Behavioral convergence properties of Cournot and Bertrand markets: An experimental analysis

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 80, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 443-458

  Davis, Douglas ^a  

^a VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bertrand and Cournot markets; Experiments; Strategic substitutes and strategic complements

Indexed keywords

EID: 81255141690     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.04.008     Document Type: Article

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