Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-336

  Kim, Jaegwon ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Action explanation; Agent's point of view; Anomalism of the mental; Anomalous monism; Downward causation; Emergence; Emergentism; Epiphenomenalism; Explanation; Explanatory exclusion; First person point of view; Law; Layered model; Mental causation; Nonreductive physicalism; Normativity; Physicalism; Realization; Reduction; Reductive explanation; Second order realization; Special science; Subset realization; Supervenience; Theory of explanation; Understanding

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855648716     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (511)

1. "Thinking Causes," in John Heil and Alfred Mele, Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
2. J. Kim, "The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 63 (1989), p.35.
3. "Thinking Causes," p. 6.
4. "Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical," Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 109-135.
5. J. Kim, "Concepts of Supervenience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1984): 153-176.
6. "Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept," Metaphilosophy 21 (1990): 1-27.
7. "Thinking Causes," p. 7.
8. Kim, "Concepts of Supervenience," and "'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1987): 315-326.
9. Kim, "Concepts of Supervenience."
10. Kim, "Causality, Identity, and Supervenience in the Mind-Body Problem," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979): 31-49.
11. "Epiphenomenal and Supervenience Causation," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 257-270.
12. Journal of Philosophy 60: 685-700.
13. J. Fodor, "Making Mind Matter More," Philosophical Topics 17 (1989): 75-76.
14. Kim, "Psychophysical Laws," in Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donal Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
15. Kim, "Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion," Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 77-108.
16. D. Garber, Descartes Embodied (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 172.
17. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).
18. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 17.
19. V. Caston, "Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern," Philosophical Review 106 (1997), pp. 309-363.
20. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
21. D. Davidson, "Thinking Causes," in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
22. F. Stoutland, "Oblique Causation and Reasons for Action," Synthese 43 (1980): 351-367.
23. T. Honderich, "The Argument of Anomalous Monism," Analysis 42 (1982): 59-64.
24. J. Kim, "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 257-270.
25. E. Sosa, "Mind Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 271-281.
26. B. McLaughlin, "Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical," Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 109-136.
27. McLaughlin, "Type Epiphenomenalism."
28. Davidson, "Thinking Causes."
29. Davidson, "Mental Events."
30. J. A. Fodor, "Making Mind Matter More," Philosophical Topics 17 (1989):72.
31. Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1984).
32. Broad The Mind and Its Place in Nature, esp. pp. 115-117.
33. J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
34. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
35. Fodor, "Making Mind Matter More," p. 66.
36. Lewis, "Causation," Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 556-567.
37. D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. ii (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
38. J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004).
39. Stalnaker, "A Theory of Conditionals," in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968).
40. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).
41. E. LePore and B. Loewer, "Mind Matters," Journal of Philosophy 93 (1987): 630-642.
42. T. Horgan, "Mental Quausation," Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 47-76.
43. B. Loewer, "Comments on Jaegwon Kim's Mind in a Physical World," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 655-662.
44. "Mental Causation, Or Something Near Enough," in Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
45. Anscombe, Causality and Determination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
46. Tooley and E. Sosa (eds.), Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
47. Hall, "Two Concepts of Causation," in Collins, Hall, and Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, 225.
48. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London, 1739).
49. L. A. Selby Bigge edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888). The quotation here is from p. 75.
50. P. Dowe, "Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory," Philosophy of Science 59 (1992): 195-216.
51. Physical Causation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
52. W.C. Salmon, "Causality Without Counterfactuals," Philosophy of Science 61 (1993): 297-312.
53. D. Fair, "Causation and the Flow of Energy," Erkenntnis 14 (1979): 219-250.
54. Dowe, "Causes Are Physically Connected to Their Effects,"
55. J. Schaffer, "Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation," both in C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).
56. I saw examples like these for the first time in B. Abbott, "Some Problems in Giving an Adequate Model-Theoretical Account of CAUSE," in C. Filmore, G. Lakoff, and R. Lakoff (eds.), Berkeley Studies in Syntax and Semantics, vol. i (1974).
57. S. McGrath, "Causation by Omission: A Dilemma," Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 125-148.
58. Garber, Descartes Embodied, p. 172.
59. Horgan, "Reduction, Reductionism," in Donald M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement (New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996), 498.
60. Kim, "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 1-26.
61. Kim, "Postscripts on Mental Causation," in Kim, Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
62. Kim, Mind in a Physical World.
63. Kim, Physicalism.
64. "Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind-Body Problem," Jourmal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2001): 1-34.
