Human rights strategies of the 1960s within the United Nations: A tribute to the late Kamleshwar Das

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 308-341

  Clark, Roger S ^a  

^a and law in the military   (United States)

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EID: 8344222724     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.1999.0023     Document Type: Article

References (168)

1. U.N. CHARTER, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered into force 24 Oct. 1945).
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., (Resolutions, part 1), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 127 (1949) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
4. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
5. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted 21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 Jan. 1969), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) [hereinafter CERD].
6. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/ 6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967).
7. Aside from those instruments mentioned in the text, see Declaration on Social Progress and Development, done 11 Dec. 1969, G.A Res. 2542 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 160, U.N. Sales No. E.96.1.15 (1997); Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, done 26 Nov. 1968, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra, at 114, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, done 14 Dec. 1967, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra, at 113, Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, done 7 Nov. 1967, G.A. Res. 2263 (XXII), U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra, at 220; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done 31 Jan. 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force 4 Oct. 1967) (entered into force for U.S. 1 Nov. 1968), Declaration on the Promotion Among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding Between Peoples, done 7 Nov. 1965, G.A. Res. 2037 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra, at 241, Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, done 7 Nov. 1962, G.A. Res. 1763A (XVII). U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra, at 218.
8. Consider, for example, the creation of the Special Committee on Decolonization, see infra note 47 and accompanying text; the Special Committee on Apartheid, see infra note 49 and accompanying text; and the Council for Namibia following the termination of the South African mandate over South West Africa, established by G.A. Res. 2248, U.N. GAOR, 5th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc.. A/6657 (1967).
9. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
10. International Year for Human Rights, G.A. Res. 2081, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) [hereinafter Resolution 2081].
11. Slavery Convention, signed 25 Sept. 1926, 82 U.N.T.S. 51 (entered into force 9 Mar. 1927) amended by Protocol, opened for signature 7 Dec. 1953, 212 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force as amended 7 July 1955), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 52 (Ian Brownlie ed., 3d ed. 1992); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted 7 Sept. 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 30 Apr. 1957), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 58.
12. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, adopted 10 June 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force 1 May 1932), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 246; Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, 25 June 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force 17 Jan. 1959), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 257.
13. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, adopted 25 June 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force 15 June 1960), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 275.
14. Equal Remuneration Convention, adopted 29 June 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force 23 May 1953), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 271.
15. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, adopted 9 July 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force 4 July 1950), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 260; Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, adopted 1 July 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (entered into force 18 July 1951), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 266.
16. UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, adopted 14 Dec. 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force 22 May 1962), reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 330.1 (1990).
17. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 Dec. 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force 12 Jan. 1951) (entered into force for U.S. 23 Feb. 1989).
18. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, G.A. Res. 640 (VII), U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952) (entered into force 7 July 1954).
19. See Resolution 2081, supra note 10, at 44.
20. Id. This formulation, it will be noted, left open for future argument what was to be done if the measures of implementation, in the Covenants for example, did not cover the whole field - leaving out, for example, those states that had not become parties, and urgent situations such as disappearances to which the machinery does not respond flexibly enough. Does the organization have power to fill the gaps, or does the existence of the treaty machinery freeze out innovation? Innovation would more or less win by the 1980s, but not without a struggle.
21. Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, at 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, U.N. Sales No. E.68.XIV.2 (1968) [hereinafter Final Act of the Teheran Conference].
22. See Id. at 2-3 (Agenda Items 10, 11 (e)).
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. Various papers prepared for the Conference advocated procedural initiatives. For example, the paper by Dr. T.O. Elias, then Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice of Nigeria, and later President of the International Court of Justice, suggested the establishment of an International Court of Human Rights. T.O. Elias, International Institutions and Machinery of Implementation in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. Doc A/Conf.32/L.3 (1968) (papers consulted by author in U.N. Secretariat).
25. Final Act of the Teheran Conference, supra note 21, at 4.
26. See Roger S. Clark, Legal Representation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 104, 125 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1982);
27. see also David Weissbrodt & James McCarthy; Fact-Finding by Nongovernmental Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 186, 194; Final Act of the Teheran Conference, supra note 21, at 12 (Resolution X, entitled "Model rules of procedure for bodies dealing with violations of human rights"). The ensuing efforts at drafting did not result in anything very useful.
28. Final Act of the Teheran Conference, supra note 21, at 15 (Resolution XIX, entitled "Legal aid").
29. See id. at 17 (Resolution XXII, entitled "Universal accession by States to international instruments relating to human rights").
