Natural obligation and normative motivation in hume's treatise

Hume Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 231-253

  Magri, Tito ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BARI   (Italy)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 80054162264     PISSN: 03197336     EISSN: 19479921     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Citations to David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), cited as T; Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), cited as EHU and EPM.
2. For a discussion of this see David Fate Norton, "Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality," The Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by David Fate Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 168-17 1.
3. For a recent discussion see Francis Snare, Morals, Motivation and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
4. Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)
5. Robert Sugden, The Economic Theory of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986)
6. Eugenio Lecaldano, Hume e Ia nascita dell'etica contemporanea (Ban: Laterza, 1991).
7. This is also the scope of the excellent discussion of Hume in Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
8. Charlotte Brown, "From Spectator to Agent: Hume's Theory of Obligation," Hume Studies 20.1 (1994): 30-31.
9. Terence Peneihum, "Hume's Moral Psychology," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by D. Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 135.
10. Kenneth O'Day, "Hume's Distinction between the Natural and Artificial Virtues," Hume Studies 20.1 (1994): 121-141.
11. Thomas Hearn, "General Rules in Hume's Treatise," Journal of the History of Philosophy 8(1970): 411, for the notion of "corrective, reflective and directive" rules, which bears some resemblance to constitutive rules
12. Walter Brand, Hume's Theory of Moral Judgement (Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer, 1992), 38-42, for a related distinction between rules of imagination and rules of understanding.
13. Nicholas Rowe, Rules and Institutions (New York/London: Allan, 1988)
14. George Ainslie, Picoeconom ics: The Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational States within the Person (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
15. Robert Nozick, The Nature ofRationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
16. Pall Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume'c Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 166-168, discusses this point with some uneasiness. See other discussions in Harrison, 4; Norton, 170.
17. Some of the problems I treat here are discussed in Annette Baler, "Natural Virtues, Natural Vices," Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1990): 24-34, although in a different perspective.
18. Thomas Hearn, "General Rules and the Moral Sentiments in Hume's Treatise," Review of Metaphysics 30 (1976): 61-62.
19. Elizabeth Radcliffe, "Hume on Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the Inculcation of 'Morality'," Hume Studies 20.1 (1994): 37-58.
20. John Mackie, Home's Moral Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 122-123
21. Annette Baler, "Master Passions," in Explaining Emotions, edited by A. 0. Rorty (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 403-423
22. Annette Baler, A Progress of Sentiments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 177-181.
23. Marie Martin, "The Rational Warrant for Hume's General Rules," Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993): 254.
24. Jean Hampton, "Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason?" Hume Studies 21.1 (1995)
25. G. Ainslie's Picoeconomics: The Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational States Within the Person (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) offers an excellent, principled discussion of temporal sensitivity of preferences as the basis for irrational behavior
26. Alfred Mele, Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 84-93, drawing on earlier work by Ainslie, for an account in these terms of akratic behavior. A related problem of rationality is discussed as the "toxin puzzle" in Gregory Kavka, "The Toxin Puzzle," Analysis (1983).
27. Tito Magri, "The Evolution of Rationality in Hume's Treatise," The Philosophical Forum 25 (1994).