011.06.001     Document Type: Article

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