30. See id. at 19 (Resolution XXV, entitled "Publicity for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"); see also In-Depth Evaluation of the Human Rights Programme: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. for Programme and Co-ordination, 29th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4(d), at 37-42, U.N. Doc. E/AC.51/1989/2 (1989); FELICE GAER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ISSUES BEFORE THE 44TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 135, 166 (1989). On 10 December 1989, the Assembly launched a new World Public Information Campaign in Human Rights. Much still needs to be done, including better Secretariat coordination, production of summary records, and translations of material into many languages - including some of the working languages of the organization!
31. See id. at 19 (Resolution XXV, entitled "Publicity for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"); see also In-Depth Evaluation of the Human Rights Programme: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. for Programme and Co-ordination, 29th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4(d), at 37-42, U.N. Doc. E/AC.51/1989/2 (1989); FELICE GAER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ISSUES BEFORE THE 44TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 135, 166 (1989). On 10 December 1989, the Assembly launched a new World Public Information Campaign in Human Rights. Much still needs to be done, including better Secretariat coordination, production of summary records, and translations of material into many languages - including some of the working languages of the organization!
32. See Harry M. Scoble & Laurie S. Wiseberg, Human Rights and Amnesty International, 413 ANNALS 11 (1974); JONATHAN POWER, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: THE HUMAN RIGHTS STORY (1981); WILLAM A. KOREY, NGOs AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: "A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE" 159 (1998).
33. See Harry M. Scoble & Laurie S. Wiseberg, Human Rights and Amnesty International, 413 ANNALS 11 (1974); JONATHAN POWER, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: THE HUMAN RIGHTS STORY (1981); WILLAM A. KOREY, NGOs AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: "A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE" 159 (1998).
34. See Harry M. Scoble & Laurie S. Wiseberg, Human Rights and Amnesty International, 413 ANNALS 11 (1974); JONATHAN POWER, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: THE HUMAN RIGHTS STORY (1981); WILLAM A. KOREY, NGOs AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: "A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE" 159 (1998).
35. See Roger S. Clark, The International League for Human Rights and South West Africa 1947-1957: The Human Rights NGO as Catalyst in the International Legal Process, 3 HUM. RTS. Q., Fall 1981, at 101; Laurie S. Wiseberg & Harry M. Scoble, The International League for Human Rights: The Strategy of a Human Rights NGO, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289 (1977); KOREY, supra note 30, at 139.
36. See Roger S. Clark, The International League for Human Rights and South West Africa 1947-1957: The Human Rights NGO as Catalyst in the International Legal Process, 3 HUM. RTS. Q., Fall 1981, at 101; Laurie S. Wiseberg & Harry M. Scoble, The International League for Human Rights: The Strategy of a Human Rights NGO, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289 (1977); KOREY, supra note 30, at 139.
37. See CHIANG PEI-HENG, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS: IDENTITY, ROLE, AND FUNCTION 106 (1981). The IADL lost its consultative status in 1950 after it criticized the UN role in the Korean War. Various attacks on some of the Western NGOs in 1967 fizzled out, and none of them lost their status.
38. See Laurie S. Wiseberg & Harry M. Scoble, Recent Trends in the Expanding Universe of Nongovernmental Organizations Dedicated to the Protection of Human Rights, 8 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 627 (1979). The activities of these organizations in the 1960s were a significant part of the intellectual climate that led to a burgeoning of NGO activity in the 1970s.
39. See Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights, March 22-27, 1968, reprinted in 9 ICJ REV., June 1969, at 94 (1968).
40. Id. at 112 (Montreal Statement Proposals for Action 18-22). The Division on Human Rights was upgraded to a Centre in 1982, having in the meantime been "exiled" to Geneva from New York. The Sub-Commission created an expert body on slavery in 1974. With regard to regional arrangements, the European system was already in place in 1968. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953). The Americas adopted their human rights convention in 1969. See American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 Nov. 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979) (entered into force 18 July 1978), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). In 1981, the Organization of African Unity adopted the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 26 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
41. The Journal of the International Commission of Jurists published two special issues for the International Year of Human Rights. 8 ICJ REV., Dec. 1967; 11 ICJ REV., June 1968.
42. The Journal of the International Commission of Jurists published two special issues for the International Year of Human Rights. 8 ICJ REV., Dec. 1967; 11 ICJ REV., June 1968.
43. See INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH NOBEL SYMPOSIUM, OSLO, SEPTEMBER 25-27, 1967 (Asbjorn Eide & August Schou eds., 1968).
