Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability

Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 87-109

  Buell, Samuel W ^a,b,c  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84455178995     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (30)

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