Mitigation, mercy, and delay: The moral politics of death penalty abolitionists

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 1996, Pages

  Alfieri, Anthony V ^a,b,c,d  

^a Department of Law ^*

^b UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

^c BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 8344263024     PISSN: 00178039     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (244)

1. For a history of the LDF abolitionist campaign, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 440-60 (1994); MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 60-72 (1973). See also HUGO A. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 81-90 (1977); Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982); Eric L. Muller, Note, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158 (1985).
2. For a history of the LDF abolitionist campaign, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 440-60 (1994); MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 60-72 (1973). See also HUGO A. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 81-90 (1977); Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982); Eric L. Muller, Note, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158 (1985).
3. For a history of the LDF abolitionist campaign, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 440-60 (1994); MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 60-72 (1973). See also HUGO A. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 81-90 (1977); Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982); Eric L. Muller, Note, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158 (1985).
4. For a history of the LDF abolitionist campaign, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 440-60 (1994); MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 60-72 (1973). See also HUGO A. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 81-90 (1977); Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982); Eric L. Muller, Note, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158 (1985).
5. For a history of the LDF abolitionist campaign, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 440-60 (1994); MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 60-72 (1973). See also HUGO A. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 81-90 (1977); Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982); Eric L. Muller, Note, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158 (1985).
6. By "abolitionists," I mean civil rights and criminal defense lawyers committed to the invalidation of the death penalty. Austin Sarat distinguishes between "old" and "new" abolitionist lawyers. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996). Old abolitionists, Sarat observes, oppose the death penalty on substantive, moral grounds. New abolitionists, by contrast, oppose the death penalty on procedural, legal grounds. Id. Because of the instrumentalist orientation shared by "old" and "new" abolitionists, I reject Sarat's sociohistorical distinction. Instead, I use the term "abolitionists" to refer generally to the anti-capital punishment bar. See Franklin E. Zimring, On the Liberating Virtues of Irrelevance, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 9, 15 (1993) (discussing the significance of empirical evidence documenting the emergence of a capital punishment bar).
7. By "abolitionists," I mean civil rights and criminal defense lawyers committed to the invalidation of the death penalty. Austin Sarat distinguishes between "old" and "new" abolitionist lawyers. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996). Old abolitionists, Sarat observes, oppose the death penalty on substantive, moral grounds. New abolitionists, by contrast, oppose the death penalty on procedural, legal grounds. Id. Because of the instrumentalist orientation shared by "old" and "new" abolitionists, I reject Sarat's sociohistorical distinction. Instead, I use the term "abolitionists" to refer generally to the anti-capital punishment bar. See Franklin E. Zimring, On the Liberating Virtues of Irrelevance, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 9, 15 (1993) (discussing the significance of empirical evidence documenting the emergence of a capital punishment bar).
8. By "abolitionists," I mean civil rights and criminal defense lawyers committed to the invalidation of the death penalty. Austin Sarat distinguishes between "old" and "new" abolitionist lawyers. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996). Old abolitionists, Sarat observes, oppose the death penalty on substantive, moral grounds. New abolitionists, by contrast, oppose the death penalty on procedural, legal grounds. Id. Because of the instrumentalist orientation shared by "old" and "new" abolitionists, I reject Sarat's sociohistorical distinction. Instead, I use the term "abolitionists" to refer generally to the anti-capital punishment bar. See Franklin E. Zimring, On the Liberating Virtues of Irrelevance, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 9, 15 (1993) (discussing the significance of empirical evidence documenting the emergence of a capital punishment bar).
9. See GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 440-60; MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 60-72.
10. See Fay S. Joyce, One Slayer Executed, with Another to Die Today, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1983, at A22. The Williams litigation is well accounted in the legal record. See Williams v. Maggio, 383 So. 2d 369 (La.). 387 So. 2d 598 (La. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. Louisiana, 449 U.S. 1103, and reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981): State ex rel. Williams v. Blackburn, 396 So. 2d 1249 (La.), Williams v. Blackburn, No. 81-237-B, slip op. (M.D. La.), 649 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted. 661 F.2d 1020 (5th Qr. 1981), aff'd on reh'g, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied sub nom. Williams v. Maggio, 463 U.S. 1214, and reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1249 (1983); Williams v. King, 439 So. 2d 1092 (La. 1983); Williams v. King, 573 F. Supp. 525 (M.D. La.), aff'd 719 F.2d 729 (5th Cir.) (granting stay of execution), 719 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.) (same), Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46 (1983) (vacating stay), cert, denied sub nom. Williams v. King, 464 U.S. 1027 (1983) (denying stay), State ex rel. Williams v. King, 442 So. 2d 473 (La. 1983), 722 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1983) (same).
11. United States Supreme Court Official Tr. at 7, McFarland v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994) (No. 93-6497) (Scalia, J.).
12. For elaboration on the notion of a practice vision, see William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (1994) (assailing new poverty law scholars); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) (comparing professional and critical views of practice).