44. See generally 15(1) REV. CONTEMP. L (1968).
45. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (A.H. Robertson ed., 1968).
46. See THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Evan Luard ed., 1967).
47. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter Resolution 1514].
48. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 1, ch. XI (Declaration Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories).
49. Resolution 1514, supra note 41.
50. See id. at 30. The Assembly added Southern Rhodesia to the list of non-self-governing territories in 1962. See The Question of Southern Rhodesia, G.A. Res. 1747, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17A, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/5100/Add.1 (1962). Southern Rhodesia would, in the mid-1960s, become the first entity on which economic sanctions were imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The issues of race and decolonization were closely related in the Rhodesia case. See generally FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 555-86 (1st ed. 1977).
51. See id. at 30. The Assembly added Southern Rhodesia to the list of non-self-governing territories in 1962. See The Question of Southern Rhodesia, G.A. Res. 1747, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17A, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/5100/Add.1 (1962). Southern Rhodesia would, in the mid-1960s, become the first entity on which economic sanctions were imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The issues of race and decolonization were closely related in the Rhodesia case. See generally FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 555-86 (1st ed. 1977).
52. See Non-Compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly Resolution 1542(XV), G.A. Res. 1699, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). The General Assembly established a Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration. See Background Paper on East Timor, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.108/L.13 (1962). The Committee was later absorbed into the Committee of 24, and the Secretariat began producing material.
53. See Non-Compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly Resolution 1542(XV), G.A. Res. 1699, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). The General Assembly established a Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration. See Background Paper on East Timor, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.108/L.13 (1962). The Committee was later absorbed into the Committee of 24, and the Secretariat began producing material.
54. See U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 4th Comm., Vol. 1, at 321-32, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.1208 & A/C.4/SR.1209 (1961). The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly began hearing petitioners from the Portuguese African territories in November 1961. See id.
55. The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1654, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). The next year, the Committee's membership increased from the original 17 to 24.
56. See Report of the United Nations Special Representative for the Supervision of the Election in the Cook Islands, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/L.228 (1965).
57. See The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, G.A. Res. 1761, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
58. See generally JOHN CAREY, UN PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, ch. 10 (1970). On the Group of Experts and the questions it raised on fact-finding, see INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 26.
59. See generally JOHN CAREY, UN PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, ch. 10 (1970). On the Group of Experts and the questions it raised on fact-finding, see INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 26.
60. See Clark, supra note 26.
61. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 26.
62. For example, at its 1968 session, the General Assembly created a Special Committee to investigate the destruction of homes of the Arab population inhabiting the area occupied by Israeli forces and of other alleged breaches by Israel of international human rights and humanitarian law.
63. See, e.g., CAREY, supra note 50, at 143.
64. HOWARD TOLLEY, THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 55-82 (1987). Tolley sees a period of "Global Protection" finally appearing in the years that followed, 1980-1986. Id. at 101-33.
65. Kamleshwar Das, Measures of Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination With Special Reference to the Provisions Concerning Reports from States Parties to the Convention, 4 HUM. RTS. J. 213, 213 (1971).
66. Id. at 215.
67. For an excellent discussion of the history and theory of petitions, see R.St.J. Macdonald, Petitioning an International Authority, in HUMAN RIGHTS, FEDERALISM AND MINORITIES 121 (Allan Gotlieb ed., 1969). See also Egon Schwelb, Complaints by Individuals to the Commission on Human Rights: 25 Years of an Uphill Struggle, (1947-1971), 13 INT'L PROBS. 11 (1974); Jakob Moller, Petitioning the United Nations, 1 UNIVERSAL HUM. RTS. 57 (1979).
68. For an excellent discussion of the history and theory of petitions, see R.St.J. Macdonald, Petitioning an International Authority, in HUMAN RIGHTS, FEDERALISM AND MINORITIES 121 (Allan Gotlieb ed., 1969). See also Egon Schwelb, Complaints by Individuals to the Commission on Human Rights: 25 Years of an Uphill Struggle, (1947-1971), 13 INT'L PROBS. 11 (1974); Jakob Moller, Petitioning the United Nations, 1 UNIVERSAL HUM. RTS. 57 (1979).