65. C.L. Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate, 1923), p. 3.
66. Broad, The Mind, p. 50.
67. E. Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961).
68. J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1998).
69. "Making Sense of Emergence," Philosophical Studies 95 (1999), pp. 3-36.
70. fA. Marras, "Kim on Reduction," Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 231-257.
71. J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World, p. 91.
72. e.g., D.J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
73. This is what I called the causal inheritance principle in "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," reprinted in J. Kim, Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
74. D. Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," in N. Rescher et al. (eds.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1969).
75. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
76. D.V. Newman, "Chaos, Emergence, and the Mind-Body Problem," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1997): 180-196.
77. P. Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge," Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 1-17.
78. M. Bedau, "Weak Emergence," Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 375-399.
79. A. Rueger, "Physical Emergence, Diachronic and Synchronic," Synthese 124 (2000): 297-332.
80. M. Silberstein, "Converging on Emergence," Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2001): 61-98.
81. T. O'Connor and H.Y. Wong, "The Metaphysics of Emergence," Noûs 39 (2005): 658-678.
82. S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1927), p. 8.
83. S. Shoemaker, "Causality and Properties," in P. Van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1980).
84. J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World and Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
85. E. Mills, "Interaction and Overdetermination," American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 105-117.
86. For example, Wesley Salmon in his Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 4.
87. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.
88. David Lewis, "Causal Explanation," in Lewis, Philosophical Papers II (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1986).
89. Paul Humphreys, The Chances of Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
90. Sylvain Bromberger, "An Approach to Explanation," in R.S. Butler, ed., Analytic Philosophy, Second Series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962).
91. Peter Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
92. Bas Van Fraassen, Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
93. Carl G. Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 337 (the italics are Hempel's).
94. "Causal Explanation," p. 217.
95. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, pp. 19-20.
96. The Chances of Explanation p. 127).
97. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World p. 259).
98. Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974): 5-19.
99. Joseph C. Pitt, ed., Theories of Explanation (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
100. "Explanation and Scientific Understanding." p.189.
101. "Explanatory Unification," p. 168 (in the Pitt volume).
102. "Explanation and Scientific Understanding," p. 190.
103. "Noncausal Connections," in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
104. Friedman, "Explanation and Scientific Understanding," p. 197.
105. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World p. 13).
106. e.g., Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton, NJ, 1984).
107. David Lewis, "Causal Explanation," in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1986).
108. Robert Cummins's distinction between "explanation by subsumption" and "explanation by analysis" in his The Nature of Psychological Explanation (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).
109. Peter Achinstein, "A Type of Non-Causal Explanation," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 221-243.
110. Donald Davidson, "Causal Relations," Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 691-703.
111. "Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event," Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 217-236.
112. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888), p. 165.
113. Bertrand Russell, "On the Notion of Cause," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13 (1913): 1-26.
114. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London, 1922).
115. "Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical?," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 3-16.
116. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.
117. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe (Oxford, 1974).
118. Putnam, "Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical." (22) "Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion," Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 77-108.
119. Compare Peter Railton "ideal explanatory text" and "ideal causal D-N text" in his "Probability, Explanation, and Information," Synthese 45 (1981): 233-256.
120. David Lewis, "Causal Explanation," Philosophical Papers, vol. 2.
121. Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966), pp. 47-49.
122. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 367-368.
123. "Events and Their Descriptions: Some Considerations," in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher et al. (Dordrecht, 1969).
124. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 347-354.
125. "The Uniqueness in Causation," American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977): 177-188.
126. "Causal Overdetermination," Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 134-150.
127. Reprinted in Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
128. Logische Syntax der Sprache (Vienna: Springer, 1934).
129. English edition, Logical Syntax of Language (London: Kegan Paul, 1937).
130. Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
131. Journal of Symbolic Logic 8 (1943): 122-143.
132. Mind 54 (1945): 1-26, 97-121.
133. Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Dordrecht:Reidel, 1969).
134. Philosophy of Science 15 (1948): 135-175.
135. Aspects of Scientific Explanation p. 247).
136. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
137. Humphreys, The Chances of Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
138. Aspects of Scientific Explanation p. 351).
139. Michael Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1962): 170-230.
140. Wesley Salmon, "The Third Dogma of Empiricism," in Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics, ed. Robert Butts and Jakko Hintikka (Dordrecht:Reidel, 1977).
