Founder management and the market for corporate control for IPO firms: The moderating effect of the power structure of the firm

Journal of Business Venturing

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 112-126

  Gao, Ning ^a   Jain, Bharat A ^b  

^a IONA COLLEGE   (United States)

^b TOWSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquisition premiums; Agency theory; Founder CEOs; IPOs; Market for corporate control; Stewardship theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 81555218476     PISSN: 08839026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2010.06.001     Document Type: Article

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