69. For an excellent discussion of the history and theory of petitions, see R.St.J. Macdonald, Petitioning an International Authority, in HUMAN RIGHTS, FEDERALISM AND MINORITIES 121 (Allan Gotlieb ed., 1969). See also Egon Schwelb, Complaints by Individuals to the Commission on Human Rights: 25 Years of an Uphill Struggle, (1947-1971), 13 INT'L PROBS. 11 (1974); Jakob Moller, Petitioning the United Nations, 1 UNIVERSAL HUM. RTS. 57 (1979).
70. The Secretary-General's acknowledgment included a copy of the "self-denying" resolution about to be discussed in the text.
71. Report of the Economic and Social Council on the First Session of the Commission on Human Rights, Held at Lake Success, 27 January-10 February 1947, U.N. ESCOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 6 (Chapter V, Communications Concerning Human Rights), U.N. Doc. E/259 (1947).
72. H. Lauterpacht, Preliminary Report for the International Law Association on Human Rights, the Charter of the U.N., and the International Bill of the Rights of Man, at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/89 (1948).
73. Communications Concerning Human Rights, E.S.C. Res. 728 F, U.N. ESCOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/3290 (1959).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Methods Used by the United Nations in the Field of Human Rights: Study Prepared by the Secretary General, at 6-9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/6 (1967).
78. E.S.C. Res. 8, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 23d Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 131-32, U.N. Doc. E/4322 (1967) [hereinafter Resolution 8].
79. E.S.C. Res. 9, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 23d Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 133, 134, U.N. Doc. E/4322 (1967) (emphasis added).
80. E.S.C. Res. 1235, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967), reprinted in part in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 389 (1996). Resolution 1235 gave birth not only to the confidential procedures for dealing with communications that are discussed in the text, but also to much more public discussion of alleged human rights breaches in countries right across the political spectrum. Id. From an NGO perspective, Resolution 1235 led ultimately to the obsolescence of the taboo against naming names.
81. Id.
82. Summary Record of the Nine Hundred and Eighteenth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 23d Sess., 918th mtg., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.918 (1967).
83. Report of the Twentieth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm'n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 20th Sess., Annex, at 42, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/947, E/CN.4/Sub.2/286 (1967). The author understands that one of the communications on Greece was from Amnesty International, the other from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. That on Haiti was from the International League for the Rights of Man (later the International League for Human Rights). NGOs also lobbied members of the Sub-Commission and Commission, supplying them with further information on the Colonels and the Duvalier regimes.
84. Id. at 40. The Sub-Commission did not ignore southern Africa. It noted that despite the repeated appeals and condemnations voiced by the various organs of the United Nations, flagrant violations of human rights were still being committed in South Africa, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Report on the Twenty-Fourth Session, 5 February-12 March 1968, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 24th Sess., Supp. No. 4, at iii, 58-79, U.N. Doc. E/4475 (1968).
88. See id. at 66-78.
89. John Humphrey, retired Head of the Secretariat Division on Human Rights, was by now a member of the Sub-Commission and actively involved in the Greece/Haiti effort. He has commented that Tanzania did obtain the adoption of a resolution which asked the Council to increase the membership of the Sub-Commission on a basis calculated to give the Afro-Asian countries a preponderate influence; and its representative is said to have boasted that this was to prevent any repetition of what had happened in 1967. Perhaps he did not know that the African members had voted with their colleagues on the Sub-Commission in favour of the "distracting" resolution. John Humphrey, The Right of Petition in the United Nations, 4 HUM. RTS. J. 463, 473 (1971). Perhaps there was some slippage going on - the Africans did not always vote as a block in different organs. Perhaps the right hand of the Tanzanian government did not know what the left was doing, a not unusual problem for governments of all stripes. Perhaps it was a case where the Sub-Commission, allegedly a collection of experts, was in fact behaving like an expert body while the Commission, an avowedly political body, was also acting true to form.
90. Report on the Twenty-Fourth Session, 5 February-12 March 1968, supra note 76, at 60.
91. One optimist saw the value in these attacks: Equally important [as the discussion of Greece and Haiti and the appearance of their representatives], certain governments, including the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic, by their interventions in the acrimonious debate, sanctioned a broad interpretation of the Council's 1967 resolution as applying to parts of the world other than southern Africa and thus implicitly rejected the double standard. Humphrey, supra note 78, at 472.
92. Summary Records of the Nine Hundred and Sixty-Ninth to the Nine Hundred and Ninety-Second Meetings, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 24th Sess., Vol. II, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.969-992 (1968).
93. William Korey, The Key to Human Rights - Implementation, 570 INT'L CONCILIATION, Nov. 1968, at 5, 23.
94. R.Q. Quentin-Baxter, International Protection of Human Rights, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 132, 140-41 (K.J. Keith ed., 1968).
