On logic, intersubjectivity, and meaning: Is reality an assumption we just don't need?

Review of International Studies

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 253-265

  Kessler, Oliver ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855861514     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210511000672     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. In the context of Critical Realism, an intriguing reference can be found in Roy Bhaskar, 'Where do we go from here', in Roy Bhaskar and Mervyn Hartwig (eds), The Formation of Critical Realism: A Personal Perspective (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 195-215, in particular p. 215.
2. I thank Benjamin Herborth for pointing this out to me. A good discussion from a constructivist perspective, see Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the condition of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 29 and 149ff.
3. For an overview on different truth theories see for example Frederick F. Schmitt, Theories of Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
4. Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Of False Promises and Safe Bets: A Plea for a Pragmatic Perspective in Theory Building', Journal of International Relations and Development, 10:1 (2007), pp. 1-15; (Pubitemid 46505772)
5. Colin Wight, 'Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off ', Journal of International Relations and Development, 10:1 (2007), pp. 40-56. (Pubitemid 46505775)
6. See Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Verso, 1997);
7. Heikki Patomäki, After International Relations (London: Routledge, 2002).
8. Wight, 'Inside the epistemological cave', p. 42.
9. See Friedrich Kratochwil and Oliver Kessler, 'Systems Theory between Explaining and Understanding', in Mathias Albert, Lars-Eric Cederman, and Alexander Wendt (eds), New Systems Theories of World Politics (London: Palgrave, 2010).
10. See also Oliver Kessler, 'From Agents and Structures to Minds and Bodies: of supervenience, quantum and the linguistic turn', Journal for International Relations and Development, 10 (2007), pp. 243-71. (Pubitemid 47456490)
11. see Nelson Grelling, 'Bemerkungen zu den Paradoxien von Russell und Burali-Forti' Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule, 2 (1908), pp. 301-33;
12. Nicholas Rescher, Paradoxes: their roots, range and resolution (Chicago: Open Court, 2001).
13. For the importance of Russell's paradox for early analytic philosophy see Michael Dummett, Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993)
14. Ernest Nagel and James Newman, Godie;del's Proof (London: Routledge, 2005).
15. For a discussion of basic ideas see David Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions (London: Routledge, 1997);
16. see also Alexander Miller and Crispin Wight, Rule-following and Meaning (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002).
17. In IR, the philosophy of Wittgenstein has been explored in particular by Nicolas Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of Southern Carolina Press, 1989), p. 42 ff;
18. Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules;
19. see also Oliver Kessler, 'From Agents and Structures to Minds and Bodies', Journal of International Relations and Development, 10:1 (2007), pp. 243-71.
20. See, for example, Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967).
21. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge. Polity Press, 1990);
22. Joseph Margolis, 'Pierre Bourdieu: Habitus and the Logic of Practice', in R. Shusterman (ed.), Pierre Bourdieu: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
23. George Lakoff and Rafael E. Nâuänez, Where mathematics comes from: how the embodied mind brings mathematics into being (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
24. One of the most intriguing exchanges in this respect is actually in H. G. Alexander (ed.), The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1956).
25. For a detailed description of monads see Benson Mates, The philosophy of Leibniz. Metaphysics and language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986);
26. Glenn A. Hartz, Leibniz's Final System: Monads, Matter, and Animals (London: Routledge, 2006).
27. www.non-contradiction.com
28. For the latter see Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975).
29. See Michael Theunissen, Schein und Sein (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1978).
30. Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, 6th edn (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006).
31. See in particular the recent publications by Alexander Wendt, in particular Alexander Wendt, 'Flatland: The Quantum Mind and the International Hologram', in Albert, Cederman and Wendt, New Systems Theories.
32. For a description see for example David Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity (London: Routledge 2006 [1965]), p. 68.
33. See Gotthard Gudie;nther, 'Metaphysik, Logik und die Theorie der Reflexion', in Gotthard Gudie;nther, Grundlegung zu einer operationsfähigen Logik (Hamburg: Meiner, 1976), p. 8;
34. Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
35. See Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, 3rd edn (London: Verso, 1996).
36. Gotthard Gudie;nther, 'Metaphysik, Logik und die Theorie der Reflexion', p. 8.
37. Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund.
38. See 'Letter from Russell to Frege', in Gottlob Frege, Briefwechsel mit D.Hilbert, E. Husserl, B. Russell, eds G. Gabriel, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel (Hamburg, 1980), pp. 59f.
39. see Ernest Nagel and James Newman, Godie;del's Proof (London: Routledge, 2005).
40. Alfred Tarski, 'The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4:3 (1944), pp. 341-75.
41. Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956).
42. William Van Orman Quine, 'Carnap and Logical Truth', The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 107-32
43. 'Truth by Convention', The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 70-99.
44. Rudolf Carnap, Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1922);
45. Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time (New York, Dover Publications, 1958).
46. Carnap, Meaning and Necsessity, §17.
47. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Udie;ber Gewissheit [On Certainty] (Frankfurt am Main. Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 61.
48. See Crispin Wight, Rule-following.
49. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954), §31.
50. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), Part V, §23.
51. Wittgenstein, Udie;ber Gewißheit [On Certainty], p. 65
52. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics., Part VI, §28.
53. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §17.
54. See also Nelson Goodman, Mary Douglas, and David Hull, How Classification Works: Nelson Goodman among the social sciences (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992);
55. George Lakoff, Woman, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories reveal about the Mind (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987).
56. Mary Doulgas, Risk Acceptability According to the Social Science (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1985), p. 80.
57. Wight, 'Inside the epistemological cave', p. 4.
58. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995), p. 32.
59. Colin Wight, 'Inside the epistemological cave', p. 7.