13. For elaboration on the notion of a practice vision, see William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (1994) (assailing new poverty law scholars); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) (comparing professional and critical views of practice).
14. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15. For surveys of death penalty litigation developments in the post-Furman era, see Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797 (1986); Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (1992).
16. For surveys of death penalty litigation developments in the post-Furman era, see Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797 (1986); Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (1992).
17. See generally Sarat, supra note 2.
18. See generally id.
19. See generally id.
20. A third, less frequently encountered judgment involves the abolitionist response to the decision of a capital defendant or a death row inmate to elect voluntary execution. The literature discussing the nature of this judgment is sparse. See Kathleen L. Johnson, Note, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?. 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 (1981); G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860 (1983); Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853 (1987); Richard C. Dieter, Note, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799 (1990).
21. A third, less frequently encountered judgment involves the abolitionist response to the decision of a capital defendant or a death row inmate to elect voluntary execution. The literature discussing the nature of this judgment is sparse. See Kathleen L. Johnson, Note, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?. 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 (1981); G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860 (1983); Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853 (1987); Richard C. Dieter, Note, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799 (1990).
22. A third, less frequently encountered judgment involves the abolitionist response to the decision of a capital defendant or a death row inmate to elect voluntary execution. The literature discussing the nature of this judgment is sparse. See Kathleen L. Johnson, Note, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?. 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 (1981); G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860 (1983); Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853 (1987); Richard C. Dieter, Note, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799 (1990).
23. A third, less frequently encountered judgment involves the abolitionist response to the decision of a capital defendant or a death row inmate to elect voluntary execution. The literature discussing the nature of this judgment is sparse. See Kathleen L. Johnson, Note, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?. 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 (1981); G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860 (1983); Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853 (1987); Richard C. Dieter, Note, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799 (1990).
24. In a prior work, I engrafted the notion of instrumentalism onto a vision of law practice carried out in the context of poverty. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2619-39 (1993) (discussing the formal/instrumental tension in the politics of poverty law practice).
25. The claim of purposivism also assumes the relative autonomy of law and lawyers from the political state. The premise of relative autonomy sees law and lawyers pushed internally by the imperatives of professional ideology and legal reasoning, and pulled externally by the forces of politics, society, and economics. Out of this tension emerges a middle ground or space open to doctrinal evolution and to lawyer maneuver. Typically, the evolution is incremental and the maneuver is small in scale.
26. Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases from the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 167 (1990).
27. Id. at 174.
28. Id. at 167.
29. For illustrations of context-specific analysis, see GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (ethnicity); Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and "Feminine" Style. 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635 (1991) (gender); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.. 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (race/class).
30. For illustrations of context-specific analysis, see GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (ethnicity); Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and "Feminine" Style. 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635 (1991) (gender); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.. 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (race/class).
31. For illustrations of context-specific analysis, see GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (ethnicity); Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and "Feminine" Style. 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635 (1991) (gender); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.. 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (race/class).
32. Carol and Jordon Steiker describe the tension between channeling and individualization as "the central dilemma in post-Furman capital punishment law." Carol S. Steiker & Jordon M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 382 (1995).
33. On the character of weighing and non-weighing schemes, see Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147 (1991); Srikanth Srinivasan, Note, Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-Nonweighing Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1347 (1995).
34. On the character of weighing and non-weighing schemes, see Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147 (1991); Srikanth Srinivasan, Note, Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-Nonweighing Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1347 (1995).
35. Weighing statutory schemes predominate in 21 of 36 state death penalty jurisdictions. See Stephen Hornbuckle, Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal Oddity in the Supreme Court's Case Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448 n.38 (1994).
36. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
37. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
38. For an analysis of channeling schemes and jury discretion, see James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995).
39. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
40. U.S. 586 (1978). For an explanation of Lockett's importance, see Randy Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REV. 317 (1981).
41. See Ronald J. Mann, The Individualized-Consideration Principle and the Death Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 29 Hous. L. REV. 493 (1992); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835 (1992).
42. See Ronald J. Mann, The Individualized-Consideration Principle and the Death Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 29 Hous. L. REV. 493 (1992); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835 (1992).
43. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (describing "the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death").
44. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; accord Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); see also JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990 172 (1994) (asserting that the "major source" of juror discretion stems from the assessment of the defendant's character and violent propensities).
45. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; accord Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); see also JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990 172 (1994) (asserting that the "major source" of juror discretion stems from the assessment of the defendant's character and violent propensities).
46. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
47. Id. at 307-10, 328; see also Peggy M. Tobolowsky, What Hath Penry Wrought?: Mitigating Circumstances and the Texas Death Penalty, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 345, 355-64 (1992) (evaluating constitutional adequacy of Texas death penalty statutory provisions regulating consideration of mitigating circumstances).
48. Id. at 307-10, 328; see also Peggy M. Tobolowsky, What Hath Penry Wrought?: Mitigating Circumstances and the Texas Death Penalty, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 345, 355-64 (1992) (evaluating constitutional adequacy of Texas death penalty statutory provisions regulating consideration of mitigating circumstances).
49. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 361; see also Albert L. Vreeland, Note, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 626 (1991). Vreeland explains: Humanizing the client requires research into personal history from birth to trial, interviewing family, neighbors, teachers, ministers, employers and anyone with significant contact with the defendant. These witnesses must be presented to the jury to tell the defendant's story, to make sense of the client's life and to explain how he came to commit the crime. Id. at 649.
50. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 361; see also Albert L. Vreeland, Note, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 626 (1991). Vreeland explains: Humanizing the client requires research into personal history from birth to trial, interviewing family, neighbors, teachers, ministers, employers and anyone with significant contact with the defendant. These witnesses must be presented to the jury to tell the defendant's story, to make sense of the client's life and to explain how he came to commit the crime. Id. at 649.
51. Weisberg, supra note 32, at 361.
52. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials: the Trouble with Us. 105 YALE L.. 825, 852 (1995) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)).
53. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials: the Trouble with Us. 105 YALE L.. 825, 852 (1995) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)).
54. See Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1122 (1995).
55. Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 19, 51 (1993).
56. A similar opportunity arises in clemency proceedings, albeit with growing infrequency. See MARQUART ET AL., supra note 29, at 102; Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1990/1991).
57. A similar opportunity arises in clemency proceedings, albeit with growing infrequency. See MARQUART ET AL., supra note 29, at 102; Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1990/1991).
58. Stephen Schulhofer comments: Cultural demonization of the criminal offender provides the emotional energy to condemn without remorse and eventually to pull the lethal switch, but it also leaves a large opening for defense counsel, because that picture of the generic Mobster or Mugger seldom corresponds to the facts of the particular case. If a guilty criminal is defined as a moral monster who deserves execution or isolation from human society forever, then the individual on trial - a three-dimensional person with human frailties and human needs-probably will not fit the picture Schulhofer. supra note 34, at 852.
59. See Sarat, supra note 36, at 39-47: see also WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 51-74 (1987).
60. See Sarat, supra note 36, at 39-47: see also WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 51-74 (1987).
61. On the use of mental disorders as mitigating evidence, see William Green. Capital Punishment, Psychiatric Experts and Predictions of Dangerousness. 13 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 533 (1984); James Liebman & Michael Shepherd, Guiding Sentencer Discretion Beyond the "Boilerplate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757 (1978); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409. 418-29 (1990); cf. EMILY F. REED, PENKY PENALTY; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 17, 42-43 (1993) (discussing mental retardation as a mitigating factor).
62. On the use of mental disorders as mitigating evidence, see William Green. Capital Punishment, Psychiatric Experts and Predictions of Dangerousness. 13 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 533 (1984); James Liebman & Michael Shepherd, Guiding Sentencer Discretion Beyond the "Boilerplate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757 (1978); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409. 418-29 (1990); cf. EMILY F. REED, PENKY PENALTY; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 17, 42-43 (1993) (discussing mental retardation as a mitigating factor).
63. On the use of mental disorders as mitigating evidence, see William Green. Capital Punishment, Psychiatric Experts and Predictions of Dangerousness. 13 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 533 (1984); James Liebman & Michael Shepherd, Guiding Sentencer Discretion Beyond the "Boilerplate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757 (1978); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409. 418-29 (1990); cf. EMILY F. REED, PENKY PENALTY; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 17, 42-43 (1993) (discussing mental retardation as a mitigating factor).
64. On the use of mental disorders as mitigating evidence, see William Green. Capital Punishment, Psychiatric Experts and Predictions of Dangerousness. 13 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 533 (1984); James Liebman & Michael Shepherd, Guiding Sentencer Discretion Beyond the "Boilerplate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757 (1978); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409. 418-29 (1990); cf. EMILY F. REED, PENKY PENALTY; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 17, 42-43 (1993) (discussing mental retardation as a mitigating factor).
65. Weisberg, supra note 32, at 361.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 381; see also Dorothy O. Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838 (1986).
68. Mark Costanzo & Julie Peterson, Attorney Persuasion in the Capital Penalty Phase: A Content Analysis of Closing Arguments, 50 J. Soc. ISSUES 125, 134 (1994).
69. For studies of capital jury decision making, see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck? - Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995).
70. For studies of capital jury decision making, see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck? - Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995).
71. See Craig Haney. Taking Capital Jurors Seriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223, 1227 (1995) (expressing skepticism that jurors understand either the significance of mitigating evidence or its proper use in reaching a verdict); see also Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1.
72. See Craig Haney. Taking Capital Jurors Seriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223, 1227 (1995) (expressing skepticism that jurors understand either the significance of mitigating evidence or its proper use in reaching a verdict); see also Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1.
73. Maria Sandys reports that the majority of capital jurors make guilt and penalty decisions concurrently, prior to the penalty phase of the trial. Concurrent decision making not only vitiates the purpose of bifurcated proceedings, but "also precludes capita) jurors from basing their sentencing decisions on an evaluation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." See Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs - Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1220-21 (1995).
74. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). But see Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 513 (1988); Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners ' Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455 (1989); Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 211 (1990).
75. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). But see Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 513 (1988); Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners ' Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455 (1989); Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 211 (1990).
76. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). But see Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 513 (1988); Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners ' Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455 (1989); Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 211 (1990).
77. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). But see Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 513 (1988); Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners ' Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455 (1989); Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 211 (1990).
78. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). But see Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 32-35, 36-37 (1994); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases: A Report Containing the American Bar Association's Recommendations Concerning Death Penalty Habeas Corpus and Related Materials from the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Project on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus. 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 62-92 (1990). See generally Symposium, Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of Counsel, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-138 (1995).
79. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). But see Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 32-35, 36-37 (1994); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases: A Report Containing the American Bar Association's Recommendations Concerning Death Penalty Habeas Corpus and Related Materials from the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Project on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus. 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 62-92 (1990). See generally Symposium, Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of Counsel, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-138 (1995).
80. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). But see Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 32-35, 36-37 (1994); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases: A Report Containing the American Bar Association's Recommendations Concerning Death Penalty Habeas Corpus and Related Materials from the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Project on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus. 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 62-92 (1990). See generally Symposium, Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of Counsel, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-138 (1995).
81. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). But see Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 32-35, 36-37 (1994); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases: A Report Containing the American Bar Association's Recommendations Concerning Death Penalty Habeas Corpus and Related Materials from the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Project on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus. 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 62-92 (1990). See generally Symposium, Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of Counsel, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-138 (1995).
82. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) ("In a death case involving a first habeas petition, it is fairly typical to consume a year on the appeal, although two years or more certainly is not unheard of."); see also Joseph B. Ingle, Final Hours: The Execution of Velma Barfield, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 221 (1989); Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons from the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1992).
83. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) ("In a death case involving a first habeas petition, it is fairly typical to consume a year on the appeal, although two years or more certainly is not unheard of."); see also Joseph B. Ingle, Final Hours: The Execution of Velma Barfield, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 221 (1989); Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons from the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1992).
84. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) ("In a death case involving a first habeas petition, it is fairly typical to consume a year on the appeal, although two years or more certainly is not unheard of."); see also Joseph B. Ingle, Final Hours: The Execution of Velma Barfield, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 221 (1989); Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons from the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1992).
85. See Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., Representing the Death Row Inmate: The Ethics of Advocacy, Collateral Style, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 92, 107 (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989). Wollan remarks: In death cases, at their very end, any amount of time, even an hour, might yield a gain: information or witnesses may come forth, a decision may be rendered by another court, a political change may occur in the system (such as appointment of a new judge). Any one of these changes may happen within hours or days or weeks of the inception of such a period of extension, thereby fundamentally altering substantive or procedural advantages. Id. at 107.
86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983); see also CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 5 (1908) ("Having undertaken [the defense of a person accused of a crime], the lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.").
87. See, e.g., ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 1.1 cmt., 2.1 cmt. (Feb. 1989); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT RULES ANNOTATED Rule 3.1 (1995) (applying duty to contested fact-finding hearing and trial).
88. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-1.2(b) (1994).
89. Section 4-1.2(c) of the Standards for Criminal Justice provides: "Since the death penalty differs from other criminal penalties in its finality, defense counsel in a capital case should respond to this difference by making extraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-1.2(c) (1994); see also ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989); Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER L. REV. 695 (1991).
90. Section 4-1.2(c) of the Standards for Criminal Justice provides: "Since the death penalty differs from other criminal penalties in its finality, defense counsel in a capital case should respond to this difference by making extraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-1.2(c) (1994); see also ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989); Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER L. REV. 695 (1991).
91. See Joseph Hoffmann, Starting from Scratch: Rethinking Federal Habeas Review of Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 133, 146 (1992). Hoffmann describes the ongoing cycle of successive habeas petitions as the "hallmark" of post-conviction litigation. He reports: [T]he State sets an execution date, even if it knows that the execution will not actually take place, because this is the only way to make the prisoner use up his federal claims by filing a habeas petition and requesting a stay. After the petition is filed, the habeas court grants a stay so it will have sufficient time to resolve the claims. If the court rejects the claims, the State sets another execution date, and the cycle resumes. Id. at 146.
92. See Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 50, at 8 (discussing "high gear" litigation efforts to "forestall" execution dates).
93. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-1.3(d) (1994).
94. See Wollan, supra note 51, at 106 (maintaining that "the interest of the client in a capital case is often not in acceleration but in delay").
95. Since 1986, congressional sponsors have introduced more than 80 bills proposing a statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 64 U.S.L.W. 4245. 4250 app. (Apr. 1. 1996); see also Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP. 3239 (1989).
96. Gomez v. United States District Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam).
97. Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1240 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
98. See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991).
99. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520 n.7 (1992); see also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 860 F.2d 165. 166 (5th Cir. 1988) (describing counsel's "[d]eliberate withholding of claims until the eleventh hour" to be a "standard tactic" in post-conviction capital proceedings).
100. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. Michael Mello, Another Attorney for Life, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 51, at 81.
102. Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205, 220 (1992).
