Debt reorganization strategies with complete verification under information asymmetry

International Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 141-160

  Shibata, Takashi ^a   Tian, Yuan ^b  

^a TOKYO METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b RYUKOKU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Agency problem; Formal and private debt reorganization; Randomized strategies; Real options

Indexed keywords

EID: 80855132432     PISSN: 10590560     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2011.09.007     Document Type: Article

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