141. James Woodward, "A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation," Erkenntnis 21 (1984): 231-262.
142. David Lewis, "Causal Explanation," in Philosophical Papers II (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
143. C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate, 1923), pp. 9-10.
144. Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (London: Macmillan, 1920).
145. "Relation is an accident which is in multiple subjects; it is what results without any change made in the subjects but supervenes from them; it is the thinkability of objects together when we think of multiple things simultaneously" (Die Leibniz- Handschriften der könighlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover, ed. E. Bodemann (Hanover, 1895), VII, c, p. 74.
146. Hidé Ishiguro, Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 71).
147. Robert Heinaman, "Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem," Phronesis 35 (1990): 83-102.
148. Brian McLaughlin, "The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism", and Achim Stephan, "Emergence-A Systematic View on Its Historical Facets", both in Emergence or Reduction?, ed. A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993).
149. D. Garber, Descartes Embodied (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 172.
150. Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
151. J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 141-156.
152. Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, ed. John Heil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
153. "Thinking Causes," in John Heil and Alfred Mele, Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
154. David Velleman, Practical Reflection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
155. e.g., Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton, NJ, 1984).
156. David Lewis, "Causal Explanation," in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1986).
157. Robert Cummins, "explanation by subsumption" and "explanation by analysis" in his The Nature of Psychological Explanation (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).
158. Peter Achinstein, "A Type of Non-Causal Explanation," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 221-243.
159. Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
160. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).
161. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 17.
162. Hilary Putnam, "Minds and Machines," reprinted in Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
163. Dimensions of Mind, ed. Sydney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1960).
164. "Explanation and Metaphysical Controversy," in Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon, eds., Scientific Explanation, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 13, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
165. Richard Nisbett and Stuart Valins, Perceiving the Causes of One's Own Behavior (New York: General Learning Press, 1971).
166. Philip Clayton, "Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory," in The Re-Emergence of Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ed. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies.
167. Hempel "Studies in the Logic of Explanation" (with Paul Oppenheim), reprinted in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
168. Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961).
169. Don Ross and David Spurrett, "What to Say to a Skeptical Metaphysician: A Defense Manual for Cognitive and Behavioral Scientists," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2004): 603-627.
170. Mark Bedau, "Weak Emergence," Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 375-399.
171. Michael Silberstein and John McGeever, "In Search for Ontological Emergence," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 182-200.
172. Robert Van Gulick, "Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind-Body Problem: A Philosophical Overview," Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2001): 1-34.
173. David J. Chalmers, "Strong and Weak Emergence," in The Re- Emergence of Emergence, ed. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies.
174. John Dupré, The Disorder of Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
175. The Disunity of Science, ed. Peter Galison and David J. Stump (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
176. D. Davidson, "Thinking Causes," in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
177. "Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical," Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 109-135.
178. e.g., John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).
179. Francisco Varella, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
180. Dennett, "Intentional Systems," Journal of Philosophy 8 (1971): 87-106.
181. Brainstorms (Montpelier, Vt.: Bradford Books, 1978).
182. Carl Gillett, "strong," "weak," and "ontological," in "The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance," Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (2002): 95-121.
183. Michael Scriven, "Causation as Explanation," Noûs 9 (1975): 3-16.
184. Scriven, "Causes as Explanations: A Critique," Theory and Decision 13 (1981): 293-309.
185. Donald Davidson, "Causal Relations," Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 691-703.
186. "Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event," Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 217-236.
187. F. Stoutland, "Oblique Causation and Reasons for Action," Synthese 43 (1980): 351-367.
188. T. Honderich, "The Argument of Anomalous Monism," Analysis 42 (1982): 59-64.
189. J. Kim, "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 257-270.
190. E. Sosa, "Mind- Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 271-281.
191. B. McLaughlin, "Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical," Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 109-136.
192. Joseph Levine, "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983): 354-361.
193. As has Brian McLauglin in "Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization," Erkenntnis 67 (2007): 149-172.
194. J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1998).
195. "Making Sense of Emergence," Philosophical Studies 95 (1999), pp. 3-36.
196. A. Marras, "Kim on Reduction," Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 231-257.
197. "On Properties," in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher et al. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1970).
198. Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
199. "Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues," Synthese 151 (2006): 547-559.
