Propositions and attitude ascriptions: A fregean account

Nous

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 595-639

  Chalmers, David J ^a,b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 81855182200     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00788.x     Document Type: Article

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