The Impact of Institutional Path Dependence on Water Market Efficiency in Victoria, Australia

Water Resources Management

Volumn 25, Issue 15, 2011, Pages 4069-4080

  Harris, Edwyna ^a  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Government; Institutional change; Markets; Path dependence; Water allocation; Water pricing

Indexed keywords

GOVERNMENT; INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE; MARKETS; PATH DEPENDENCE; WATER ALLOCATION; WATER PRICING;

IRRIGATION; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS; WATER MANAGEMENT; WATER SUPPLY;

COMMERCE;

COMMODITY PRICE; GOVERNMENT; IRRIGATION; PRICING POLICY; TRADE; WATER ECONOMICS;

AUSTRALIA; VICTORIA [AUSTRALIA];

EID: 81255136822     PISSN: 09204741     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11269-011-9884-0     Document Type: Article

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