200. D.J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
201. Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson, "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes," Psychological Review 84 (1977): 231-259.
202. Alison Gopnik, "How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 11-14.
203. My approach bears a certain similarity with the accounts of George Wilson in The Intentionality of Human Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
204. Carl Ginet in On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
205. "Emergence as Non-Aggregativity and the Biases of Reductionisms", Foundations of Science 5 (2000): 269-297.
206. Paul Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge," Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 1-17.
207. This is what I called the causal inheritance principle in "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," reprinted in J. Kim, Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
208. Carl Ginet, "Can the Will Be Caused?" Philosophical Review 71 (1962): 49-55.
209. Paul Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge," Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 1-17.
210. Timothy O'Connor and Hong Yu Wong, "The Metaphysics of Emergence," Noûs 39 (2005): 658-678.
211. Michael Silberstein, "In Defense of Ontological Emergence and Mental Causation," in The Re-Emergence of Emergence.
212. Michael Tye "perspectival subjectivity," in his Ten Problems of Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).
213. D. Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," in N. Rescher et al. (eds.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1969).
214. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
215. Marcelo Sabates, "Varieties of Exclusion," Theoria 16 (2001): 13-42.
216. Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Dordrecht:Reidel, 1969).
217. For example, David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 43.
218. Carl Ginet, "Can the Will Be Caused?" Philosophical Review 71 (1962): 49-55.
219. Davidson, "Thinking Causes" (in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
220. David Armstrong A Materialist Theory of Mind (New York: Humanities Press, 1964).
221. David Lewis's "An Argument for the Identity Theory," Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 203-211.
222. Robert Van Gulick, "Nonreductive Materialism and the Nature of Intertheoretic Constraint," in Emergence or Reduction?.
223. Joseph Levine, "On Leaving Out What It Is Like," in Consciousness, ed. Martin Davies and Glyn W. Humphreys (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
224. Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
225. D.V. Newman, "Chaos, Emergence, and the Mind-Body Problem," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1997): 180-196.
226. P. Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge," Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 1-17.
227. M. Bedau, "Weak Emergence," Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 375-399.
228. A. Rueger, "Physical Emergence, Diachronic and Synchronic," Synthese 124 (2000): 297-332.
229. M. Silberstein, "Converging on Emergence," Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2001): 61-98.
230. T. O'Connor and H.Y. Wong, "The Metaphysics of Emergence," Noûs 39 (2005): 658-678.
231. Ned Block, "Troubles with Functionalism" in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, ed. Block (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
232. To mimic a felicitous sentence from Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap," Philosophical Review 108 (1999): 1-46.
233. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1925), p. 96.
234. David Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2002).
235. Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974): 5-19.
236. Joseph C. Pitt, ed., Theories of Explanation (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
237. William P. Alston "Conceptual Prolegomena to a Psychological Theory of Intentional Action," in Philosophy of Psychology, ed. S.C. Brown (London: The Macmillan Press, 1974).
238. Lawrence Sklar, "Types of Intertheoretic Reduction," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1967): 109-124.
239. Robert Causey, "Attribute Identities in Microreductions," Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972): 407-422.
240. Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1984).
241. S. Shoemaker, "Causality and Properties," in P. Van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1980).
242. Lawrence Sklar, Physics and Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
243. For example, Christopher Hill, Sensations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
244. Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer, Physicalism and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
245. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.
246. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe (Oxford, 1974).
247. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science 15 (1948): 135-175.
248. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961).
249. James Van Cleve, "Mind-Dust or Magic? Panpsychism versus Emergence," Philosophical Perspectives 4 (1990): 215-226.
250. J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
251. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
252. "Reduction with Autonomy" (Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997):83-105).
253. This accords with the idea of reductive explanation promoted by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, in their "Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation," Philosophical Review 110 (2001): 315-360.
254. In "Explanatory Unification," Philosophy of Science 48 (1981): 507-531.
255. "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," p. 17.
256. Ned Block, "Do Causal Powers Drain Away?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 133-150.
257. Jonathan Schaffer, "Is There a Fundamental Level?" Noûs 37 (2003): 498-517.
258. E. Mills, "Interaction and Overdetermination," American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 105-117.
259. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, tr. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 15.
260. Putnam, "Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical."
261. Ned Block, "Do Causal Powers Drain Away?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 133-150, and the references given therein.
262. A good place to sample some of this is J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004).
263. "Explanatory Unification," p. 168 (in the Pitt volume).
