Entity Realism Meets the Pessimistic Meta-Induction Argument The World is not Enough

SATS

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 106-126

  Busch, Jacob ^a  

^a NONE

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Indexed keywords

EID: 82455174672     PISSN: 16001974     EISSN: 18697577     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/SATS.2006.106     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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7. Laudan L (1981), ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’, Philosophy of Sci­ence 48, pp. 19-49.
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