The increased concentration of health plan markets can benefit consumers through lower hospital prices

Health Affairs

Volumn 30, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 1728-1733

  Melnick, Glenn A ^a   Shen, Yu Chu ^b   Wu, Vivian Yaling ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONSUMER; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; HEALTH CARE PLANNING; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH ECONOMICS; HOSPITAL COST;

CATCHMENT AREA (HEALTH); COST CONTROL; ECONOMICS, HOSPITAL; HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS, EMPLOYEE; HOSPITAL CHARGES; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84855643207     PISSN: 02782715     EISSN: 15445208     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0406     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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