264. W.V. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
265. Stalnaker, "A Theory of Conditionals," in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968).
266. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).
267. Ned Block, "The Harder Problem of Consciousness," Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 391-425.
268. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind.
269. Joseph Levine, "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983): 354-361.
270. Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982): 127-136.
271. For example, E. LePore and B. Loewer, "Mind Matters," Journal of Philosophy 93 (1987): 630-642.
272. T. Horgan, "Mental Quausation," Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 47-76.
273. B. Loewer, "Comments on Jaegwon Kim's Mind in a Physical World," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 655-662.
274. "Mental Causation, Or Something Near Enough," in Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
275. Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, "Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis," in Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1958).
276. Compare Peter Railton "ideal explanatory text" and "ideal causal D-N text" in his "Probability, Explanation, and Information," Synthese 45 (1981): 233-256.
277. David Lewis, "Causal Explanation," Philosophical Papers, vol. 2.
278. Achim Stephan calls the mathematical archangel "a colleague of the Laplacian demon" in his "Emergence-A Systematic View on its Historical Facets," in Emergence or Reduction?, ed. Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr, and Jaegwon Kim (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992).
279. Terence Horgan, "Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics," Southern Journal of Philosophy 22, Spindel Supplement (1984): 19-38.
280. William C. Wimsatt, "Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem," in Consciousness and the Brain, ed. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin Savodnik (New York: Plenum Press, 1976).
281. "The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels of Organization, Perspectives, and Causal Thickets," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 20 (1994): 207-274.
282. Anscombe, Causality and Determination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
283. M. Tooley and E. Sosa (eds.), Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
284. Wesley Salmon, "The Third Dogma of Empiricism," in Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics, ed. Robert Butts and Jakko Hintikka (Dordrecht:Reidel, 1977).
285. Hall, "Two Concepts of Causation," in Collins, Hall, and Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, 225.
286. Davidson, "Developed physics."
287. Davidson, "Thinking Causes," in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford:Clarendon, 1993).
288. The Conscious Mind p. 33).
289. David Lewis, "Causal Explanation," in Philosophical Papers II (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
290. Brian McLaughlin, "Is Role Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism?" Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (2006): 39-66.
291. David-Hillel Ruben's Explaining Explanation (London and New York:Routledge, 1990).
292. "Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 225-240.
293. P. Dowe, "Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory," Philosophy of Science 59 (1992): 195-216.
294. Physical Causation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
295. W.C. Salmon, "Causality Without Counterfactuals," Philosophy of Science 61 (1993): 297-312.
296. D. Fair, "Causation and the Flow of Energy," Erkenntnis 14 (1979): 219-250.
297. Dowe, "Causes Are Physically Connected to Their Effects,"
298. J. Schaffer, "Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation," both in C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).
299. "Mental Phenomena as Causal Determinants in Brain Function," in Consciousness and the Brain, ed. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin Savodnik (New York: Plenum Press, 1976), p. 165.
300. "Events and Their Descriptions: Some Considerations," in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher et al. (Dordrecht, 1969).
301. Block, "Antireductionism Slaps Back"
302. Fodor, "Special Sciences.".
303. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, "Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation," Philosophical Review 110 (2001): 315-360.
304. Frank Jackson, "A Priori Physicalism," in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
305. Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap," Philosophical Review 108 (1999): 1-46.
306. Brian McLaughlin, "On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism," in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen.
307. B. Abbott, "Some Problems in Giving an Adequate Model-Theoretical Account of CAUSE," in C. Filmore, G. Lakoff, and R. Lakoff (eds.), Berkeley Studies in Syntax and Semantics, vol. i (1974).
308. S. McGrath, "Causation by Omission: A Dilemma," Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 125-148.
309. Kim, Mind in a Physical World.
310. McLaughlin, "Is Role- Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism?" for recent discussion; Louis E. Loeb, "Causal Theories and Causal Overdetermination," Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974): 525-544.
311. Timothy O'Connor, "Emergent Properties" American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994): 91-104.
312. Terry Hogan, I believe, was the first to remind me of this implication of functional reduction.
313. C. Lloyd Morgan explicitly denies that emergence is a form of causation, in Emergent Evolution, p. 28.
314. Jerry A. Fodor, "Special Sciences-or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis" (1974), reprinted in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. David J. Chalmers (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 129.