103. Id. at 217-18.
104. Mello, supra note 66, at 85. The strategic logic behind the filing of the appeal hinges on the likely issuance of a stay to allow reasoned consideration of the merits of the claims. Cast routinely in the form of a successive habeas corpus petition, the appeal may assert the defendant's innocence, allude to newly discovered evidence, or introduce innovative scientific procedures for evaluating past or proffered evidence.
105. Wollan, supra note 51, at 104. Wollan comments: "In a field as fast-moving as death penalty law, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish today's 'good faith argument' from tomorrow's 'frivolous' argument, and vice versa. What today seems absurd may persuade a judge tomorrow or another judge down the corridor today." Id.
106. See Robert Weisberg, Who Defends Capital Defendants?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 535, 539 (1995).
107. Id. at 540.
108. On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted legislation reforming federal habeas corpus procedures under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253, 2261-2266 (1996)). Title I of the Act limits the filing, appeal, and review of habeas petitions in captial cases. On May 3, 1996, in Felker v. Turpin, 64 U.S.L.W. 3740 (U.S. May 3, 1996) (May 3, 1996) (mem.), the Supreme Court granted a stay of execution and a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of Title 1 of the Act. For a prior history of the judicial dismantlement of habeas corpus protections, see Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 485 (1995); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); James S. Liebman, More than "Slightly Retro": The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1990/1991).
109. On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted legislation reforming federal habeas corpus procedures under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253, 2261-2266 (1996)). Title I of the Act limits the filing, appeal, and review of habeas petitions in captial cases. On May 3, 1996, in Felker v. Turpin, 64 U.S.L.W. 3740 (U.S. May 3, 1996) (May 3, 1996) (mem.), the Supreme Court granted a stay of execution and a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of Title 1 of the Act. For a prior history of the judicial dismantlement of habeas corpus protections, see Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 485 (1995); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); James S. Liebman, More than "Slightly Retro": The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1990/1991).
110. On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted legislation reforming federal habeas corpus procedures under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253, 2261-2266 (1996)). Title I of the Act limits the filing, appeal, and review of habeas petitions in captial cases. On May 3, 1996, in Felker v. Turpin, 64 U.S.L.W. 3740 (U.S. May 3, 1996) (May 3, 1996) (mem.), the Supreme Court granted a stay of execution and a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of Title 1 of the Act. For a prior history of the judicial dismantlement of habeas corpus protections, see Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 485 (1995); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); James S. Liebman, More than "Slightly Retro": The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1990/1991).
111. Congress recently voted to defund federal Community Defender Organizations created by statute in 1988. See H.R. 3019, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (declaring funds unavailable after Apr. 1, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. H1958 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (same); 142 CONG. REC. S2441, 2450 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (same). Congress created these organizations to provide representation, assistance, information, and other related services to eligible persons and appointed attorneys in connection with federal habeas corpus proceedings commenced to challenge state capital convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1995).
112. Abolitionists mention that the strategy of mitigation applies to both the guilt and penalty phases of capital proceedings. See Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System. Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases. 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1986). Goodpaster cautions: A capital case defense attorney, who tries the capital case guilt phase without regard to its potential effects on the penalty phase trial, may effectively condemn his client to a death sentence. Such an attorney is not aware that some guilt phase defenses are seriously inconsistent with an affirmative penalty phase case for life. Id. at 84-85.
113. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer. 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994).
114. Id. at 1837. Bright states: "[A]a large part of the death row population is made up of people who are distinguished by neither their records nor the circumstances of their crimes, but by their abject poverty, debilitating mental impairments, minimal intelligence, and the poor legal representation they received." Id. at 1840.
115. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245 (1991); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 50-72 (1991); Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1131, 1155-57 (1993); Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 283-84 (1994); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
116. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245 (1991); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 50-72 (1991); Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1131, 1155-57 (1993); Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 283-84 (1994); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
117. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245 (1991); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 50-72 (1991); Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1131, 1155-57 (1993); Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 283-84 (1994); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
118. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245 (1991); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 50-72 (1991); Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1131, 1155-57 (1993); Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 283-84 (1994); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
119. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245 (1991); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 50-72 (1991); Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1131, 1155-57 (1993); Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 283-84 (1994); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
120. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 337, 348-53 (1984);
121. Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1992).
122. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 468 (1995) (citing public defender's fear of incurring race-based community hostility); Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1994) (David R. Dow, noting "systematic pressure not to litigate aggressively" in order to secure future appointments); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 399 (commenting that state attorneys appointed under voluntary assignment schemes "are frequently underfunded, inexperienced, unsympathetic to their clients, and thoroughly incapable of mounting an effective defense during either the guilt or punishment phases of the capital trial").
123. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 468 (1995) (citing public defender's fear of incurring race-based community hostility); Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1994) (David R. Dow, noting "systematic pressure not to litigate aggressively" in order to secure future appointments); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 399 (commenting that state attorneys appointed under voluntary assignment schemes "are frequently underfunded, inexperienced, unsympathetic to their clients, and thoroughly incapable of mounting an effective defense during either the guilt or punishment phases of the capital trial").
124. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 468 (1995) (citing public defender's fear of incurring race-based community hostility); Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1994) (David R. Dow, noting "systematic pressure not to litigate aggressively" in order to secure future appointments); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 399 (commenting that state attorneys appointed under voluntary assignment schemes "are frequently underfunded, inexperienced, unsympathetic to their clients, and thoroughly incapable of mounting an effective defense during either the guilt or punishment phases of the capital trial").
125. See Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 281 (1991).
126. See Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679. 680 (1990); Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo. L. REV. 849, 858 (1992); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction, The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 491 (1993).
127. See Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679. 680 (1990); Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo. L. REV. 849, 858 (1992); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction, The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 491 (1993).
128. See Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679. 680 (1990); Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo. L. REV. 849, 858 (1992); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction, The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 491 (1993).
129. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
130. Id. at 689.
131. See id. at 687-88, 692-96.
132. Id. at 688.
133. Id. at 686.
134. Id. at 689; see Green, supra note 82, at 502 n.284 (explaining that "decisions about the content of opening statements and summations, about what evidence to introduce, about what objections to make, and about how to conduct cross-examination, are presumed to be strategic").
135. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see Bright, supra note 76, at 858; Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 634 (1986); Ellen Kreitzberg, Death Without Justice, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 485. 500 (1995). Echoing Bright, Kreitzberg notes that "[r]eviewing courts uphold the performance of counsel when the court is able to attribute any conceivable strategy to the performance, even if there is no evidence that the attorney pursued that particular strategy." Id. (citation omitted).
136. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see Bright, supra note 76, at 858; Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 634 (1986); Ellen Kreitzberg, Death Without Justice, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 485. 500 (1995). Echoing Bright, Kreitzberg notes that "[r]eviewing courts uphold the performance of counsel when the court is able to attribute any conceivable strategy to the performance, even if there is no evidence that the attorney pursued that particular strategy." Id. (citation omitted).
137. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see Bright, supra note 76, at 858; Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
138. Bright charges that the presumption of competence is misplaced "where the accused is represented by counsel who lacks the training, experience, skill, knowledge, inclination, time, and resources to provide adequate representation in a capital case." See Bright, supra note 76, at 863.
139. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
140. See Bright, supra note 80. at 459 (asserting counsel's "obligation to investigate the life and background of the client in order to introduce mitigating evidence"); Kreitzberg, supra note 89, at 493 (underscoring counsel's duty "to investigate and assemble all possible evidence about a defendant's life"); see also ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES §§ 11.4.2, 11.7.1, 11.8.2-.3, 11.8.6, 1 1.9.3 (1989); Linda E. Carter. Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987).
141. See Bright, supra note 80. at 459 (asserting counsel's "obligation to investigate the life and background of the client in order to introduce mitigating evidence"); Kreitzberg, supra note 89, at 493 (underscoring counsel's duty "to investigate and assemble all possible evidence about a defendant's life"); see also ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES §§ 11.4.2, 11.7.1, 11.8.2-.3, 11.8.6, 1 1.9.3 (1989); Linda E. Carter. Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987).
142. See Robert A. Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to the Capital Sentencing Proceeding: Theoretical and Practical Support for Open Admissibility of Mitigating Information, 60 UMKC L. REV. 411 (1992); see also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
143. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 422 (1995) (reporting evidence of "a substantial drop in findings of ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases over the past decade").
144. See Green, supra note 82, at 502 (citation omitted) (finding that "courts frequently reject ineffective assistance claims premised on defense counsel's failure to present a case at the sentencing proceeding or even to investigate the possibility of a defense"); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 421 (noting that "it is commonplace in many states for trial counsel to fail to present any evidence or argument at all during the punishment phase of a capital trial").
145. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (1995).
146. 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).
147. Id. at 2571.
148. Id. at 2572.
149. Id. at 2573; accord Duffey v. Lehman, No. 94-9003, 1996 U.S. App. WL 13154 (3d Cir. Jan. 16, 1996) (opinion vacated on grant of rehearing en bane, Feb. 12, 1996).
150. Cf. Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225. 240 (1992) (opposing manipulation of court procedures to delay death penalty).
151. Mello, supra note 66. at 85.
152. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
153. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214-15 (1971); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195-96 n.47 (1976); see also CHARLES L. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 17-107 (1981).
154. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214-15 (1971); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195-96 n.47 (1976); see also CHARLES L. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 17-107 (1981).
155. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
156. See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990); SAMUEL GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION; RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); Bowers, supra note 79, at 193-269; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING - RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. S6889-90 (daily ed. May 24, 1990).
157. See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990); SAMUEL GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION; RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); Bowers, supra note 79, at 193-269; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING - RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. S6889-90 (daily ed. May 24, 1990).
158. See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990); SAMUEL GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION; RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); Bowers, supra note 79, at 193-269; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING - RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. S6889-90 (daily ed. May 24, 1990).
159. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101, EC 7-1 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983). For strong and weak defenses of this mandate, see Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993).
160. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101, EC 7-1 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983). For strong and weak defenses of this mandate, see Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993).
161. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101, EC 7-1 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983). For strong and weak defenses of this mandate, see Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993).
162. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101, EC 7-1 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983). For strong and weak defenses of this mandate, see Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993).
163. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101, EC 7-1 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983). For strong and weak defenses of this mandate, see Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993).
164. Lacking expertise, time, and resources, defense counsel may be unable to prepare and to present mitigation evidence regarding psychosocial theories of victimization.
165. For a justice-based defense of lawyer discretion, see William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
166. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1241 (1992).
167. Sarat, supra note 36, at 41.
168. Robbins, supra note 49, at 63.
169. BrigHt, supra note 80, at 459.
170. Bright, supra note 76, at 1864.
171. Mello, supra note 66, at 84. Mello notes that "[t]he first step in most postconviction efforts is to compile a complete life history of the inmate. Often the information needed is of the most intimate son and may require the inmate to confront and share painful feelings and long-buried memories." Id.
172. Id.
173. On the ambiguity of legitimacy in legal advocacy, see George E. Bisharat. Courting Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering under Israeli Occupation, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 349 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitimacy in South Africa, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 407 (1995).
174. On the ambiguity of legitimacy in legal advocacy, see George E. Bisharat. Courting Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering under Israeli Occupation, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 349 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitimacy in South Africa, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 407 (1995).
175. See Carol J. Greenhouse, Constructive Approaches to Law, Culture, and Identity, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1231 (1994); Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1243 (1994).
176. See Carol J. Greenhouse, Constructive Approaches to Law, Culture, and Identity, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1231 (1994); Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1243 (1994).
177. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 548-49 (1995).
178. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995).
179. See J. Michael Echevarria, Reflections on O.J. and the Gas Chamber, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491, 526 (1995) (challenging the notion of free will as applied to certain types of criminally deviant behavior).
180. Sarat, supra note 36, at 44.
181. Costanzo and Peterson elucidate this complexity in their summary of victimization stories. See Costanzo & Peterson, supra note 44, at 143. They report: Defenders tell a complex and textured story. The defendant is a tragically flawed character, emotionally and socially deformed by years of neglect and abuse. The origins of his violent behavior can be traced back to early life experiences as well as to the forces acting on him at the time of the crime (e.g., drug addiction, domination by others, emotional stress). According to this version of the story, the causes of his crimes are complex-the product of multiple determinants. Id.
182. Sarat, supra note 36, at 45.
183. The term belongs to Costanzo and Peterson. See Costanzo & Peterson, supra note 44, at 143.
184. Sarat, supra note 36, at 46.
185. Sarat, supra note 35, at 1123.
186. Sarat, supra note 36, at 41.
187. Haney, supra note 119, at 549.
188. Even when present, such proof is distorted by the cognitive and interpretive frameworks of judges and jurors that narrow their perception and comprehension of moral action.
189. Sarat. supra note 36, at 42, 52.
190. Id. at 52.
191. Id. at 23.
192. Mello, supra note 66, at 83.
193. Sarat, supra note 36, at 40.
194. Haney, supra note 119, at 560-61.
195. Sarat, supra note 35, at 1128.
196. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); see also Albert P. Cardarelli & Stephen C. Hicks, Radicalism in Law and Criminology: A Retrospective View of Critical Legal Studies and Radical Criminology, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 502 (1993).
197. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); see also Albert P. Cardarelli & Stephen C. Hicks, Radicalism in Law and Criminology: A Retrospective View of Critical Legal Studies and Radical Criminology, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 502 (1993).
198. See Kelman, supra note 138, at 596 (explaining intentionalism and determinism as constructs that pervade the substantive criminal law). Kelman explains: Intentionalism is the principle that human conduct results from free choice. An intentionalist interpretation of an incident gives moral weight to autonomous choice and expresses the indeterminacy of future actions. Determinism, on the other hand, implies that subsequent behavior is causally connected to prior events. A determinist interpretation considers behavior by looking backward, and it expresses no moral respect or condemnation of these predetermined acts. Id. at 597-98 (citations omitted).
199. Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299. 335 (1983).
200. Id. at 335.
201. Haney, supra note 46, at 1227. Haney observes: [W]e seem to have become a society that has, at this time in our history, a very difficult time conceptualizing and legitimizing compassion, mercy, charity, and understanding - all concepts that are intertwined with mitigation but which now have become terribly hard for our citizens to define, harder to assert, and virtually impossible to connect to something resembling a principled point of view. Id.
202. Costanzo & Peterson, supra note 44, at 136. Haney adds: particularly in the case of powerful risk factors and traumatic life experiences like chronic poverty and childhood maltreatment, different kinds of behavior - behavior that "not everybody" engages in the same way - must be understood as variation in adapting, coping, and struggling to survive a set of circumstances that few if any have "chosen" to endure. Haney, supra note 119, at 592.
203. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 162 (1988).