95. Although the Commission on Human Rights' "gross violations" resolution of 1967, see supra notes 67, 68, and accompanying text, had also requested the Sub-Commission to give it information on violations of human rights "from all available sources," that language has never been regarded expansively. Resolution 8, supra note 67, at 132. The 1966 Sub-Commission discussion that preceded this had included a draft resolution listing as acceptable sources of violations: governments (apparently reporting on their own rather than on someone else's violations, not all that common an occurrence); the Secretary-General; the Committee of 24; the Special Committee on Apartheid; the Specialized Agencies; regional inter-governmental organizations; NGOs provided in accordance with ECOSOC resolution 1074 C (XXXIX); observation or investigation upon the request of the government whose territory is concerned; "the writings of recognized scholars and scientists, as authorized for human rights studies under Human Rights Commission resolution III (XVIII) and subsequent resolutions." Periodic Reports on Human Rights and Reports on Freedom of Information, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm'n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 19th Sess., Agenda Item 7, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L458 (1966).
96. E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 1A, at 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/4832/ Add.1 (1970) [hereinafter Resolution 1503]. See generally Antonio Cassese, The Admissibility of Communications to the United Nations on Human Rights. Violations, 5 REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME/HUM. RTS. J. 375 (1972).
97. Resolution 1503, supra note 85, at 8.
98. Id.
99. A decade-old in-depth review of the human rights program candidly reported on some quite devastating criticism of the 1503 procedure. See In-Depth Evaluation of the Human Rights Programme: Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 29, at 20-21. The criticism still seems true even if the overall situation is somewhat alleviated by the creation of the office of High Commissioner and the numerous country and theme mechanisms. See generally KOREY, supra note 30.
100. The role for NGOs was not achieved without considerable debate. See Korey, supra note 82, at 26-27.
101. See E.S.C. Res. 1074 C, U.N. ESCOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 25, U.N. Doc. E/4117 (1965).
102. Id. Paragraph 13 provided for the forwarding of material that mentioned particular states to the states concerned. See id.
103. U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Periodic Reports, 1st mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ AC.20/SR.1 (1966).
104. See Periodic Reports on Human Rights and Reports on Freedom of Information, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm'n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 19th Sess., Agenda Item 7, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.458 and Rev.1 (1967).
105. Id. at 4 (deleted in revised version of the report).
106. The public record does not show which governments received criticism, but one was the Soviet Union. See Morris B. Abram, The U.N. and Human Rights, 47 FOREIGN AFF. 363, 371 (1969) (discussing remarks of U.S. delegate).
107. See Report of the Nineteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm'n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 19th Sess., at 82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/274 (1967) adopted by E/CN.4/930 (1967).
108. Id.
109. See E.S.C. Res. 16, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 181-84, U.N. Doc. E/4322 (1967).
110. E.S.C. Res. 1231, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 13, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967).
111. See (ILO) Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 1J 21 (1977), reproduced in part in HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 403, 406 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1987). A leading commentator on the ILO system noted that without NGO participation, the examination would be quite different; indeed one might wonder whether in such a case there would be any discussions at all beyond those on procedural questions of reporting and on the meaning of specific provisions of certain Conventions. The obvious reticence to intervene, usually displayed by governments when the application of standards by other governments is under consideration, reinforces the impression that the whole system largely depends on the active interest of the non-governmental groups. E.A. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE 186 (1966). In the UN system, a further need for NGO participation is simply the relative paucity of information and the lack of sufficient Secretariat resources for proper "staff-work."
112. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION arts. 3, 7, concluded 28 June 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 15 U.N.T.S. 35 (entered into force 10 Jan. 1920).
113. One of the relatively new, and more creative, Committees, the Committee Against Torture, has made specific reference to a role for NGOs in its Rules of Procedure. See Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/43/46 (1988) (Rule 62 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee Against Torture). In respect of the other Committees, the role of the NGOs is based on suffrance and on a pragmatic realization that in the absence of an independent source of information the examination of reports is likely to bear only a limited relationship with reality.
114. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 1, art. 1, ¶ 3.
115. On the more general concept of good offices, see B.C. RAMCHARAN, HUMANITARIAN GOOD OFFICES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (1983).
116. U.N. Press Release of 29 April 1967, Statement Concerning Secretary-General's Meetings on Political Detainees in Greece, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/699 (1967).