315. Block and Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis"
316. Kim, Physicalism.
317. Block, "Functional Reduction," in Supervenience in Mind, ed. Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates, and David Sosa (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
318. William Bechtel, Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007).
319. Carl F. Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
320. Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
321. Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
322. Brian McLaughlin, "The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism"
323. Achim Stephan, "Emergence-A Systematic View on Its Historical Facets", both in Emergence or Reduction?, ed. A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993).
324. Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation" (with Paul Oppenheim), reprinted in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
325. Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961).
326. John C. Eccles and Karl R. Popper, The Self and Its Brain (Berlin & New York: Springer International, 1977).
327. e.g., John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).
328. Francisco Varella, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
329. In particular, "The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism," reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
330. C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate, 1923), pp. 2-3.
331. William C. Wimsatt, "Emergence as Non-Aggregativity and the Biases of Reductionisms", Foundations of Science 5 (2000): 269-297.
332. Paul Humphreys' interesting paper, "How Properties Emerge," Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 1-17.
333. Michael Tye, "perspectival subjectivity," in his Ten Problems of Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).
334. For example, David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 43.
335. The fundamental ideas for this view of reduction are present in David Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of Mind (New York: Humanities Press, 1964).
336. David Lewis, "An Argument for the Identity Theory," Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 203-211.
337. Robert Van Gulick, "Nonreductive Materialism and the Nature of Intertheoretic Constraint," in Emergence or Reduction?.
338. Joseph Levine, "On Leaving Out What It Is Like," in Consciousness, ed. Martin Davies and Glyn W. Humphreys (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
339. Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
340. Lawrence Sklar, Physics and Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
341. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), chap. 11.
342. "Reduction with Autonomy" (Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997):83-105).
343. "The Mind-Body Problem:Taking Stock After 40 Years," Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 185-207.
344. "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 1-26.
345. The Conscious Mind p. 129).
346. Chalmers, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983): 354-361.
347. Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982): 127-136.
348. Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, "Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis," in Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1958).
349. William C. Wimsatt, "Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem," in Consciousness and the Brain, ed. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin Savodnik (New York: Plenum Press, 1976).
350. "The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels of Organization, Perspectives, and Causal Thickets," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 20 (1994): 207-274.
351. Space, Time, and Deity, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1927), p. 8.
352. Emergent Evolution (London: Williams & Norgate, 1927), pp. 15-16. Emphasis added.
353. "Mental Phenomena as Causal Determinants in Brain Function," in Consciousness and the Brain, ed. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin Savodnik (New York: Plenum Press, 1976), p. 165.
354. "A Modified Concept of Consciousness", Psychological Review 76 (1969):532-536.
355. Timothy O'Connor, "Emergent Properties" American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994): 91-104.
356. "Self-Understanding and Rationalizing Explanations," Philosophia Naturalis 21 (1984): 309-320.
357. David Velleman discusses such cases, in detail and with subtlety, in his Practical Reflection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
358. Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," Journal of Philosophy 60 (1967).
359. reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
360. This is taken from Richard Nisbett and Stuart Valins, Perceiving the Causes of One's Own Behavior (New York: General Learning Press, 1971).
361. Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
362. Davidson "Hempel on Explaining Action," reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events.
363. Dennett, "Intentional Systems," Journal of Philosophy 8 (1971): 87-106.
364. Brainstorms (Montpelier, Vt.: Bradford Books, 1978).
365. Georg von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1971).
366. Carl Ginet, "Can the Will Be Caused?" Philosophical Review 71 (1962): 49-55.
367. Dennett, "Intentional Systems."
368. Oliver Sacks, An Anthropologist on Mars (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).
369. William P. Alston "Conceptual Prolegomena to a Psychological Theory of Intentional Action," in Philosophy of Psychology, ed. S.C. Brown (London: The Macmillan Press, 1974).
370. J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 141-156.
371. Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, ed. John Heil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
372. "Special Sciences: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis," Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115.
373. Block, "Antireductionism Slaps Back," Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 107-132.
374. Don Ross and David Spurrett, "What to Say to a Skeptical Metaphysician: A Defense Manual for Cognitive and Behavioral Scientists," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2004): 603-627.
375. "Special Sciences," p. 107.
376. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 43.
