Why is platform pricing generally highly skewed?

Review of Network Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2011, Pages

  Schmalensee, Richard ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

non concavity; platform; pricing; skewed

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855398934     PISSN: None     EISSN: 14469022     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1274     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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