117. Assurance Given on Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, 4 May 1967, at 4.
118. Drew Middleton, "Moral Pressure" by Big 4 Asked by Thant on Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, 29 Jan. 1969, at 1.
119. Note the reliance placed on the purposes of the organization as a source of power for the organization in general and the General Assembly in particular in Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (20 July 1962) (advisory opinion), available in (visited 7 Apr. 1999). While often seen as a "maintenance of international peace and security" case, the Congo operation that gave rise to the Expenses case had significant humanitarian and human rights aspects. Perhaps one can see the organization's involvement there as the application of a strategy of activism akin to that which has been mentioned in the human rights examples in the text. The Expenses case itself and the financial crisis of which it was part underscore the danger of disaster for the organization itself if it tries to go further and faster than a substantial part of the membership would like. A current manifestation of the financial problem is the inexcusable failure of numerous states to meet their (very minimal) financial obligations under various treaty regimes.
120. See RAMCHARAN, supra note 104, at 62-70.
121. See generally ROGER STENSON CLARK, A UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1972); R.St.J. Macdonald, The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 5 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 84 (1967); R.St.J. Macdonald, A United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Decline and Fall of an Initiative, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 40 (1972).
122. See generally ROGER STENSON CLARK, A UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1972); R.St.J. Macdonald, The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 5 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 84 (1967); R.St.J. Macdonald, A United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Decline and Fall of an Initiative, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 40 (1972).
123. See generally ROGER STENSON CLARK, A UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1972); R.St.J. Macdonald, The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 5 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 84 (1967); R.St.J. Macdonald, A United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Decline and Fall of an Initiative, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 40 (1972).
124. E.S.C. Res. 1237, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 18-19, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967).
125. Id. at 18.
126. Id.
127. The generally worded power to make reports in the draft resolution, obviously closely related, made some countries nervous also.
128. See supra notes 69-88 and accompanying text.
129. On the absence of hierarchical "power" on the part of a typical ombudsman to change administrative decisions, see WALTER CELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIES 431-32 (1966). Of course, the persuasive powers of the office are very significant.
130. Some supporters of the proposal tried to wish away the Ombudsman analogy by simply denying it. See, e.g., Creation of the Post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Note by the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Annex III, Provisional Agenda Item 53 1 15, U.N. Doc. A/7498 (1969) (remarks of the Representative of Costa Rica); Summary Record of the Five Hundred and Seventy-Fourth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., 574th mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.574 (1967) (remarks of the Representative of U.K.). It was hard to do this without dropping the whole paragraph dealing with communications. Some subsequent efforts to revive the idea in the 1970s and 1980s did just that - gutting the whole proposal, in the view of this author. Professor Humphrey who, along with Kamleshwar Das, was involved in early drafting efforts on the proposal, has argued that the powers to deal with communications and to make reports to the General Assembly were what ultimately made the proposal anathema to the Soviet Union and to some Afro-Asian and Arab countries. "The malady of which the patient died may have been brought about by the excessive zeal of some of its well-wishers." JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 300 (1984).
131. Some supporters of the proposal tried to wish away the Ombudsman analogy by simply denying it. See, e.g., Creation of the Post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Note by the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Annex III, Provisional Agenda Item 53 1 15, U.N. Doc. A/7498 (1969) (remarks of the Representative of Costa Rica); Summary Record of the Five Hundred and Seventy-Fourth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., 574th mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.574 (1967) (remarks of the Representative of U.K.). It was hard to do this without dropping the whole paragraph dealing with communications. Some subsequent efforts to revive the idea in the 1970s and 1980s did just that - gutting the whole proposal, in the view of this author. Professor Humphrey who, along with Kamleshwar Das, was involved in early drafting efforts on the proposal, has argued that the powers to deal with communications and to make reports to the General Assembly were what ultimately made the proposal anathema to the Soviet Union and to some Afro-Asian and Arab countries. "The malady of which the patient died may have been brought about by the excessive zeal of some of its well-wishers." JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 300 (1984).
132. Some supporters of the proposal tried to wish away the Ombudsman analogy by simply denying it. See, e.g., Creation of the Post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Note by the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Annex III, Provisional Agenda Item 53 1 15, U.N. Doc. A/7498 (1969) (remarks of the Representative of Costa Rica); Summary Record of the Five Hundred and Seventy-Fourth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., 574th mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.574 (1967) (remarks of the Representative of U.K.). It was hard to do this without dropping the whole paragraph dealing with communications. Some subsequent efforts to revive the idea in the 1970s and 1980s did just that - gutting the whole proposal, in the view of this author. Professor Humphrey who, along with Kamleshwar Das, was involved in early drafting efforts on the proposal, has argued that the powers to deal with communications and to make reports to the General Assembly were what ultimately made the proposal anathema to the Soviet Union and to some Afro-Asian and Arab countries. "The malady of which the patient died may have been brought about by the excessive zeal of some of its well-wishers." JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 300 (1984).