377. Joseph Levine, "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983): 354-361.
378. Kim, Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
379. Hilary Putnam, "Psychological Predicates" (1967), reprinted with the title "The Nature of Mental States," in Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality:Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
380. Fodor, "Special Sciences."
381. Donald Davidson, "Mental Events,"
382. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
383. Feigl, "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2 (1958): 370-497.
384. Feigl, "Postscript after Ten Years," in Feigl, The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967), pp.136ff.
385. Lawrence Sklar, "Types of Intertheoretic Reduction," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1967): 109-124.
386. Robert Causey, "Attribute Identities in Microreductions," Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972): 407-422.
387. For example, Christopher Hill, Sensations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
388. Block and Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis"
389. Brian McLaughlin, "In Defense of New-Wave Materialism," in Physicalism and Its Discontents, ed. Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
390. Kim, Physicalism
391. Block and Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis," 24.
392. Kim, "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction" (1992), reprinted in Kim, Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
393. Brian McLaughlin, "Is Role Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism?" Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (2006): 39-66.
394. Kim, Mind in a Physical World
395. McLaughlin, "Is Role- Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism?" for recent discussion.
396. Block, "Introduction: What is Functionalism?" in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, ed. Block (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
397. "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 67-90.
398. "Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction," Journal of Philosophy 104 (2007): 193-216.
399. Block and Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis"
400. Kim, Physicalism.
401. Block, "Functional Reduction," in Supervenience in Mind, ed. Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates, and David Sosa (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
402. "Making Sense of Emergence," Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 3-36.
403. Jaegwon Kim "The Layered World: Metaphysical Considerations," published under the title "The Layered Model: Metaphysical Considerations," in Philosophical Explorations 5 (2002): 2-20.
404. "Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues," Synthese 151 (2006): 547-559.
405. Jaegwon Kim "'Supervenient and Yet Not Deducible': Is There a Coherent Concept of Ontological Emergence?" In Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain, ed. Alexander Hieke and Hannes Leitgeb, Ontos Verlag, 2009.
406. Jaegwon Kim "Reasons and the First Person." In Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, ed. Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers, Kluwer, 1998, 67-87.
407. Jaegwon Kim "Taking the Agent's Point of View Seriously in Action Explanation." New.
408. Jaegwon Kim "Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 225-239. Used with permission of Wiley- Blackwell.
409. "Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence," Philosophical Issues 5 (1994): 51-69.
410. "Hempel, Explanation, Metaphysics," Philosophical Studies 94 (1999): 1-20. Used with permission of Springer.
411. "Reduction and Reductive Explanation: Is One Possible Without the Other?" In Being Reduced: New Essays on Causation and Explanation in the Special Sciences, ed. Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup, Oxford University Press, 2007.
412. Jaegwon Kim "Can Supervenience and 'Non-Strict' Laws Save Anomalous Monism?" From Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele, Oxford University Press, 1993.
413. Jaegwon Kim "Causation and Mental Causation." In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, Blackwell, 2007. Used with permission of Wiley-Blackwell.
414. "Two Concepts of Realization, Mental Causation, and Physicalism." New.
415. Jaegwon Kim, "Why There Are No Laws in the Special Sciences: Three Arguments.".
416. Jaegwon Kim, C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate, 1923), pp. 9-10.
417. Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (London: Macmillan, 1920).
418. C.D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1925), p. 58.
419. Philip Clayton, "Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory," in The Re-Emergence of Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ed. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies.
420. Mark Bedau, "Weak Emergence," Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 375-399.
421. Michael Silberstein and John McGeever, "In Search for Ontological Emergence," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 182-200.
422. Robert Van Gulick, "Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind-Body Problem: A Philosophical Overview," Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2001): 1-34.
423. David J. Chalmers, "Strong and Weak Emergence," in The Re- Emergence of Emergence, ed. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies.
424. Carl Gillett, "strong," "weak," and "ontological," in "The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance," Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (2002): 95-121.
425. "Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues," Synthese 151 (2006): 547-559.
426. Paul Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge," Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 1-17.
427. Timothy O'Connor and Hong Yu Wong, "The Metaphysics of Emergence," Noûs 39 (2005): 658-678.
428. Michael Silberstein, "In Defense of Ontological Emergence and Mental Causation," in The Re-Emergence of Emergence.
429. Michael Silberstein, "In Defense of Ontological Emergence and Mental Causation," p. 203.
430. Emergent Evolution p. 3).
431. "Emergence," Journal of Philosophy 23 (1926): 241-245.
432. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science 15 (1948): 135-175.
433. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961).
434. James Van Cleve, "Mind-Dust or Magic? Panpsychism versus Emergence," Philosophical Perspectives 4 (1990): 215-226.
435. Chalmers, "Strong and Weak Supervenience." (19) "Epiphenomenal Qualia," Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982): 126-136.
436. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 435-450.
437. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, tr. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 15.
438. Change in View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986), p. 19.
439. "Strong and Weak Emergence," p. 244.
440. The Mind and Its Place in Nature p. 71).
441. The Conscious Mind (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
442. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, "Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation," Philosophical Review 110 (2001): 315-360.
443. Frank Jackson, "A Priori Physicalism," in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
444. Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap," Philosophical Review 108 (1999): 1-46.
445. Brian McLaughlin, "On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism," in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen.
446. Paul Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge," Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 1-17.
447. Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).
448. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 14.
449. The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 113.
450. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
451. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 463-487.
452. Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson, "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes," Psychological Review 84 (1977): 231-259.
453. Alison Gopnik, "How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 11-14.
454. Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 48.
455. Carl Ginet, "Can the Will Be Caused?" Philosophical Review 71 (1962): 49-55.
456. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, p. 463. Original emphasis.
457. William Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 124.
458. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 470-471.
459. "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," p. 10.
460. The View from Nowhere p. 116).
461. Laws and Explanation in History p. 110).
462. G.H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), chap. 1.
463. Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1984).
464. C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate, 1923), pp. 5-6.
465. Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, "Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958).
466. "Concepts of Supervenience," reprinted in my Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
467. Ned Block, "Do Causal Powers Drain Away?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 133-150, and the references given therein.
468. W.V. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
469. Ned Block, "The Harder Problem of Consciousness," Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 391-425.
470. "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
471. Robert Heinaman, "Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem," Phronesis 35 (1990): 83-102.
472. Hilary Putnam, "Minds and Machines," reprinted in Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
473. Dimensions of Mind, ed. Sydney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1960).
474. Lawrence Shapiro, "Multiple Realizations," Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 635-654.
475. Shapiro, The Mind Incarnate (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004).
476. Lenny Clapp, "Disjunctive Properties: Multiple Realizations," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 111-136.
477. Carl Gillett, "The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences," Journal of Philosophy 100 (2003): 591-603.
478. Thomas Polger, Natural Minds (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004).
479. As has Brian McLauglin in "Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization," Erkenntnis 67 (2007): 149-172.
480. "On Properties," in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher et al. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1970).
481. Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
482. Ned Block, "Can the Mind Change the World?" in Meaning and Method, ed. George Boolos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
483. Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
484. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
485. Marcelo Sabates, "Varieties of Exclusion," Theoria 16 (2001): 13-42.
486. "Making Sense of Emergence," Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 3-36.
487. Shoemaker, "Realization and Mental Causation," in Physicalism and Its Discontents, ed. Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
488. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, "Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation," Philosophical Review 110 (2001): 315-360.
489. Jerry Fodor, "Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years," Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 149-163.
490. J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).
491. John Dupré, The Disorder of Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
492. The Disunity of Science, ed. Peter Galison and David J. Stump (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
493. Davidson, "Could There Be a Science of Rationality?", in his Problems of Rationality (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 2004).
494. "Mental Events," p. 224.
495. "Mental Events," p. 208.
496. "Events as Property Exemplifications," reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
497. Ned Block, "Do Causal Powers Drain Away?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 133-150.
498. Jonathan Schaffer, "Is There a Fundamental Level?" Noûs 37 (2003): 498-517.
499. Philip Kitcher, "1953 All That: A Tale of Two Sciences," Philosophical Review 93 (1984): 335-373.
500. All That: A Tale of Two Sciences," p. 342.
501. J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 52.
502. Davidson, "Developed physics."
503. Davidson, "Thinking Causes," in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford:Clarendon, 1993).
504. Philosophy and Scientific Realism p. 57).
505. Philosophy and Scientific Realism p. 61).
506. Jerry A. Fodor, "Making Mind Matter More," Philosophical Topics 17 (1989): 59-79 (the quotation is from p. 75).
507. Jerry A. Fodor, "Special Sciences-or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis" (1974), reprinted in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. David J. Chalmers (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 129.
508. "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction" (1992), reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
509. Ned Block, "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back," Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 107-132.
510. William Bechtel, Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007).
511. Carl F. Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).