204. Id. at 163. Luban evaluates this principle against the practice tradition illustrated by the "lawyer for the damned." Id. at 166. For Luban, the lawyer for the damned "takes on those cases that no one else will come near, cases in which the client has for one reason or another rightly become odious or untouchable in the eyes of mankind." Id. at 162. Here. I extend his analysis to the abolitionist lawyer.
205. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302. 319 (1989) (citations omitted).
206. On the contextual meaning of good and bad client moral character, see Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (Of Motherhood). 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1990. 2078 (1995) (urging advocates "to break down stereotypical notions of 'good' or 'bad' mothers in order to represent them" in context). See also Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992).
207. On the contextual meaning of good and bad client moral character, see Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (Of Motherhood). 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1990. 2078 (1995) (urging advocates "to break down stereotypical notions of 'good' or 'bad' mothers in order to represent them" in context). See also Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992).
208. See Helen Prejean, Capital Punishment: The Humanistic and Moral Issues, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1995).
209. MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW 143 (1993).
210. MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS 23 (1981).
211. Id. Ball cautions that "stories require good listeners as well as good tellers if they are to have effect." BALL, supra note 149, at 144. Stories, he admonishes, "cannot gather willing hearers among us if we do not have ears to hear." Id. Thus, for Ball, there is a "limit to the power of stories in law." Id.
212. West, supra note 15, at 161.
213. Stephanie Wildman and Adrienne Davis trace silence to experiences of oppression and fear. See Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881. 885 (1995).
214. See Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 99 (1995).
215. Cf. Kreitzberg, supra note 89, at 489. Kreitzberg comments: From the outset of the case, defense counsel needs to devise a common theme or strategy that effectively links the guilt and penalty phases. Counsel's challenge is to maintain credibility with jurors during the penalty trial, even after a guilty verdict is returned in the guilt trial. Id.
216. See Maureen Cain, Horatio's Mistake: Notes on Some Spaces in an Old Text, 22 J. L. & SOC'Y 68, 75 (1995). Cain remarks: [L]ike discourse, social relations exist powerfully in a state of radical and uncaused autonomy. What is needed, therefore, methodologically, is a mapping of the articulations between relationships and knowledge/discourse or, if you will, between discourse and the extra-discursive. Id. at 75.
217. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992); Lynn Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
218. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992); Lynn Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
219. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 346 (1995).
220. On the ethical duty to advise clients of their moral connection to third parties and communities, see Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901. 933 (1995); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1598 (1995).
221. On the ethical duty to advise clients of their moral connection to third parties and communities, see Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901. 933 (1995); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1598 (1995).
222. See Cynthia G. Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy. 109 HARV. L. REV. 549, 628 (1996).
223. Id. at 627. Bowman and Mertz note that "therapists treating incest survivors repeatedly stress the importance of returning agency, authority, and decision-making power to the client." Id.
224. Robert J. Araujo, S.J., Political Theory and Liberation Theology: The Intersection of Unger and Gutiérrez, 11 J. L. & RELIGION 63, 66 (1994-95).
225. Id. at 68. Araujo draws on liberation theology "to reconcile human beings so that injustice and oppression caused by people and institutions are replaced with a more just society in which the dignity and the right to a flourishing human experience for all are respected." Id.
226. Cf. Sanford Levinson, National Loyalty, Communalism, and the Professional Iden7 tity of Lawyers, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 49, 69 (1995) (positing a conception that "emphasizes the role played by the lawyer (or teacher) as a transmitter of cultural norms and, indeed, as a model of what it might mean to conceive of oneself as a member of an overarching political community").
227. Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1333 (1995). Lobel claims that law viewed "as a process of struggle . . . arises from the clash between the state seeking to enforce its rules and the activist communities seeking to create, extend, or preserve an alternative vision of justice." Id. (citation omitted).
228. For an examination of "discourses of community" in the field of criminal justice, see Nicola Lacey & Lucia Zedner, Discourses of Community in Criminal Justice, 22 J. L. & SOC'Y 301, 301, 317 (1995). Lacey and Zedner note that "[c]ommunity has furnished a discursive framework within which social policies have been conceived, designed, implemented, and legitimated." Id. at 301 (citation omitted).
229. But see Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VANDERBILT L. REV. 123, 159 (1996) (describing anonymous juries as "an ideal compromise between the interests of jurors, defendants, and the public in a jury free from apprehension about exposure, on the one hand, and the interests of insuring adequate disclosure of the workings of the jury on the other").
230. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1523 (1996).
231. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR. L. REV. 423, 447 (1995).
232. BALL, supra note 150, at 19.
233. Id.
234. See West, supra note 15, at 162.
235. Id.
236. BALL, supra note 149, at 155.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 137.
240. See BALL, supra note 150, at 136.
241. Id. at 137 ("The more such words the lawyer finds, the more he will have made law mean life, for his clients and therefore also for himself.").
242. See BALL, supra note 149, at 12.
243. See Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994).
244. See BALL, supra note 149, at 153 ("Where law is a medium of community, lawyers' professional responsibility lies in developing, curing, and sustaining the communities of which they are members.").