Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning: A dynamic revenue equivalence theorem

2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2011

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1002-1003

  Iyer, Krishnamurthy ^a   Johari, Ramesh ^a   Sundararajan, Mukund ^b  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b GOOGLE INC   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CROWDSOURCING; ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS; EQUIVALENCE THEOREM; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; MARKET MECHANISMS; MARKET PARTICIPANTS; MEAN FIELD; ONLINE MARKETPLACES; SPONSORED SEARCHES;

COMMUNICATION; INTERNET; SEARCH ENGINES; THEOREM PROVING;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84856116183     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/Allerton.2011.6120276     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (2)

1. Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, and Mukund Sundararajan, Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning, Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (New York, NY, USA), EC '11, ACM, 2011, pp. 339-340.
2. -, Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning, SSRN eLibrary (2011), no. 1799085.