Parameterized supply function bidding: Equilibrium and efficiency

Operations Research

Volumn 59, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1079-1089

  Johari, Ramesh ^a   Tsitsiklis, John N ^b  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b USA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGGREGATE COSTS; ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY; ASYMMETRIC COSTS; EFFICIENCY LOSS; FINITE NUMBER; INFINITELY DIVISIBLE; MARKET DESIGN; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; OPTIMAL LEVEL; PARAMETERIZED; PRODUCTION COST; REVENUE MANAGEMENT; STRATEGY SPACE; SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION; SUPPLY FUNCTION; SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIUM; UNIFORM PRICE; UPPER BOUND;

COMMERCE; ECONOMICS; EFFICIENCY; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRY; PROFITABILITY;

COSTS;

EID: 81455141801     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1110.0980     Document Type: Article

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