133. Creation of the Post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, G.A. Res. 3136, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add.1 (1974).
134. See Andrew Clapham, Creating the High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Outside Story, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 556 (1994); Philip Alston, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: The Quest to Define the Role of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 321 (1997).
135. See Andrew Clapham, Creating the High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Outside Story, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 556 (1994); Philip Alston, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: The Quest to Define the Role of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 321 (1997).
136. On the program in general, see HUMPHREY, supra note 117, at 176-77; John P. Humphrey, The United Nations Human Rights Advisory Programme, 86/1 BULL. HUM. RTS. 38 (1986).
137. Methods Used by the United Nations in the Field of Human Rights: Study Prepared by the Secretary General, supra note 66, at 176.
138. Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 25th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 17, at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/995 (1969), also available in U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on the Status of Women, 22d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 11, at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/522 (1969).
139. John P. Humphrey, The United Nations and Human Rights, 11 How. LJ. 373, 377 (1965). Use of advice by experts has continued to be unusual. Some recent critics have suggested that it is sometimes even used as a fig leaf to permit governments to avoid accountability. See, e.g., International League for Human Rights, Human Rights at the United Nations: Using Advisory Services, IN BRIEF, Oct. 1988, at 1.
140. John P. Humphrey, The United Nations and Human Rights, 11 How. LJ. 373, 377 (1965). Use of advice by experts has continued to be unusual. Some recent critics have suggested that it is sometimes even used as a fig leaf to permit governments to avoid accountability. See, e.g., International League for Human Rights, Human Rights at the United Nations: Using Advisory Services, IN BRIEF, Oct. 1988, at 1.
141. See Methods Used by the United Nations in the Field of Human Rights: Study Prepared by the Secretary General, supra note 66, at 180-82; see also Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights: Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 122, at 12, Annex Il (discussing the 47 awards made in 1968). Recipients included "officials with responsibility for the administration of justice and legislative drafting as well as officials of national development boards and ministries of justice, labour, and social affairs." Id. at 12.
142. See Methods Used by the United Nations in the Field of Human Rights: Study Prepared by the Secretary General, supra note 66, at 180-82; see also Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights: Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 122, at 12, Annex Il (discussing the 47 awards made in 1968). Recipients included "officials with responsibility for the administration of justice and legislative drafting as well as officials of national development boards and ministries of justice, labour, and social affairs." Id. at 12.
143. Much of the material in this area belonged as much with the Secretariat's criminal justice arm (known first as the Social Defence Section and later the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch) as with the Division on Human Rights. According to Dr. Das (in a conversation with the author), John Humphrey, as Head of the Division, had resisted taking the Branch formally under his wing. See ROGER S. CLARK, THE UNITED NATION'S CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM: FORMULATION OF STANDARDS AND EFFORTS AT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 13 (1994). He does not seem to have been averse to moving in on some of its turf.
144. HUMPHREY, Supra note 117, at 41.
145. Development of the Work of the United Nations for the Wider Observance of, and Respect for. Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Throughout the World, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 12th Sess., Agenda Item 3(b), at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ 727 (1956).
146. Id.
147. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STUDY OF THE RIGHT OF EVERYONE TO BE FREE FROM ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION AND EXILE, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/826/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 65.XIV.2 (1964).
148. Commission on Human Rights, Study on the Rights of Arrested Persons to Consult With Those Whom it is Necessary for Them to Consult in Order to Protect Their Essential Interests, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/996 (1969). The writer had some personal experience with the usefulness of this particular Report. A client in the hands of the New Zealand Police was denied access to his lawyer. In his comments to the police following a complaint, the Ombudsman drew attention to the UN Report as a standard.
149. UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 16.
150. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTISES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 60.XIV.2 (1960).
151. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF THE RIGHT OF EVERYONE TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING His OWN, AND TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/220/Rev.1 & Corr.1-3, U.N. Sales No. 64.XIV.2 (1960).
152. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/265/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 68.XIV.3 (1967).
153. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, STUDY OF EQUALITY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/296/Rev.1, Sales No. E.71.XIV.3 (1970).
154. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, SPECIAL STUDY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SPHERES, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/Sub.2/307/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.71.XIV.2 (1970). In addition to the Commission and Sub-Commission studies, there have been various studies by ad hoc Committees or Special Rapporteurs, especially on slavery and freedom of information. See, e.g., Methods Used by the United Nations in the Field of Human Rights: Study Prepared by the Secretary General, supra note 66, at 169-70.
155. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, SPECIAL STUDY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SPHERES, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/Sub.2/307/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.71.XIV.2 (1970). In addition to the Commission and Sub-Commission studies, there have been various studies by ad hoc Committees or Special Rapporteurs, especially on slavery and freedom of information. See, e.g., Methods Used by the United Nations in the Field of Human Rights: Study Prepared by the Secretary General, supra note 66, at 169-70.
156. The most substantial contribution of the United Nations to the Vietnam conflict was a fact-finding mission on the Diem regime's treatment of the Buddhists, which occurred before the significant escalation of the conflict. See Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission to South Viet-Nam, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Annex, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/ 5630 (1963). The exercise was aborted with the overthrow of the Diem regime while the Mission was in Saigon. It remains interesting as an early example of human rights fact-finding, a concept that received some more exposure later in the decade. See generally Clark, supra note 26. On Biafra and the United Nations, see J.W. Samuels, Humanitarian Relief in Man-Made Disasters: International Law, Government Policy and the Nigerian Experience, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 35-37 (1972). The Biafra and later Bangladesh struggles suggest that, in situations where the mainstream human rights organs are not able to act, it may be possible for the more operational humanitarian organs such as the High Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEF to do some good.
157. The most substantial contribution of the United Nations to the Vietnam conflict was a fact-finding mission on the Diem regime's treatment of the Buddhists, which occurred before the significant escalation of the conflict. See Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission to South Viet-Nam, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Annex, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/ 5630 (1963). The exercise was aborted with the overthrow of the Diem regime while the Mission was in Saigon. It remains interesting as an early example of human rights fact-finding, a concept that received some more exposure later in the decade. See generally Clark, supra note 26. On Biafra and the United Nations, see J.W. Samuels, Humanitarian Relief in Man-Made Disasters: International Law, Government Policy and the Nigerian Experience, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 35-37 (1972). The Biafra and later Bangladesh struggles suggest that, in situations where the mainstream human rights organs are not able to act, it may be possible for the more operational humanitarian organs such as the High Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEF to do some good.
158. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted B June 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 1125 U.N.T.S. 512 (entered into force 7 Dec. 1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 1125 U.N.T.S. 513 (entered into force 7 Dec. 1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
159. The 1967 demarche followed on from Protection of Civilian Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare, Resolution XXVIII, International Committee of the Red Cross, 20th International Conference (Vienna 1965), reprinted in THE LAVVS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 259 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman eds., 1988).
160. Note of 19 May 1967 to Governments, annexed to letter of 25 May 1967 addressed to the Central Committees of the Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Lion Societies, referred to in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 400 (Y. Sandoz et al. eds., 1986) (reference supplied by the International Committee of the Red Cross, original seen by author in Dr. Das' files c.1969).
161. Final Act of the Teheran Conference, supra note 21, at 18 (Resolution XXIII, entitled "Human rights in armed conflicts"). The Conference also adopted two related resolutions. Resolution I was on respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories (notably those occupied by Israel) which called for application of the standards of the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Id. at 5. Resolution IV dealt with treatment of persons who oppose racist regimes. Id. at 7. It condemned the acts of racist minority regimes in South Africa, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and in other parts of southern Africa, and called, inter alia, for the regimes to treat those opposing them in conformity with standards for prisoners of war. See id. The resolutions all anticipated themes that would be of considerable significance during the drafting of the 1977 Protocols.
162. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969).
163. Id. at 51.
164. Id.
165. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Agenda Item 61, U.N. Doc. A/7720 (1969); Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, 25th Sess., Agenda Item 47, U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970); Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, 26th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 52(a), U.N. Doc. A/8370 (1971).
166. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Agenda Item 61, U.N. Doc. A/7720 (1969); Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, 25th Sess., Agenda Item 47, U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970); Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, 26th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 52(a), U.N. Doc. A/8370 (1971).
167. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Agenda Item 61, U.N. Doc. A/7720 (1969); Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, 25th Sess., Agenda Item 47, U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970); Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, 26th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 52(a), U.N. Doc. A/8370 (1971).
168. See generally MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 619 (1982) (providing a good introduction to the interpretation of the Protocols and to the whole process of drafting them).